TASK
SETTING
TASK 1 (Clarification of position and active efforts)
At the decision on the indefinite extension of the NPT in
1995, four states -- the US, Russia, the UK and France -- declared
that they would neither use nor threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the non-nuclear weapon States that are parties to the NPT,
unless attacked by such a state that is
allied with a state possessing nuclear weapons. China declared
that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any
circumstance. The UNSC resolution 984 on the security of
non-nuclear-weapon States, of April 11, 1995, reaffirmed the
contents of those declarations. Assuring security, in this way, by
pledging not to use nuclear weapons is called the Negative
Security Assurances (NSA), but it is not yet legally binding.
However, unless the nuclear weapon States assure the
security of non-nuclear-weapon States that make legal pledges not
to acquire nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapon States would suffer
an great disadvantage by acceding to the NPT. In other words, NSA
is an important requirement, and can be said to be a foundation of
the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
With regard to negotiations to make the NSA legally binding
thus far, an Ad Hoc Committee on security assurances was
established in the CD in 1998, but it not been reestablished since
then. The aforementioned Amorim proposal (August 24, 2001)
suggests the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate on
NSA, with a vague expression that the “arrangements (agreed by
the Committee) could take the form of an internationally legally
binding instrument.” Some objections have also been expressed
about the appropriateness of the CD as the body to negotiate on
the NSA.
The Japanese government has not been active towards legally
binding NSA. The working paper submitted by the Japanese
government to the 2000 NPT Review Conference did not include this
item. The 2000 UNGA Path Resolution did not call for it either. In
order to take advantage of the 2000 NPT agreement, the Japanese
government should make its position clear and make positive
efforts toward the coming Review PrepCom.
TASK 2 (Abandon the idea of nuclear deterrence against BCW)
The Japanese government has suggested that its position is
that it needs to maintain the option that the US will use nuclear
weapons against potential BCW attacks by the DPRK. This position,
which overrides the statement on nuclear deterrence in the
National Defense Program Outline, that “against the threat of
nuclear weapons, (Japan) relies on the US nuclear deterrent,”
expands the concept of nuclear deterrence to respond to
non-nuclear threats. It is not only a violation of the National
Defense Program Outline, but also an expansion that violates the
provision of “the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in
security policy” in item 9e of the 2000 NPT agreements.
Even if the alleged BCWs or ballistic missiles of the DPRK
pose threats to Japan, they should be dealt with in the framework
of arms control of BCW and missile negotiations or in the process
of negotiations toward a NWFZ in Northeast Asia.
EVALUATION
As for TASK
1, the Japanese Path Resolution in
the UNGA did not address legally binding NSA. On the other hand,
the GOJ voted in support of the resolution for legally binding NSA
proposed by Pakistan and others. The attitude of the Japanese
government can be characterized as not opposing but not being
positive on this task. This is one of the important differences
between Japan and the New Agenda countries. We strongly recommend
that the GOJ improve its policy on this.
With regard to TASK
2, although the Japanese government
has not officially expressed a position in support, it has neither
clearly confirmed its opposition to the “non-use of nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear threats.” This continued ambiguity
should not be allowed for the country devastated by nuclear
weapons. This task has much to do with item 9e, and Japan is urged
to make a fundamental change in its security policy.
As a whole, we give it a D grade.
