TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Call for a 2003 Time Frame)

The number of CTBT signatories increased from 155 to 165, and the number of ratifiers from 61 to 89 during the period from May 20, 2000 to February 16, 2002, or the “relevant period” of this report. Although it is welcome that the number of the State parties is steadily increasing, there has been a lack of progress during this period in the fact that thirteen of the forty-four states required for the entry into force (EIF) of the CTBT have not ratified it yet. In this regard, we have to say that there has been no concrete progress towards an early EIF.

Of the thirteen states, three – India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) – have not signed it. The remaining ten – Algeria, China, Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Vietnam – have signed but not ratified it.

The Japanese government has long made the early EIF of the CTBT a core diplomatic priority . In particular, it proposed to set a time frame for the EIF in its UNGA resolution in 2000, entitled “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”  (A/55/33R, November 20, 2000. We will call it the ‘A Path’ Resolution.). It was jointly submitted by Japan and Australia and gained overwhelming support. It stressed the importance of “the early signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by all States, especially by the States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, with a view to its early entry into force before 2003.” Several of the non-ratifying thirteen states voted in favor of the resolution: Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia, Iran, the US, and Vietnam. In other words, at that time, these six states had the intention, at the administrative level, to ratify the treaty before 2003.

Therefore, although the change of the policy by the new US administration posed greater difficulties, the Government of Japan (GOJ) was requested, at least in 2001, to maintain this positive policy and incorporate it into the text of the 2001 UNGA ‘A Path’ Resolution and appeal Japan’s aspirations to the international community at the Second CTBT EIF Conference.

TASK 2 and 3 (Call on the US)

The failure of the United States to ratify the CTBT is a particularly serious impediment to the EIF of the Treaty. For the three current non-signatories, in particular, the fact that the world’s largest nuclear power refuses to ratify it can be a major rationale for rejecting the credibility of the Treaty. While the US Senate’s rejection of the CTBT ratification in October 1999 had cast a dark shadow on its early EIF, the situation worsened during the relevant period of this report. The Bush Administration, which came to power in January 2001, suggested a policy to let the CTBT fade away (Ari Fleischer, Spokesman for the White House, and Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the Department of State, July 9, 2001). However, it was also to be noted that more than half of the U.S. Senate, though an insufficient number for the two-thirds requirement for ratification, supported the CTBT at that time, according to a survey conducted by a US NGO.

Under such circumstances, the true value of the Japan’s diplomacy towards the US faced a test, as a close US ally and a strong advocate of the CTBT. Nuclear disarmament should always be given great importance in the Japanese government’s vision of global security, in so far as the Japanese representatives to the UN have repeatedly emphasized that “Japan is the only country that has suffered from nuclear devastation” in their speeches. Therefore, the Japanese government should not act differently as the US Administration changes, but should act on its own initiative, based on the recognition that the CTBT is an issue at the heart of the US-Japan security relationship. In addition, this stance should be clearly visible to the public of Japan.

TASK 4 (Call on states other than the US)

While it is essential to logically criticize the US nuclear weapon policy per se in order to call for a US policy change on the CTBT, it is necessary, at the same time, to contain the US government using international public opinion. One such approach would be to advance the universality of the CTBT, by making the number of State parties increase. Pushing for ratification by the twelve states required for the EIF other than the US is particularly important. Since each of the twelve is under different conditions regarding CTBT ratification, the specific measures to overcome the difficulties will be different. In addition, their diplomatic relationships with Japan are different. Therefore, systematic efforts for each state should be pursued with assistance from a team of experts and NGOs.

TASK 5 (Cooperation with CTBTO)

One of the important tasks is to prepare to ensure that the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), including the international verification system, can function as soon as the treaty enters into force. The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO has been working since its foundation on November 19, 1996. If the US continues to refuse to ratify the CTBT, it might underfund the PrepCom. That is why Japan is urged to work actively for the maintenance of the PrepCom, not to mention to offer technical cooperation with it.

EVALUATION

As for TASK 1, there was a setback in Japan’s policy during the relevant period of this report.
               Japanese citizens welcomed the progress in the GOJ’s nuclear disarmament policy from the paradigm of “ultimate elimination” to the paradigm of “unequivocal undertaking,” when the Japanese ‘A Path’ Resolution demonstrated some positive initiatives at the 2000 UNGA, including the 2003 time frame for the CTBT EIF. However, at a consultation meeting between Japanese citizen groups and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in a Diet Office Building, Tokyo on August 10, 2001, citizens discovered that the MOFA already had the intention to weaken the text of the 2001 UNGA draft resolution in order to get a ‘yes’ vote, or an abstention at worst, from the Bush administration. Astonished at this finding, many citizens requested that the MOFA maintain the 2003 time frame call. The mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki jointly submitted a request to the Prime Minister on September 6. Some municipalities adopted similar resolutions in their assemblies.

Despite of all of these efforts, the text of the 2001 ‘A Path’ Resolution draft submitted to the First Committee (A/C.1/56/L.35) demonstrated surprising setbacks. In order to obtain US support, it dropped even the call for “the early EIF,” not to mention “the 2003 time frame.” This development clearly demonstrated that Japan’s diplomacy on CTBT was pursued neither by deriving strength from the support of national public opinion, wishes from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor international public opinion, but was pursued solely through bargaining with the US behind closed doors, with the aim of obtaining the US support.

In this development, we should not overlook the fact that when Prime Minister Junichiro KOIZUMI himself referred to the 2000 UNGA ‘A Path’ Resolution and emphasized to the international community that he was committed to striving for the early EIF of the CTBT, as he spoke at the Peace Memorial Ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 2001, respectively, the MOFA bureaucrats were already about to draw back from the very resolution. This bears a relationship to the fundamental characteristics of Japanese diplomacy, which is often labeled “diplomacy in the absence of citizens” or “diplomacy in the absence of politicians.” It should be seriously questioned.

Fortunately, the GOJ revised the first draft and revived the phrase calling for “the early EIF” (A/C.1/56/L.35/Rev.1). Later, an MOFA official in charge of the process told Peace Depot that they were not surprised at the US vote against the Japan’s resolution even after the revision, because they knew it would happen beforehand through advance negotiations. It can be rightly inferred that the MOFA revised the too notorious first draft and restored the early EIF call because they knew the US would vote ‘against’ it anyway. But the MOFA did not revive the time frame call, probably because it wished to attain support from other nuclear weapon States. In fact, France and the UK voted in favor of the revised resolution.

It is understandable that they thought the 2003 time frame had become less realistic after the developments in the past year in international politics. However, even a year earlier, the possibility of achieving the EIF of the CTBT before 2003 was quite bleak, considering the policies of India, Pakistan and the DPRK. Nevertheless it was important that Japan had proposed such resolution because it was effective in exerting international pressure on the non-ratifiers.

In addition, considering that Japan had just moved to a new stage of disarmament diplomacy by submitting the ‘A Path’ Resolution in 2000 and that the symbolic core of the resolution was the proposal of a time frame for the EIF of the CTBT, the CTBT EIF was a key issue in judging the sincerity or lack thereof of Japan’s nuclear disarmament diplomacy. As a result, Japan has committed a serious failure in this task.

The above also relates to TASKS 2 and 3. The Japanese government’s attitude towards the US, which rejects the CTBT, has not been strict enough. The US clearly denounced the CTBT in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), partly released on January 9, 2002. On this occasion, the GOJ should have responded quickly, protesting this policy.

It is true that Japan’s position on the CTBT has been repeatedly explained to the US on various occasions, including the Powell-Tanaka meeting on January 20, 2002, but we cannot help but seriously question the GOJ’s attitude toward the US. This is because it represents the inconsistency of the GOJ‘s claim on the importance of the credibility of the US-Japan security relationship. When the GOJ decided to start joint research on the TMD with the US, it claimed that the joint research would improve trust in the US-Japan Security Arrangement (Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, December 25, 1998) If this is so, the GOJ should have clearly criticized the US CTBT policy, pointing out that the it would “undermine the trust of the US-Japan Security Arrangement.” The reason is as follows.

The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (April 17, 1996) clearly states that “both governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the CTBT negotiations.” Furthermore, the US-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Verification, one of whose immediate priorities is “bringing about the early EIF of the CTBT,” was established on March 8, 2000. Both governments held uplifting press conference, saying, “today is a historic occasion,” in the joint press statement to announce the establishment of the Commission. Considering this recent history, Japan could and should have raised a strong objection to the US policy change on the CTBT.

In relation to TASK 3, Japan referred to the US only in a roundabout way at the 2nd CTBT EIF Conference in November 2001. Despite the diplomatic tradition not to identify states by name, even the EU criticized the US explicitly by name, saying, “we can only regret” and “this is all the more worrying,” and appealed to the Government of the US, urging it to review its position. Sweden “deeply regret[ed] the US was the only country that did not vote in favor of the procedural decision on the CTBT in the UNGA First Committee, and stated it [did] not support the Treaty.” However, as for Japan, the only phrase referring the US position was the following in a speech given by Ambassador Nobuyasu ABE: “Unfortunately, there is no prospect at the moment for the early EIF of the CTBT, due in part to the hesitation of some of the major States to ratify it.” (November 12, 2001) The Final Declaration of the 2^nd CTBT EIF Conference “call[ed] upon the remaining two [nuclear weapon States (that is, the US and China)] to accelerate their ratification processes,” but failed to refer to the fact that the US openly expressed that it did not support the Treaty.

Generally speaking, Japan has gained fairly high appreciation from the diplomatic community, including concerned NGOs, with respect to its active involvement in the CTBT EIF Conference. However, from the viewpoint of Japanese citizens who have witnessed the recent series of actions taken by the GOJ regarding the CTBT, Japan’s nuclear disarmament policy would be regarded as a mere superficial performance played within the framework allowed by the US. We urge the GOJ to reflect seriously its conduct.

As for TASK 4, it is to be appreciated that the GOJ has been carrying out diplomatic efforts to promote CTBT ratification. Prior to the CTBT EIF Conference in August 2001, Japan's Foreign Minister Ms Makiko TANAKA sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of all states but North Korea whose ratification is required for the CTBT EIF, but that had not yet signed or ratified it. In addition, the MOFA explains that they have repeatedly made use of various opportunities to influence states to promote the CTBT EIF.

However, according to a response given by the GOJ to a question submitted by House of Councilors Member Atsuo NAKAURA in 2001, there seems to be neither a plan nor a system in Japan’s diplomatic efforts to promote CTBT ratification. It is recommended that the GOJ plan and implement more advanced efforts such as we suggested in TASK 4.

One significant example of relevant events is the decision made by the GOJ to ‘quit’ the economic sanctions on India and Pakistan (October 26, 2001). These measures were taken in protest toward the two states for conducting nuclear tests. But Japan followed the US in “lifting the sanctions” in order to encourage Pakistan to cooperate with the US in its military operations in Afghanistan, in response to the events of September 11, 2001 and to prevent regional instability in South Asia. However, neither India nor Pakistan has committed itself to a continued moratorium on nuclear testing. Both are openly pursuing the development of missiles as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Japan should have gained their commitment to stopping nuclear testing as a premise for lifting economic sanction, so that Japan could be consistent in its CTBT policy. India turned out to be one of the two states that voted against the Japanese resolution in the UNGA First Committee on November 5, 2001, soon after the sanctions were lifted.

In terms of TASK 5, Japan has repeatedly expressed its willingness to cooperate with the verification regime and to give assistance to the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). It should be noted that Japan is willing to be actively involved in this process.

In summary, while recognizing that the GOJ has devoted much energy to implement this step, the negative aspects of its record are quite serious. Thus we give it a D grade on this item for the relevant period.