TASK
SETTING
TASK
1 (Call for plans of action)
This item can be called a treasure to be utilized as a key for
the abolition of nuclear weapons.
The nuclear-weapon States have not made any concrete efforts to
fulfill their “unequivocal undertaking,” since the 2000 NPT Final
Document was agreed. On the contrary, in the US presidential election in
the fall of 2000, neither of the candidates specifically mentioned this
“unequivocal undertaking.” Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, at the
discussions in the CD that year, the nuclear-weapon States failed to
show any improvement in their attitude. Under such circumstances, at the
UNGA in the fall 2000, it was significant that the New Agenda countries
submitted a draft resolution to reaffirm the Final Document, and that
Japan submitted a new draft resolution based upon the same Document. In
particular, the Japanese resolution, entitled “A Path to the Total
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” had a title that implied a plan of
action for the implementation of the “unequivocal undertaking,” and
the high motivation of the sponsor, the Japanese government, should be
highly praised.
The GOJ is urged to attach great importance to the “unequivocal
undertaking” in future Path Resolutions, and to repeat concrete
attempts to push the nuclear-weapon States, through the resolutions,
towards the implementation of the “unequivocal undertaking.”
Repeating the contents of the 2000 resolution in future resolutions
would be insufficient, since the 2000 resolution ended up being no more
than a list of individual interim measures, and was thus not a
comprehensive plan aimed to totally abolish nuclear weapons: The
contents did not live up to the title.
A possible step to take would be to demand that the
nuclear-weapon States formulate “plans of action for the
implementation of the total elimination,” as a next step since they
have already committed themselves to the “unequivocal undertaking.”
The Plans of action could be different for each nuclear-weapon State,
and therefore it would be realistic to include, in the draft text of the
Path Resolution, contents that only request them to formulate and submit
plans of actions for the implementation of the “unequivocal
undertaking.”
TASK
2 (Total elimination of dependence on nuclear weapons)
The task of achieving the total elimination of nuclear arsenals
deals not only with the nuclear-weapon States themselves, but also with
states such as the NATO members, Japan, Australia and the Republic of
Korea (ROK, South Korea), which are dependent on nuclear weapons in
their security policies. Since the “unequivocal undertaking to
accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals” was made, this
means that the nuclear-dependent States also made an “unequivocal
undertaking to totally eliminate their dependence on nuclear weapons.”
Therefore, the nuclear-dependent States are urged to formulate “plans
of action for the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking.”
Among them, Japan should play a leading role.
TASK
3 (Opposition to subcritical tests)
The minimum obligation imposed by the “unequivocal
undertaking” is not to increase the number of nuclear weapons from the
present number. From the viewpoint of Japan calling for the speedy
implementation, it should call for an end to the subcritical tests being
conducted by the US and Russia. Even granting that these subcritical
tests are “to ensure the safety and reliability of existing
stockpiles,” they still remain means to prolong the life of nuclear
weapons. Many nuclear weapon-free municipalities, including Hiroshima
and Nagasaki Cities, have opposed and protested subcritical tests by any
states, but the Japanese government has admitted them. It can be fairly
inferred that Japan cannot raise an objection against the subcritical
tests, which the US claims to be essential, substantially because Japan
maintains the policy of depending on US nuclear deterrence. Japan should
change its policy of admitting subcritical tests in order to implement
its own “unequivocal undertaking.”
EVALUATION
The Japanese government adopted strange behavior in the text of
the 2001 draft Path Resolution, which can be interpreted as having an
intention to discard the gains of the “unequivocal undertaking.”
The
fair and natural course of logic goes as follows: The “unequivocal
undertaking” has already been made, and the next steps should be
called for on the premise of the undertaking. Along this course, Japan
put the words of the “unequivocal undertaking” into the preamble and
welcomed it in the 2000 Path Resolution. The New Agenda took a similar
stance as well.
However, in the 2001 Path Resolution, the GOJ put part of the
“unequivocal undertaking” into one of the operative paragraphs; in
other words, it downgraded the “unequivocal undertaking” into one
among a series of steps to be taken in the future. In response to the
strong criticism by the New Agenda countries on this, Japan made an
amendment to add the modifier of “as agreed in the 2000 NPT Review
Conference” to the “unequivocal undertaking,” but did not amend
the place where it was put. That was one of the major reasons why the
New Agenda countries abstained from voting for the 2001 Path Resolution.
It is still not clear what awareness the GOJ had of the important
implication the change of the structure of its draft resolution would
present. It is known that there was influence from the French government
during the drafting period.
In any case, regarding the Japanese government’s records on TASK
1 during the relevant period, the GOJ has
committed the fault of confusing the context for the “unequivocal
undertaking,” not to mention the call for “plans of action.”
In addition, the MOFA presented to Peace Depot its view that the
ongoing US-Russian strategic arms reduction is evidence that the
“unequivocal undertaking” is actually being implemented. However,
though the reduction itself should certainly be welcomed, the MOFA has
turned its eyes away from the point that the reduction is being pursued
in the context of preserving nuclear forces for an indefinite period, as
described in the NPR (January 9, 2002).
As for TASK
2, there has been no sign that the
Japanese government recognizes that the “unequivocal undertaking” is
a task related to Japan itself, and thus no efforts have been made.
As for the subcritical tests of TASK 3, five such tests were conducted by
the US alone (Oboe 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), once jointly by the US and the UK
(Vito), and at least five by Russia, but the Japanese government has
maintained the position of admitting them. It is also notable that Prime
Minister Junichiro KOIZUMI stated, in front of reporters, “this is not
a matter that needs any particular comment on” in a “so-what”
attitude on 14th February 2002, the day of the US and UK
joint test. This also revealed the government’s indifference to the
issue. It must reflect the Japanese leaders’ indifference to the
“unequivocal undertaking” itself.
The policies of the Japanese government on this important item
run seriously counter to the expectations that were placed, from both
inside and outside, on Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear
weapons. As a whole, we give it an E grade.
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