Grade: E

TASK SETTING 

TASK 1 (Call for irreversibility in START)

              With regard to irreversibility, the primary concerns have been with the quantitative reduction and management of nuclear warheads and weapon-usable fissile materials. At the 1997 Helsinki US-Russia Summit, there were discussions on making the irreversibility of cuts in nuclear weapons part of the agenda at the START III talks. Taking advantage of this, the Japanese government should have repeatedly called their attention to this point and made efforts to further develop the principle.

TASK 2 (Call on the US)

              What is remarkable about the latest NPT agreement is that it does not limit its focus to quantitative reductions. It should be recognized as an agreement that does not allow any stepping back from or abandoning of existing measures on arms control and disarmament regarding nuclear weapons, including the moratorium on nuclear explosion tests and the UN Security Council resolution on  security assurances (April 11, 1995), as well as other political declarations and resolutions.

              The Bush administration has indicated that it would abrogate the ABM Treaty in pursuing missile defense; neglected to work to bring the START II into force; and indicated a policy not to support the CTBT. This attitude might affect many other states or issues to move backwards. Therefore, there was certainly a need for Japan, as a country in a close relation with the US and, moreover, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, to strongly urge the US to observe the principle of irreversibility.

TASK 3 (Termination of TMD research cooperation)

              The US-Japan cooperative research on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) puts irreversibility in danger in two senses. First, even if it is only research, the US-Japanese intention to develop TMD has the potential to heighten tensions in East Asia, and trigger an arms race. Thus, the cooperative research could become the cause for a reversal in Chinese nuclear policy, including a change of its no-first-use/negative security assurances policy. Second, there had been no agreement between the US and Russia on whether the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NWTD) system, the subject of the US-Japan research cooperation, violates the ABM Treaty or not. Still more, since missile defense under the Bush administration has been an integrated initiative of TMD and NMD (National Missile Defense), there is a strong likelihood that the overall scheme violates the ABM Treaty. This is why the Bush administration had been suggesting that it would choose unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US-Japan cooperative research on TMD technologies not only paves the way for the collapse of the ABM Treaty regime, but could also lead to setbacks in Russia’s nuclear weapon policies.

              If it is upgraded to the development stage, as suggested in the recent US-Japan consultation on defense (February 8, 2002), it would become the biggest obstacle to promoting the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.

TASK 4 (Prevention of redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on board ships)

              In 1991, President Bush and Secretary General Gorbachev agreed to eliminate and withdraw tactical nuclear weapons as “a coordinated unilateral action.” It is especially important to assure the irreversibility of these measures. Japan, through these measures, has gained the direct benefit of liberation from the suspicion of introduction by the U.S. of nuclear weapons using ships and aircraft, at least in peacetime. It would be appropriate to legislate the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as a method to guarantee the irreversibility of these measures in a host nation of ships and aircraft.

TASK 5 (Independent examination on the SSMP)

              In addition, the US Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP), whose purpose is explained as to maintain the existing stockpile, has been criticized by experts, based on scientific data, as going beyond the objectives of ensuring safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons. It goes against irreversibility to develop new nuclear weapons. Similar criticisms have been directed at the NIF.

              However, the Japanese government turns its eyes away from any analysis other than the US official explanation of the SSMP. This is connected to the Japanese government’s attitude of not seriously examining HOYA’s cooperation with the NIF. It is urged to make an independent examination, not just following US statements.

EVALUATION

              During the relevant period of this report, there were a great number of US acts that violate the principle of irreversibility, which cannot be overlooked:

(a)    Adopting a stance against the CTBT (Ari Fleischer, Spokesman for the White House, and Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the Department of State, July 9, 2001)

(b)    Notification of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (December 13, 2001)

(c)    Abandoning the START process (ditto, and Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002)

(d)    Reducing the time to resume nuclear testing (Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002)

(e)    Placing reduced warheads into the Responsive Force (ditto)

              As to START in TASK 1, the START process had been unilaterally abandoned by the US ((c) above), before the Japanese government took any measures to save it. Since then, the Japanese government has taken the passive attitude of just watching the US-Russian talks on a new strategic framework.

              As for TASK 2, the Japanese government had not taken even a single action suitable to the government of the country devastated by nuclear weapons, in the face of the series of serious violations by the US, from (a) to (e) above, of its commitment to the international community. This history is completely unsatisfactory and the GOJ must be blamed for this lack of action.

              On TASKS 3, 4 and 5, which are concrete tasks Japan should tackle, the GOJ has exhibited no attitude that it would make efforts.

              Meanwhile, it should be reaffirmed, though it is not mentioned in the above tasks, that Japan itself has a unique responsibility regarding the principles of irreversibility such as presented by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the Diet resolution on the peaceful use of the space, and so forth. It would be a suicidal act against nuclear disarmament if Japan deviated from these principles.

              As a whole, we cannot help but be strict and give the GOJ an E grade.