(9)gInternational Stabilityh and the gPrinciple of Undiminished Security for Allh

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

 

TASK 1: The GOJ should not use, and not let others use, the gpromotion of international stabilityh or the gprinciple of undiminished security for allh as reasons for delaying the implementation of the thirteen steps.

Grade: D

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Preventing misuse)

              The 9th item contains six steps to be taken, 9a to 9f, but they are covered by an overall chapeau including ginternational securityh and the gprinciple of undiminished security for all.h In the negotiation process, the nuclear-weapon States favored the phrase gstrategic stabilityh as a chapeau to cover the 9th item, but the New Agenda countries and others found this to be a recognition of the nuclear weapons balance, and insisted on the wording ginternational stability.h

              In the same way, nuclear deterrence and the balance of power can be used as a basis for opposing nuclear disarmament, through the gprinciple of undiminished security for all.h For example, there are arguments, within the Japanese government, that gthe US policy of first-use of nuclear weapons is a necessary deterrent against threat posed by the DPRK.h This is one example of a government resisting steps towards nuclear disarmament with the excuse that those steps might diminish the statefs security.

              Rather, ginternational stabilityh and gundiminished security for allh should be argued in such a way that they will be created and maintained through the promotion of nuclear disarmament by taking steps as nuclear arms reduction, lowered alert status, enhanced accountability for nuclear weapons, the reduction of dependence on nuclear weapons by means such such as no-first-use, confidence building, and the promotion of compliance with existing agreements.

EVALUATION

              During the relevant period, there were no instance where TASK 1 became the direct point of issue in relation to the implementation of items 9a to 9f. However, the US action of openly violating the 7th item (the ABM Treaty/START) and replacing START with unilateral cuts was an alarm for the implementation of the steps such as (9a) unilateral cuts and (9b) transparency. As described before in our report on the 7th item, the GOJ did not cope with it properly.

              We give a D grade to Japanfs efforts on this item.

Introduction 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f 10  11  12  13  +1  +2 Acronyms

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