(9c)  Reduction in Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

9c. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

 

TASK 1: The GOJ should place emphasis on the reduction and increased transparency of non-strategic nuclear arms as one of its major focuses of nuclear disarmament.

TASK 2: The GOJ should support the call on the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons deployed in NATO countries.

TASK 3: The GOJ should call on the US for unilateral cuts in nuclear cruise missiles, and call on China for unilateral cuts in tactical nuclear weapons.

TASK 4: The GOJ should call on the US to abandon its NCND policy.

Grade: D 

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Focus on non-strategic nuclear weapons)

              Within the new strategic environment, there are concerns that both the US and Russia will increase their dependence on non-strategic nuclear weapons. It is, in fact, tactical nuclear weapons that are most likely to be actually used. Consequently, it is vitally important to place an emphasis on non-strategic nuclear arms reduction.

              There are variety of problems in this area, including the US’s deployment of nuclear bombs in NATO countries, NATO’s sub-strategic nuclear weapons including those deployed by the UK and France, the possible redeployment by Russia of tactical nuclear weapons to Kaliningrad, which became an issue in January 2001 (but with Russia denied), Russia’s new doctrine of increasing dependence on tactical nuclear weapons (which is acting as an impediment to the efforts to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia), and the suspected presence of nuclear weapons aboard US submarines caused by continued launch tests of nuclear cruise missiles and the US policy of NCND. The GOJ should mindfully make efforts toward the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

              Up to now, cuts in non-strategic nuclear weapons have all been done through unilateral initiatives, with no verification or reporting taking place through treaties. In this regard, it is of particular importance to impart transparency and legal bindingness to the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev initiative on the dismantlement, removal and reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. It has been reported that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons was to be discussed at the START III talks, but there is also a need to search for a path towards an agreement focusing specifically on tactical nuclear weapons, since even the collapse of the START process is anticipated.

TASK 2 (Removal of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in NATO)

              The nuclear weapons deployed in NATO by the US unique in being the only nuclear weapons in the world that are deployed on soil outside the nuclear weapon States. They may constitute a destructive precedent that could lead other nuclear weapon States, and especially Russia, to deploy their tactical nuclear weapons on soil outside their territories. Global public opinion calling for their withdrawal should be raised.

TASK 3 (Call for abandoning the NCND policy)

              The issue of tactical nuclear weapons is of particular importance to the Japanese government in terms of easing regional tensions and advancing regional security in East Asia. It would be a beneficial way toward the easing of tensions and the denuclearization of the region for Japan to call for a reduction in US nuclear cruise missiles, since they could be brought into Japanese ports aboard US attack nuclear powered submarines in emergency situations. While pursuing such efforts, it would be effective to call upon China for a reduction in its tactical nuclear weapons. At that time, the need for the US to abandon its NCND policy should be addressed again to ensure transparency.

EVALUATION

              As for TASK 1, though the GOJ has expressed its interest in addressing the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons, it actually has done nothing concrete.

              With regard to TASK 2, the GOJ has not expressed any position. This is just one example of how the GOJ does not speak from a global perspective, which is a mandatory task for a government of the country devastated by nuclear weapons.

              As for TASKS 3 and 4, though these are issues that are very much associated with Japan, there have been no efforts by the GOJ.

              As a whole, we give the GOJ a D grade on this item.


Introduction 2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f 10  11  12  13  +1  +2 Acronyms

 

Japan’s Report Card Evaluation Committee on Nuclear Disarmament
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Peace Depot 3-3-1-102, Minowa-cho, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-0051 Japan
TEL: 045-563-5101 FAX: 045-563-9907
Email:
office@peacedepot.org