Japan Update

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 and 2 (Call on states)

Generally speaking, signatories to the CTBT are not allowed to take actions contrary to the aims of the treaty even before its EIF (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Since the five nuclear-weapon States and Israel have signed the treaty, one may argue that brakes on testing are in place to some extent. However, there is another argument that as long as signatories can withdraw from the CTBT according to its provisions, signatories may resort to testing if the situation changes before the EIF. Therefore, there is no ground for optimism with regard to the continuation of the moratorium.

The Bush administration, which expressed a policy of letting the CTBT die, had nevertheless stated during its election campaign that it would continue the moratorium. However, there were arguments in the US that the manufacture of mini nukes (with yields of less than one kiloton) would require nuclear explosion tests. Moreover, it was reported that the US Department of Energy requested a budget to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear tests once the decision to do so was made.

In addition, the media reported that Russia might reconsider all the existing arms control treaties if the US went ahead with its missile defense program. Similarly, it was considered that China had growing incentives to resume nuclear tests, as it would think it necessary to strengthen its arsenal. India and Pakistan have said that they will keep the moratorium in place, but if China conducts tests, India, and then Pakistan, might follow.

Therefore, the GOJ should constantly reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear tests with a sense of urgency, at such forums as the UNGA and 2^nd CTBT EIF Conference. At the same time, Japan should pursue other measures to promote the continuation of the test moratorium.

TASK 3 (Critical Position toward the NIF)

The planned nuclear tests at the US National Ignition Facility (NIF), which is currently under construction, might involve very small but sustained nuclear fusion reactions, and it is likely that they might violate the provisions of the CTBT. Clearly, they would be in contravention of the spirit of the CTBT. These tests are useful for research on nuclear weapons in secondary explosions, in which nuclear fusion plays a central role. If this is permitted, China, which does not have facilities such as the NIF, will claim the right to conduct nuclear explosion tests. The NIF may not directly violate the moratorium on nuclear tests, but it enhances risks that endanger the stability of the moratorium.

Against this backdrop, it was revealed that the US subsidiary of HOYA, a Japanese glass manufacturer, was producing major parts for the NIF. The mayors of Hiroshima (February 2001) and Nagasaki (April 2001) protested this. There were also several discussions in the Diet from May to June 2001. If the GOJ wants to attain the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons, it should be more sensitive to this kind of matter.

EVALUATION

The GOJ, though moving backward on its policy on the CTBT, has maintained a consistent argument for the moratorium on nuclear tests thus far.

As for TASK 1, the government included a call for the continuation of the moratorium into the text of the UNGA ‘A Path’ Resolution from its first draft. Also, Ambassador ABE strongly called for the continuation of the moratorium at the 2^nd CTBT EIF Conference, the Final Declaration of which included that call. We naturally appreciate such efforts. Fortunately, the recent US Nuclear Posture Review (January 9, 2002) also reaffirmed the continuation of the moratorium.

However, the situation surrounding the moratorium gives no grounds for optimism, for in the NPR the US made clear that it would reduce the preparation time necessary to resume nuclear tests substantially in the coming several years. In spite of the fact that the GOJ has been called upon to take measures to respond to the new situation with a sense of urgency, one cannot find any such sense of urgency in its attitude .

In addition, it is probable that most Japanese citizens feel that “Japan’s call for a moratorium at present is nothing but another example of the GOJ always following the US policy.” It should acknowledge the lack of citizens’ trust as serious.

As for TASK 2, it was reported that the Japanese government was given promises by India and Pakistan that they would continue the moratorium on nuclear tests when it decided to lift the economic sanctions on them in October 2001. Later, the Japan-India Joint Declaration issued when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Tokyo (December 10, 2001) included the phrase “to continue the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing” by India. Moreover, a remark made by President Musharraf that. “Pakistan will not become the first country to resume nuclear testing” (November 26, 2001) is on the record of then Foreign Minister TANAKA’s report on her Pakistan visit. It can be said that the setback of the situation with respect to the moratorium by the two states has been checked so far.

As for TASK 3, the Japanese government has repeatedly explained that it has no authority to control the involvement of foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms in the NIF. It has not expressed concern over the NIF, nor has it made its position clear on the cooperation of Japanese private companies, including HOYA, with the NIF. We regard the GOJ’s efforts on this task as insufficient.

As a whole, the lack of sense of urgency on the side of the GOJ following the US announcement on the NPR is serious, and we give it a D grade on this item.