Japan Update

Evaluating Implementation of the NPT 13+2 Steps:

JAPAN’S REPORT CARD ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

2002

March 27, 2002

The Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2002, a separate sheet, is an assessment, from Japanese citizens’ perspectives, of the Japanese government’s efforts from May 20, 2000 to February 16, 2002 for the implementation of the 13+2 steps, that is, the thirteen practical steps to implement article VI, plus two steps which are deeply connected to Japan among the steps on article VII, contained in the Final Document of 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that was adopted by consensus in May 2000.

This “Annex: Explanation of the Reason of Evaluation” is to explain the details of the task setting and the grounds for evaluation. It also aims to serve as a practical briefing book to provide an annual overview of the Japanese and global efforts towards nuclear disarmament. The issuance of the Report Card will be continued every year until 2005, when the next NPT Review Conference will be held.

The evaluation was made by the Evaluation Committee, consisting of the following ten members.

(In alphabetical order)

HIRAOKA Takashi Former Mayor of Hiroshima City

KUROSAWA Mitsuru Osaka University

MAEDA Tetsuo Tokyo International University

MORITAKI Haruko Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition

NIKI Michiko YWCA of Japan

TAKEMURA Yasuko Former Member of the House of Councilors

TANAKA Terumi Nihon Hidankyo

TSUCHIYAMA Hideo Former President, Nagasaki University

TSURU Yasuko Tokyo Gakugei University

UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi Peace Depot (Chair of the Committee)

Secretary: KAWASAKI Akira, Peace Depot

Explanation for Grading:

A: Japan has tackled its core task of eliminating dependence on nuclear weapons, or has made a significant contribution for global nuclear disarmament.

B: Japan has been enthusiastic in tackling the important tasks (underlined in the text of this Annex).

C: Japan has carried out some of the tasks.

D: Japan carried out none or very few of the tasks. Fortunately, this did not constitute a direct factor setting back the global situation.

E: Japan carried out none of the important tasks. Or even if Japan carried out some of them, it failed to make the most of its precious opportunity as a country devastated by nuclear weapons.

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Call for a 2003 Time Frame)

The number of CTBT signatories increased from 155 to 165, and the number of ratifiers from 61 to 89 during the period from May 20, 2000 to February 16, 2002, or the “relevant period” of this report. Although it is welcome that the number of the State parties is steadily increasing, there has been a lack of progress during this period in the fact that thirteen of the forty-four states required for the entry into force (EIF) of the CTBT have not ratified it yet. In this regard, we have to say that there has been no concrete progress towards an early EIF.

Of the thirteen states, three – India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) – have not signed it. The remaining ten – Algeria, China, Colombia, Congo (Kinshasa), Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Vietnam – have signed but not ratified it.

The Japanese government has long made the early EIF of the CTBT a core diplomatic priority . In particular, it proposed to set a time frame for the EIF in its UNGA resolution in 2000, entitled “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” (A/55/33R, November 20, 2000. We will call it the ‘A Path’ Resolution.). It was jointly submitted by Japan and Australia and gained overwhelming support. It stressed the importance of “the early signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by all States, especially by the States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, with a view to its early entry into force before 2003.” Several of the non-ratifying thirteen states voted in favor of the resolution: Algeria, Colombia, Indonesia, Iran, the US, and Vietnam. In other words, at that time, these six states had the intention, at the administrative level, to ratify the treaty before 2003.

Therefore, although the change of the policy by the new US administration posed greater difficulties, the Government of Japan (GOJ) was requested, at least in 2001, to maintain this positive policy and incorporate it into the text of the 2001 UNGA ‘A Path’ Resolution and appeal Japan’s aspirations to the international community at the Second CTBT EIF Conference.

TASK 2 and 3 (Call on the US)

The failure of the United States to ratify the CTBT is a particularly serious impediment to the EIF of the Treaty. For the three current non-signatories, in particular, the fact that the world’s largest nuclear power refuses to ratify it can be a major rationale for rejecting the credibility of the Treaty. While the US Senate’s rejection of the CTBT ratification in October 1999 had cast a dark shadow on its early EIF, the situation worsened during the relevant period of this report. The Bush Administration, which came to power in January 2001, suggested a policy to let the CTBT fade away (Ari Fleischer, Spokesman for the White House, and Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the Department of State, July 9, 2001). However, it was also to be noted that more than half of the U.S. Senate, though an insufficient number for the two-thirds requirement for ratification, supported the CTBT at that time, according to a survey conducted by a US NGO.

Under such circumstances, the true value of the Japan’s diplomacy towards the US faced a test, as a close US ally and a strong advocate of the CTBT. Nuclear disarmament should always be given great importance in the Japanese government’s vision of global security, in so far as the Japanese representatives to the UN have repeatedly emphasized that “Japan is the only country that has suffered from nuclear devastation” in their speeches. Therefore, the Japanese government should not act differently as the US Administration changes, but should act on its own initiative, based on the recognition that the CTBT is an issue at the heart of the US-Japan security relationship. In addition, this stance should be clearly visible to the public of Japan.

TASK 4 (Call on states other than the US)

While it is essential to logically criticize the US nuclear weapon policy per se in order to call for a US policy change on the CTBT, it is necessary, at the same time, to contain the US government using international public opinion. One such approach would be to advance the universality of the CTBT, by making the number of State parties increase. Pushing for ratification by the twelve states required for the EIF other than the US is particularly important. Since each of the twelve is under different conditions regarding CTBT ratification, the specific measures to overcome the difficulties will be different. In addition, their diplomatic relationships with Japan are different. Therefore, systematic efforts for each state should be pursued with assistance from a team of experts and NGOs.

TASK 5 (Cooperation with CTBTO)

One of the important tasks is to prepare to ensure that the CTBT Organization (CTBTO), including the international verification system, can function as soon as the treaty enters into force. The Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO has been working since its foundation on November 19, 1996. If the US continues to refuse to ratify the CTBT, it might underfund the PrepCom. That is why Japan is urged to work actively for the maintenance of the PrepCom, not to mention to offer technical cooperation with it.

EVALUATION

As for TASK 1, there was a setback in Japan’s policy during the relevant period of this report.

Japanese citizens welcomed the progress in the GOJ’s nuclear disarmament policy from the paradigm of “ultimate elimination” to the paradigm of “unequivocal undertaking,” when the Japanese ‘A Path’ Resolution demonstrated some positive initiatives at the 2000 UNGA, including the 2003 time frame for the CTBT EIF. However, at a consultation meeting between Japanese citizen groups and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) in a Diet Office Building, Tokyo on August 10, 2001, citizens discovered that the MOFA already had the intention to weaken the text of the 2001 UNGA draft resolution in order to get a ‘yes’ vote, or an abstention at worst, from the Bush administration. Astonished at this finding, many citizens requested that the MOFA maintain the 2003 time frame call. The mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki jointly submitted a request to the Prime Minister on September 6. Some municipalities adopted similar resolutions in their assemblies.

Despite of all of these efforts, the text of the 2001 ‘A Path’ Resolution draft submitted to the First Committee (A/C.1/56/L.35) demonstrated surprising setbacks. In order to obtain US support, it dropped even the call for “the early EIF,” not to mention “the 2003 time frame.” This development clearly demonstrated that Japan’s diplomacy on CTBT was pursued neither by deriving strength from the support of national public opinion, wishes from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor international public opinion, but was pursued solely through bargaining with the US behind closed doors, with the aim of obtaining the US support.

In this development, we should not overlook the fact that when Prime Minister Junichiro KOIZUMI himself referred to the 2000 UNGA ‘A Path’ Resolution and emphasized to the international community that he was committed to striving for the early EIF of the CTBT, as he spoke at the Peace Memorial Ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 2001, respectively, the MOFA bureaucrats were already about to draw back from the very resolution. This bears a relationship to the fundamental characteristics of Japanese diplomacy, which is often labeled “diplomacy in the absence of citizens” or “diplomacy in the absence of politicians.” It should be seriously questioned.

Fortunately, the GOJ revised the first draft and revived the phrase calling for “the early EIF” (A/C.1/56/L.35/Rev.1). Later, an MOFA official in charge of the process told Peace Depot that they were not surprised at the US vote against the Japan’s resolution even after the revision, because they knew it would happen beforehand through advance negotiations. It can be rightly inferred that the MOFA revised the too notorious first draft and restored the early EIF call because they knew the US would vote ‘against’ it anyway. But the MOFA did not revive the time frame call, probably because it wished to attain support from other nuclear weapon States. In fact, France and the UK voted in favor of the revised resolution.

It is understandable that they thought the 2003 time frame had become less realistic after the developments in the past year in international politics. However, even a year earlier, the possibility of achieving the EIF of the CTBT before 2003 was quite bleak, considering the policies of India, Pakistan and the DPRK. Nevertheless it was important that Japan had proposed such resolution because it was effective in exerting international pressure on the non-ratifiers.

In addition, considering that Japan had just moved to a new stage of disarmament diplomacy by submitting the ‘A Path’ Resolution in 2000 and that the symbolic core of the resolution was the proposal of a time frame for the EIF of the CTBT, the CTBT EIF was a key issue in judging the sincerity or lack thereof of Japan’s nuclear disarmament diplomacy. As a result, Japan has committed a serious failure in this task.

The above also relates to TASKS 2 and 3. The Japanese government’s attitude towards the US, which rejects the CTBT, has not been strict enough. The US clearly denounced the CTBT in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), partly released on January 9, 2002. On this occasion, the GOJ should have responded quickly, protesting this policy.

It is true that Japan’s position on the CTBT has been repeatedly explained to the US on various occasions, including the Powell-Tanaka meeting on January 20, 2002, but we cannot help but seriously question the GOJ’s attitude toward the US. This is because it represents the inconsistency of the GOJ‘s claim on the importance of the credibility of the US-Japan security relationship. When the GOJ decided to start joint research on the TMD with the US, it claimed that the joint research would improve trust in the US-Japan Security Arrangement (Statement of the Chief Cabinet Secretary, December 25, 1998) If this is so, the GOJ should have clearly criticized the US CTBT policy, pointing out that the it would “undermine the trust of the US-Japan Security Arrangement.” The reason is as follows.

The US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (April 17, 1996) clearly states that “both governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament, including acceleration of the CTBT negotiations.” Furthermore, the US-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Verification, one of whose immediate priorities is “bringing about the early EIF of the CTBT,” was established on March 8, 2000. Both governments held uplifting press conference, saying, “today is a historic occasion,” in the joint press statement to announce the establishment of the Commission. Considering this recent history, Japan could and should have raised a strong objection to the US policy change on the CTBT.

In relation to TASK 3, Japan referred to the US only in a roundabout way at the 2nd CTBT EIF Conference in November 2001. Despite the diplomatic tradition not to identify states by name, even the EU criticized the US explicitly by name, saying, “we can only regret” and “this is all the more worrying,” and appealed to the Government of the US, urging it to review its position. Sweden “deeply regret[ed] the US was the only country that did not vote in favor of the procedural decision on the CTBT in the UNGA First Committee, and stated it [did] not support the Treaty.” However, as for Japan, the only phrase referring the US position was the following in a speech given by Ambassador Nobuyasu ABE: “Unfortunately, there is no prospect at the moment for the early EIF of the CTBT, due in part to the hesitation of some of the major States to ratify it.” (November 12, 2001) The Final Declaration of the 2^nd CTBT EIF Conference “call[ed] upon the remaining two [nuclear weapon States (that is, the US and China)] to accelerate their ratification processes,” but failed to refer to the fact that the US openly expressed that it did not support the Treaty.

Generally speaking, Japan has gained fairly high appreciation from the diplomatic community, including concerned NGOs, with respect to its active involvement in the CTBT EIF Conference. However, from the viewpoint of Japanese citizens who have witnessed the recent series of actions taken by the GOJ regarding the CTBT, Japan’s nuclear disarmament policy would be regarded as a mere superficial performance played within the framework allowed by the US. We urge the GOJ to reflect seriously its conduct.

As for TASK 4, it is to be appreciated that the GOJ has been carrying out diplomatic efforts to promote CTBT ratification. Prior to the CTBT EIF Conference in August 2001, Japan's Foreign Minister Ms Makiko TANAKA sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of all states but North Korea whose ratification is required for the CTBT EIF, but that had not yet signed or ratified it. In addition, the MOFA explains that they have repeatedly made use of various opportunities to influence states to promote the CTBT EIF.

However, according to a response given by the GOJ to a question submitted by House of Councilors Member Atsuo NAKAURA in 2001, there seems to be neither a plan nor a system in Japan’s diplomatic efforts to promote CTBT ratification. It is recommended that the GOJ plan and implement more advanced efforts such as we suggested in TASK 4.

One significant example of relevant events is the decision made by the GOJ to ‘quit’ the economic sanctions on India and Pakistan (October 26, 2001). These measures were taken in protest toward the two states for conducting nuclear tests. But Japan followed the US in “lifting the sanctions” in order to encourage Pakistan to cooperate with the US in its military operations in Afghanistan, in response to the events of September 11, 2001 and to prevent regional instability in South Asia. However, neither India nor Pakistan has committed itself to a continued moratorium on nuclear testing. Both are openly pursuing the development of missiles as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Japan should have gained their commitment to stopping nuclear testing as a premise for lifting economic sanction, so that Japan could be consistent in its CTBT policy. India turned out to be one of the two states that voted against the Japanese resolution in the UNGA First Committee on November 5, 2001, soon after the sanctions were lifted.

In terms of TASK 5, Japan has repeatedly expressed its willingness to cooperate with the verification regime and to give assistance to the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). It should be noted that Japan is willing to be actively involved in this process.

In summary, while recognizing that the GOJ has devoted much energy to implement this step, the negative aspects of its record are quite serious. Thus we give it a D grade on this item for the relevant period.

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 and 2 (Call on states)

Generally speaking, signatories to the CTBT are not allowed to take actions contrary to the aims of the treaty even before its EIF (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). Since the five nuclear-weapon States and Israel have signed the treaty, one may argue that brakes on testing are in place to some extent. However, there is another argument that as long as signatories can withdraw from the CTBT according to its provisions, signatories may resort to testing if the situation changes before the EIF. Therefore, there is no ground for optimism with regard to the continuation of the moratorium.

The Bush administration, which expressed a policy of letting the CTBT die, had nevertheless stated during its election campaign that it would continue the moratorium. However, there were arguments in the US that the manufacture of mini nukes (with yields of less than one kiloton) would require nuclear explosion tests. Moreover, it was reported that the US Department of Energy requested a budget to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear tests once the decision to do so was made.

In addition, the media reported that Russia might reconsider all the existing arms control treaties if the US went ahead with its missile defense program. Similarly, it was considered that China had growing incentives to resume nuclear tests, as it would think it necessary to strengthen its arsenal. India and Pakistan have said that they will keep the moratorium in place, but if China conducts tests, India, and then Pakistan, might follow.

Therefore, the GOJ should constantly reaffirm the moratorium on nuclear tests with a sense of urgency, at such forums as the UNGA and 2^nd CTBT EIF Conference. At the same time, Japan should pursue other measures to promote the continuation of the test moratorium.

TASK 3 (Critical Position toward the NIF)

The planned nuclear tests at the US National Ignition Facility (NIF), which is currently under construction, might involve very small but sustained nuclear fusion reactions, and it is likely that they might violate the provisions of the CTBT. Clearly, they would be in contravention of the spirit of the CTBT. These tests are useful for research on nuclear weapons in secondary explosions, in which nuclear fusion plays a central role. If this is permitted, China, which does not have facilities such as the NIF, will claim the right to conduct nuclear explosion tests. The NIF may not directly violate the moratorium on nuclear tests, but it enhances risks that endanger the stability of the moratorium.

Against this backdrop, it was revealed that the US subsidiary of HOYA, a Japanese glass manufacturer, was producing major parts for the NIF. The mayors of Hiroshima (February 2001) and Nagasaki (April 2001) protested this. There were also several discussions in the Diet from May to June 2001. If the GOJ wants to attain the rapid elimination of nuclear weapons, it should be more sensitive to this kind of matter.

EVALUATION

The GOJ, though moving backward on its policy on the CTBT, has maintained a consistent argument for the moratorium on nuclear tests thus far.

As for TASK 1, the government included a call for the continuation of the moratorium into the text of the UNGA ‘A Path’ Resolution from its first draft. Also, Ambassador ABE strongly called for the continuation of the moratorium at the 2^nd CTBT EIF Conference, the Final Declaration of which included that call. We naturally appreciate such efforts. Fortunately, the recent US Nuclear Posture Review (January 9, 2002) also reaffirmed the continuation of the moratorium.

However, the situation surrounding the moratorium gives no grounds for optimism, for in the NPR the US made clear that it would reduce the preparation time necessary to resume nuclear tests substantially in the coming several years. In spite of the fact that the GOJ has been called upon to take measures to respond to the new situation with a sense of urgency, one cannot find any such sense of urgency in its attitude .

In addition, it is probable that most Japanese citizens feel that “Japan’s call for a moratorium at present is nothing but another example of the GOJ always following the US policy.” It should acknowledge the lack of citizens’ trust as serious.

As for TASK 2, it was reported that the Japanese government was given promises by India and Pakistan that they would continue the moratorium on nuclear tests when it decided to lift the economic sanctions on them in October 2001. Later, the Japan-India Joint Declaration issued when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Tokyo (December 10, 2001) included the phrase “to continue the unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing” by India. Moreover, a remark made by President Musharraf that. “Pakistan will not become the first country to resume nuclear testing” (November 26, 2001) is on the record of then Foreign Minister TANAKA’s report on her Pakistan visit. It can be said that the setback of the situation with respect to the moratorium by the two states has been checked so far.

As for TASK 3, the Japanese government has repeatedly explained that it has no authority to control the involvement of foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms in the NIF. It has not expressed concern over the NIF, nor has it made its position clear on the cooperation of Japanese private companies, including HOYA, with the NIF. We regard the GOJ’s efforts on this task as insufficient.

As a whole, the lack of sense of urgency on the side of the GOJ following the US announcement on the NPR is serious, and we give it a D grade on this item.

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Call for 2005 time frame)

The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has continued since the adoption of the 2000 NPT Final Document, and no agreement has been reached on a program of work for a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

In the background of this impasse are two theories of linkages. The first involves links between nuclear disarmament talks and the FMCT, over the question of whether the two should take place in parallel at the CD. The argument of countries such as India and Pakistan is that without a clear nuclear disarmament program by the nuclear-weapon States, who already have fissile materials, it is impossible to go forward on a ban on production alone. In opposition to this, the nuclear-weapon States have protested vigorously against the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament.

Secondly, there is a dispute over the link between the prevention of arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the FMCT. On this issue, there is a sharp conflict between China, which emphasizes the urgency of PAROS, and the US, which is trying to avoid any debate being centered on missile defense.

The Japanese government considers the FMCT to be on par with the CTBT in terms of importance, and has pushed for its negotiation. At the UNGA in the autumn of 2000, Japan submitted a draft resolution calling for the FMCT, with the text of “conclusion as early as possible before 2005,” and attained overwhelming support. The Japanese government should strictly keep this position.

TASKS 2 and 3 (Normalization of the CD and outside work)

In order to obtain results within the deadline, it will be important to find the necessary conditions for normalizing the CD. There is also agreement for the CD to establish “a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament” as will be mentioned in the next item. The establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the negative security assurances (NSA) has also been proposed: During the 1998 session, an NSA Ad Hoc committee was once established. All four Ad Hoc committees are to deal with important issues, and it would be appropriate to establish them loosely in parallel, with the premise that the agenda will not be fixed at their first stages, but will be developed gradually. Japan should make independent diplomatic efforts based on such a position.

At the same time, it is necessary to make technical preparations, outside the framework of the CD, to contribute to effective negotiations in the normalized CD. In particular, the formulation of an inventory of all fissile materials possessed by states, regardless of whether they are for military or commercial use, will be useful as the basis for FMCT negotiations. It would be appropriate to add these categories to the database of weapons of mass destruction held by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs.

EVALUATION

As for TASK 1, Japan submitted, at the 2001 session of the UNGA, a draft resolution with more concrete objectives than those in the 2000 resolution, and attained overwhelming support. It called for “the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD as early as possible during its 2002 session to negotiate [a FMCT] with a view to the conclusion within five years.”

It is inevitable that Japan’s maintenance of a positive FMCT policy consistent with the US policy will cloud our evaluation, considering that it made an unjust change in its CTBT policy to win US favor. However, we should appreciate the continuation of its positive attitude from the viewpoint that it contributes to activating the multilateral processes of nuclear disarmament, which are stalled as a whole.

In 2002, the US showed a positive attitude towards the CD, stating that criticizing the US as unilateralist was inappropriate and that it was committed to multilateral regimes. In this regard, the US stated that the FMCT negotiations should be the first step in moving the CD forward (January 24, 2002, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State). However, most of the states will remain skeptical and cautious when the President Bush keeps promoting tensions through various occasions including his State of the Union Address condemning the “axis of evil” (January 29, 2002).

Therefore, in relation to TASK 2, it is particularly necessary for the Japanese government to present sufficient independence, and not to just follow the US, in its diplomacy at the CD. Unfortunately, no such impressive initiatives have been presented by the Japanese government at the CD. However, the speech by the Ambassador on Disarmament Seiichiro NOBORU at the first session of the 2002 CD, calling for overcoming the deadlock at the CD and calling strongly for support for the Amorim proposal (August 2000, CD/1624, named after the Brazilian ambassador) that includes the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee for the FMCT negotiations, was notable in its sincerity and motivation. This should be fairly appreciated.

Some measures were made regarding the experts panel on the FMCT outside the CD. Actually, Japan and Australia co-sponsored a FMCT workshop in Geneva on May 14-15, 2001, in which officials and experts from about one hundred states participated. Views were exchanged on obligations, verification and organization of the treaty to be negotiated. There were several unofficial responses to the workshop finding that it lacked a sense of purpose and leadership or that it was not open enough. We should keep watching how these lessons will be reflected in the next step.

As to TASK 3, there is no information to show any concrete steps made by the Japanese government on this.

As a whole, we welcome the continued work of the Japanese government on this item, and give it a B grade.

TASK SETTING

TASK 1, 2 (Break though the CD impasse)

As stated in the previous item, the deadlock over the CD still continues, and it seems unlikely that a program of work for establishing the subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament will be agreed on in the near future. A basis for compromise may be found in the previously mentioned Amorim proposal. However, the mandate of the subsidiary body in this proposal is limited to “exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic effort to attain this objective [of nuclear disarmament],” and the mandate to make consultations or negotiations on nuclear disarmament is not a premise. While the US has reluctantly agreed to this proposal, some positive states like New Zealand have expressed the criticism that the subsidiary body under this proposal would fall short of the one that the 2000 NPT Final Document agreed to establish.

Under such circumstances, it is important for Japan to establish its tradition of independent diplomacy, which would be consistently based upon moral principles as the country devastated by nuclear weapons.

TASK 3 (Raising international public opinion)

In order to overcome the deadlock in the CD and to achieve the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament, we believe it is necessary to raise global public awareness on the urgency of nuclear disarmament. Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, has an important role to play in this respect. It would be possible for Japan to enact a Non-Nuclear Law, for example, clearly denying the utility of nuclear weapons, and to demonstrate its change of policy to the world. It would also be possible to educate the public globally on the immorality and dangers of nuclear weapons in an original manner, by letting municipalities such as Hiroshima and Nagasaki play a leading role. Another possible way would be to utilize, from such a viewpoint, the Annan proposal calling for a “major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers” which was raised at the UN Millennium Assembly and also adopted in the Millennium Declaration.

EVALUATION

As for TASK 1, the 2001 Japanese UNGA resolution proposed a more concrete objective than that of the 2000 resolution, namely the establishment of the subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the CD “as early as possible during its 2002 session.” This can be seen as progress.

As for TASK 2, or Japan’s diplomatic attitude in the CD, as we mentioned in the previous item, the enthusiastic speech by Ambassador NOBORU at the first session of the 2002 CD should be appreciated from the viewpoint of breaking through the CD deadlock. Although the Amorim proposal is indeed a possible choice for compromise at the moment, the Japanese government should make it clear that supporting the proposal is nothing but a reluctant choice, after expressing the earnest sentiment of the country devastated by nuclear weapons. This should have been done particularly under the circumstances in which New Zealand raised an objection to the Amorim proposal, arguing that the subsidiary body described in the proposal would not fulfill the requirement of the NPT agreement.

TASK 3 is the most important task for overcoming the deadlock, but the Japanese government had shown no intention to tackle this.

As a whole, we give the GOJ a C grade on this item.

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Call for irreversibility in START)

With regard to irreversibility, the primary concerns have been with the quantitative reduction and management of nuclear warheads and weapon-usable fissile materials. At the 1997 Helsinki US-Russia Summit, there were discussions on making the irreversibility of cuts in nuclear weapons part of the agenda at the START III talks. Taking advantage of this, the Japanese government should have repeatedly called their attention to this point and made efforts to further develop the principle.

TASK 2 (Call on the US)

What is remarkable about the latest NPT agreement is that it does not limit its focus to quantitative reductions. It should be recognized as an agreement that does not allow any stepping back from or abandoning of existing measures on arms control and disarmament regarding nuclear weapons, including the moratorium on nuclear explosion tests and the UN Security Council resolution on security assurances (April 11, 1995), as well as other political declarations and resolutions.

The Bush administration has indicated that it would abrogate the ABM Treaty in pursuing missile defense; neglected to work to bring the START II into force; and indicated a policy not to support the CTBT. This attitude might affect many other states or issues to move backwards. Therefore, there was certainly a need for Japan, as a country in a close relation with the US and, moreover, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons, to strongly urge the US to observe the principle of irreversibility.

TASK 3 (Termination of TMD research cooperation)

The US-Japan cooperative research on Theater Missile Defense (TMD) puts irreversibility in danger in two senses. First, even if it is only research, the US-Japanese intention to develop TMD has the potential to heighten tensions in East Asia, and trigger an arms race. Thus, the cooperative research could become the cause for a reversal in Chinese nuclear policy, including a change of its no-first-use/negative security assurances policy. Second, there had been no agreement between the US and Russia on whether the Navy Theater Wide Defense (NWTD) system, the subject of the US-Japan research cooperation, violates the ABM Treaty or not. Still more, since missile defense under the Bush administration has been an integrated initiative of TMD and NMD (National Missile Defense), there is a strong likelihood that the overall scheme violates the ABM Treaty. This is why the Bush administration had been suggesting that it would choose unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US-Japan cooperative research on TMD technologies not only paves the way for the collapse of the ABM Treaty regime, but could also lead to setbacks in Russia’s nuclear weapon policies.

If it is upgraded to the development stage, as suggested in the recent US-Japan consultation on defense (February 8, 2002), it would become the biggest obstacle to promoting the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.

TASK 4 (Prevention of redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on board ships)

In 1991, President Bush and Secretary General Gorbachev agreed to eliminate and withdraw tactical nuclear weapons as “a coordinated unilateral action.” It is especially important to assure the irreversibility of these measures. Japan, through these measures, has gained the direct benefit of liberation from the suspicion of introduction by the U.S. of nuclear weapons using ships and aircraft, at least in peacetime. It would be appropriate to legislate the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as a method to guarantee the irreversibility of these measures in a host nation of ships and aircraft.

TASK 5 (Independent examination on the SSMP)

In addition, the US Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (SSMP), whose purpose is explained as to maintain the existing stockpile, has been criticized by experts, based on scientific data, as going beyond the objectives of ensuring safety and reliability of the existing nuclear weapons. It goes against irreversibility to develop new nuclear weapons. Similar criticisms have been directed at the NIF.

However, the Japanese government turns its eyes away from any analysis other than the US official explanation of the SSMP. This is connected to the Japanese government’s attitude of not seriously examining HOYA’s cooperation with the NIF. It is urged to make an independent examination, not just following US statements.

EVALUATION

During the relevant period of this report, there were a great number of US acts that violate the principle of irreversibility, which cannot be overlooked:

(a) Adopting a stance against the CTBT (Ari Fleischer, Spokesman for the White House, and Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the Department of State, July 9, 2001)

(b) Notification of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty (December 13, 2001)

(d) Reducing the time to resume nuclear testing (Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002)

(e) Placing reduced warheads into the Responsive Force (ditto)

As to START in TASK 1, the START process had been unilaterally abandoned by the US ((c) above), before the Japanese government took any measures to save it. Since then, the Japanese government has taken the passive attitude of just watching the US-Russian talks on a new strategic framework.

As for TASK 2, the Japanese government had not taken even a single action suitable to the government of the country devastated by nuclear weapons, in the face of the series of serious violations by the US, from (a) to (e) above, of its commitment to the international community. This history is completely unsatisfactory and the GOJ must be blamed for this lack of action.

On TASKS 3, 4 and 5, which are concrete tasks Japan should tackle, the GOJ has exhibited no attitude that it would make efforts.

Meanwhile, it should be reaffirmed, though it is not mentioned in the above tasks, that Japan itself has a unique responsibility regarding the principles of irreversibility such as presented by the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the Diet resolution on the peaceful use of the space, and so forth. It would be a suicidal act against nuclear disarmament if Japan deviated from these principles.

As a whole, we cannot help but be strict and give the GOJ an E grade.

TASK SETTING

TASK 1 (Call for plans of action)

This item can be called a treasure to be utilized as a key for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear-weapon States have not made any concrete efforts to fulfill their “unequivocal undertaking,” since the 2000 NPT Final Document was agreed. On the contrary, in the US presidential election in the fall of 2000, neither of the candidates specifically mentioned this “unequivocal undertaking.” Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, at the discussions in the CD that year, the nuclear-weapon States failed to show any improvement in their attitude. Under such circumstances, at the UNGA in the fall 2000, it was significant that the New Agenda countries submitted a draft resolution to reaffirm the Final Document, and that Japan submitted a new draft resolution based upon the same Document. In particular, the Japanese resolution, entitled “A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” had a title that implied a plan of action for the implementation of the “unequivocal undertaking,” and the high motivation of the sponsor, the Japanese government, should be highly praised.

The GOJ is urged to attach great importance to the “unequivocal undertaking” in future Path Resolutions, and to repeat concrete attempts to push the nuclear-weapon States, through the resolutions, towards the implementation of the “unequivocal undertaking.” Repeating the contents of the 2000 resolution in future resolutions would be insufficient, since the 2000 resolution ended up being no more than a list of individual interim measures, and was thus not a comprehensive plan aimed to totally abolish nuclear weapons: The contents did not live up to the title.

A possible step to take would be to demand that the nuclear-weapon States formulate “plans of action for the implementation of the total elimination,” as a next step since they have already committed themselves to the “unequivocal undertaking.” The Plans of action could be different for each nuclear-weapon State, and therefore it would be realistic to include, in the draft text of the Path Resolution, contents that only request them to formulate and submit plans of actions for the implementation of the “unequivocal undertaking.”

TASK 2 (Total elimination of dependence on nuclear weapons)

The task of achieving the total elimination of nuclear arsenals deals not only with the nuclear-weapon States themselves, but also with states such as the NATO members, Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), which are dependent on nuclear weapons in their security policies. Since the “unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals” was made, this means that the nuclear-dependent States also made an “unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate their dependence on nuclear weapons.” Therefore, the nuclear-dependent States are urged to formulate “plans of action for the implementation of the unequivocal undertaking.” Among them, Japan should play a leading role.

TASK 3 (Opposition to subcritical tests)

The minimum obligation imposed by the “unequivocal undertaking” is not to increase the number of nuclear weapons from the present number. From the viewpoint of Japan calling for the speedy implementation, it should call for an end to the subcritical tests being conducted by the US and Russia. Even granting that these subcritical tests are “to ensure the safety and reliability of existing stockpiles,” they still remain means to prolong the life of nuclear weapons. Many nuclear weapon-free municipalities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki Cities, have opposed and protested subcritical tests by any states, but the Japanese government has admitted them. It can be fairly inferred that Japan cannot raise an objection against the subcritical tests, which the US claims to be essential, substantially because Japan maintains the policy of depending on US nuclear deterrence. Japan should change its policy of admitting subcritical tests in order to implement its own “unequivocal undertaking.”

EVALUATION

The Japanese government adopted strange behavior in the text of the 2001 draft Path Resolution, which can be interpreted as having an intention to discard the gains of the “unequivocal undertaking.”

The fair and natural course of logic goes as follows: The “unequivocal undertaking” has already been made, and the next steps should be called for on the premise of the undertaking. Along this course, Japan put the words of the “unequivocal undertaking” into the preamble and welcomed it in the 2000 Path Resolution. The New Agenda took a similar stance as well.

However, in the 2001 Path Resolution, the GOJ put part of the “unequivocal undertaking” into one of the operative paragraphs; in other words, it downgraded the “unequivocal undertaking” into one among a series of steps to be taken in the future. In response to the strong criticism by the New Agenda countries on this, Japan made an amendment to add the modifier of “as agreed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference” to the “unequivocal undertaking,” but did not amend the place where it was put. That was one of the major reasons why the New Agenda countries abstained from voting for the 2001 Path Resolution.

It is still not clear what awareness the GOJ had of the important implication the change of the structure of its draft resolution would present. It is known that there was influence from the French government during the drafting period.

In any case, regarding the Japanese government’s records on TASK 1 during the relevant period, the GOJ has committed the fault of confusing the context for the “unequivocal undertaking,” not to mention the call for “plans of action.”

In addition, the MOFA presented to Peace Depot its view that the ongoing US-Russian strategic arms reduction is evidence that the “unequivocal undertaking” is actually being implemented. However, though the reduction itself should certainly be welcomed, the MOFA has turned its eyes away from the point that the reduction is being pursued in the context of preserving nuclear forces for an indefinite period, as described in the NPR (January 9, 2002).

As for TASK 2, there has been no sign that the Japanese government recognizes that the “unequivocal undertaking” is a task related to Japan itself, and thus no efforts have been made.

As for the subcritical tests of TASK 3, five such tests were conducted by the US alone (Oboe 4, 5, 6, 7, 8), once jointly by the US and the UK (Vito), and at least five by Russia, but the Japanese government has maintained the position of admitting them. It is also notable that Prime Minister Junichiro KOIZUMI stated, in front of reporters, “this is not a matter that needs any particular comment on” in a “so-what” attitude on 14^th February 2002, the day of the US and UK joint test. This also revealed the government’s indifference to the issue. It must reflect the Japanese leaders’ indifference to the “unequivocal undertaking” itself.

The policies of the Japanese government on this important item run seriously counter to the expectations that were placed, from both inside and outside, on Japan, as the country devastated by nuclear weapons. As a whole, we give it an E grade.

Grade: D

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Grade: B

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Grade: C

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Grade: E

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Grade: E

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