TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Call for 2005 time frame)

               The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has continued since the adoption of the 2000 NPT Final Document, and no agreement has been reached on a program of work for a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

               In the background of this impasse are two theories of linkages. The first involves links between nuclear disarmament talks and the FMCT, over the question of whether the two should take place in parallel at the CD. The argument of countries such as India and Pakistan is that without a clear nuclear disarmament program by the nuclear-weapon States, who already have fissile materials, it is impossible to go forward on a ban on production alone. In opposition to this, the nuclear-weapon States have protested vigorously against the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament.

                Secondly, there is a dispute over the link between the prevention of arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the FMCT. On this issue, there is a sharp conflict between China, which emphasizes the urgency of PAROS, and the US, which is trying to avoid any debate being centered on missile defense.

The Japanese government considers the FMCT to be on par with the CTBT in terms of importance, and has pushed for its negotiation. At the UNGA in the autumn of 2000, Japan submitted a draft resolution calling for the FMCT, with the text of “conclusion as early as possible before 2005,” and attained overwhelming support. The Japanese government should strictly keep this position.

TASKS 2 and 3 (Normalization of the CD and outside work)

               In order to obtain results within the deadline, it will be important to find the necessary conditions for normalizing the CD. There is also agreement for the CD to establish “a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament” as will be mentioned in the next item. The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the negative security assurances (NSA) has also been proposed: During the 1998 session, an NSA Ad Hoc committee was once established. All four Ad Hoc committees are to deal with important issues, and it would be appropriate to establish them loosely in parallel, with the premise that the agenda will not be fixed at their first stages, but will be developed gradually. Japan should make independent diplomatic efforts based on such a position.

                At the same time, it is necessary to make technical preparations, outside the framework of the CD, to contribute to effective negotiations in the normalized CD. In particular, the formulation of an inventory of all fissile materials possessed by states, regardless of whether they are for military or commercial use, will be useful as the basis for FMCT negotiations. It would be appropriate to add these categories to the database of weapons of mass destruction held by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs.

EVALUATION

                As for TASK 1, Japan submitted, at the 2001 session of the UNGA, a draft resolution with more concrete objectives than those in the 2000 resolution, and attained overwhelming support. It called for “the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD as early as possible during its 2002 session to negotiate [a FMCT] with a view to the conclusion within five years.”

                 It is inevitable that Japan’s maintenance of a positive FMCT policy consistent with the US policy will cloud our evaluation, considering that it made an unjust change in its CTBT policy to win US favor. However, we should appreciate the continuation of its positive attitude from the viewpoint that it contributes to activating the multilateral processes of nuclear disarmament, which are stalled as a whole.

                  In 2002, the US showed a positive attitude towards the CD, stating that criticizing the US as unilateralist was inappropriate and that it was committed to multilateral regimes. In this regard, the US stated that the FMCT negotiations should be the first step in moving the CD forward (January 24, 2002, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State). However, most of the states will remain skeptical and cautious when the President Bush keeps promoting tensions through various occasions including his State of the Union Address condemning the “axis of evil” (January 29, 2002).

                   Therefore, in relation to TASK 2, it is particularly necessary for the Japanese government to present sufficient independence, and not to just follow the US, in its diplomacy at the CD. Unfortunately, no such impressive initiatives have been presented by the Japanese government at the CD. However, the speech by the Ambassador on Disarmament Seiichiro NOBORU at the first session of the 2002 CD, calling for overcoming the deadlock at the CD and calling strongly for support for the Amorim proposal (August 2000, CD/1624, named after the Brazilian ambassador) that includes the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for the FMCT negotiations, was notable in its sincerity and motivation. This should be fairly appreciated.

                    Some measures were made regarding the experts panel on the FMCT outside the CD. Actually, Japan and Australia co-sponsored a FMCT workshop in Geneva on May 14-15, 2001, in which officials and experts from about one hundred states participated. Views were exchanged on obligations, verification and organization of the treaty to be negotiated. There were several unofficial responses to the workshop finding that it lacked a sense of purpose and leadership or that it was not open enough. We should keep watching how these lessons will be reflected in the next step.

                      As to TASK 3, there is no information to show any concrete steps made by the Japanese government on this.

                      As a whole, we welcome the continued work of the Japanese government on this item, and give it a B grade.