Evaluating Implementation of the NPT 13+2 Steps:

JAPAN’S REPORT CARD ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

2003

April 18, 2003

   

Written from Japanese citizens' perspectives, The Japan's Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2003 is an assessment, of the Japanese government's efforts from February 17, 2002 to February 16, 2003 for the implementation of the 13+2 steps. These are the thirteen practical steps to implement Article VI, plus two steps which are deeply connected to Japan among the steps on Article VII, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that was adopted by consensus in May 2000.

This "Appendix: Reason for the Evaluation" was written to explain in detail the criteria for the tasks that we have set and the grounds for the evaluation. It also aims to serve as a practical briefing tool, providing an annual overview of Japanese and global efforts towards nuclear disarmament. The Report Card will be issued every year until 2005, when the next NPT Review Conference is scheduled to be held.

 

The evaluation was made by the Evaluation Committee, consisting of the following ten members.

(In alphabetical order)
HIRAOKA Takashi	Former Mayor of Hiroshima City
KUROSAWA Mitsuru	Osaka University
MAEDA Tetsuo	Tokyo International University
MORITAKI Haruko	Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (HANWA)
NIKI Michiko	YWCA of Japan
TAKEMURA Yasuko	Former Member of the House of Councilors
TANAKA Terumi	Nihon Hidankyo
TSUCHIYAMA Hideo	Former President, Nagasaki University
TSURU Yasuko	Tokyo Gakugei University
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi	Peace Depot (Chair of the Committee)

Explanation for Grading:

A: Japan has tackled its core task of eliminating dependence on nuclear weapons, or has made a significant contribution for global nuclear disarmament.

B: Japan has been enthusiastic in tackling the important tasks (underlined in the text of this Annex).

C: Japan has carried out some of the tasks.

D: Japan carried out none or very few of the tasks. Fortunately, this did not constitute a direct factor setting back the global situation.

E: Japan carried out none of the important tasks. Or even if Japan carried out some of them, it failed to make the most of its precious opportunity as a country devastated by nuclear weapons.

The bold section which follows the short title of each of the 13+2 Steps below is the exact quote from the NPT Final Document. The section in bold italics represents tasks, and those that we regard are particularly important (“the important tasks”) are underlined.

 

(1)      Early Entry-into-Force of the CTBT

 

1.      The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

 

Task 1: The Government of Japan (GOJ) should make repeated appeals for the early entry-into-force (EIF) of the CTBT, taking such occasions as the 2002 Preparatory Committee for NPT Review Conference, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), etc. The GOJ is also requested to support other states' proposals with similar policy objectives.

Task 2: We are concerned that international interest in the CTBT will deteriorate because of the dim prospect of its EIF. Therefore, the GOJ should make efforts to sustain and to strengthen international interest in the CTBT.

Task 3:The GOJ should criticize the Bush Administration's policy rejecting the CTBT and explain it to the Japanese public. Backed by Japanese public opinion, the GOJ should then urge the Bush Administration to ratify the CTBT.

Task 4: The GOJ should systematically and constantly promote the ratification of the CTBT by the twelve states other than the US which have not yet ratified the Treaty, but whose ratification is required for the EIF, through means appropriate to each state.

Task 5: The GOJ is requested to strengthen its technical cooperation with the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO and work actively for its sustained operation.

 

Grade: B

 

TASK SETTING

 

TASK 1 (Call for an Early EIF)

The number of states that have signed the CTBT has increased from 165 to 166; and the number of states that have ratified it has increased from 89 to 97 during the evaluation period of February 17, 2002 to February 16, 2003. Since many other states have already signed the CTBT, it is understandable that an increase in the number of new signatories is marginal. It is still problematic, however, that the number of newly ratified states in a year is as small as eight. We should carefully watch this numerical trend as an indicator of the continued strength of international interest in the Treaty.

It is especially troublesome that out of the 44 states that have nuclear technology and whose ratification is a conditional requirement for the EIF, 13 have not ratified it yet. Taking into consideration that this situation has not changed for the last two years, we must conclude that no progress towards an early EIF has been made during this evaluation period.

Out of the 13 states, the three states of India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) have not even singed the Treaty yet. Algeria, China, Columbia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Vietnam have signed, but not ratified it. Among the nuclear weapon states (NWS), the United States and China have yet to ratify it.

It was disappointing to see that the GOJ prepared a draft proposal for the 2001 UNGA resolution without including the phrase "the Early Entry Into Force of the CTBT." It only introduced the phrase after realizing that the US would not agree to the proposal anyway. Though the EIF by the Year 2003 was a reasonable objective in 2001, it is no longer a practical objective under the current international circumstances. Still, the GOJ should at least keep calling for the early EIF. For example, it should make strong calls for it on occasions such as the First Preparatory Committee for 2005 NPT Review Conference (8 April 2002 to 19 April 2002) (2002 NPT PrepCom, for short), various international conferences related to the CTBT EIF conference, and the UNGA..

 

TASK 2 (International Interest)

This evaluation period commenced five years following the conclusion of the CTBT. We were concerned that international interest in the CTBT would deteriorate because of the lack of prospect for the EIF even after the passage of five years. Therefore, the GOJ, as a pro-Early EIF country, should make efforts to maintain and strengthen international interest in the CTBT by continuously bringing the issue to the attention of the international community.

TASK 3 (Criticism of the US and Accountability to Citizens)

The Senate of the US, the most powerful NWS, decided not to ratify the CTBT in October 1999 and the Bush Administration, which came to power in January 2001, disclosed its intention to let the CTBT die. The Bush Administration made the situation worse even during this Report's evaluation period. The official "Information Paper" submitted to the 2002 NPT PrepCom on 11 April says that, "The Bush Administration has no plans to pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

The US made a definite statement in its intention not to fulfill the first of the 13 steps that were agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.The "Nuclear Posture Review" (issued on 31 December 2001, or on 8 January 2002 according to another source of information) has brought to light a worrisome policy transformation by the US behind these movements. We shall discuss this topic in detail in Item 2.

             The US government's refusal to ratify the CTBT is a serious obstacle for its EIF. The fact that the most powerful NWS refused ratification undermines the credibility of the CTBT, especially for the three states which have not signed it yet.
The US policy also constitutes a material breach of the Japan-US bilateral defense agreement, because the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security" of 1996 calls for the "acceleration of the CTBT negotiations." It also states that "both governments will coordinate their policies and cooperate on issues such as arms control and disarmament." Moreover, in March 2000, the two governments set up a "Japan-US Committee on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non Proliferation and Verification" with the intent to promote the early EIF of the CTBT as an issue of the highest priority. The two nations even issued a joint statement celebrating the commencement day of the Committee as a "historic occasion."

             Under these circumstances, it is clear that the GOJ should vigorously protest the US's position. In order to maintain a healthy Japan-US relationship and remain accountable to its citizenry, the GOJ should also inform its citizens of its vigorous protest against the US's stance toward the CTBT.

TASK 4 (Call on States Other than the US)

To change the US policy stance on the CTBT, it is imperative not only to logically criticize its nuclear policy, but also to make an effort to influence the government of the US by rallying international public opinion. One way to achieve this is to make the CTBT more universal by increasing the number of State parties. It is especially important to persuade the twelve states other than the US whose ratification are required for the CTBT to be effective.

              The GOJ and Australia drew up a joint resolution "A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" ("Path Resolution" for short) and submitted it to the 2000 UNGA (November 20, 2000. 55/33R). The resolution proposes to set a time limit to the CTBT ratification process by stressing the importance of "the early signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by all States, especially by those States whose ratification is required for its entry into force, with a view to its early entry into force before 2003." Of the twelve states other than the US whose ratification is required for the CTBT, five voted for the resolution, including Algeria, Columbia, Indonesia, Iran, and Vietnam. We take this to signify that these states agreed to the objective, at least within the administrative apparatus, and may agree to negotiate the CTBT with the above time limit for its ratification.

As exemplified by the above, the GOJ should call upon each State to promote the ratification of the Treaty.

 

TASK 5 (Cooperation with the CTBTO)

The primary mission of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, which was established with funding contributions from the signatories on November 19, 1996, is to get the International Monitoring System (IMS) ready by the time of the coming into effect of the Treat. Since the GOJ has been requested to install ten monitoring stations, it is imperative that these stations receive approval by the CTBTO. However, it is also desirable for the GOJ to provide technical assistance to other countries in areas where Japan has a technological advantage. Moreover, should the US decide not to cooperate with the CTBT, its financial contribution to the CTBTO will likely dwindle. The GOJ should not limit its role not only to technical cooperation but assume a much broader responsibility in maintaining the CTBTO.

 

EVALUATION

 

During the period set for evaluation, we saw some eagerness on the part of the GOJ to achieve the objective set out in Task 1 and 2.

In a general speech delivered during the 2002 NPT PrepCom, Ambassador Yukiya Amano stressed that: "Early entry into force of the CTBT should be achieved. We would like to this opportunity to urge those States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty" (April 8, 2002). In addition, in a working paper, the GOJ expressed its concern that "the NPT regime may be negatively affected" by the lack of progress in the CTBT, and cited some concrete examples of actions taken by the GOJ to demonstrate its eagerness to promote the early EIF. We take this series of actions as a manifestation of the re-establishment of a steady early EIF policy by Japan, and take it as a positive step by the GOJ.

The GOJ has also taken a proactive attitude in its joint call for the ""Friends of the CTBT" Foreign Ministers' Meeting" which was held on September 14, 2002 together with Australia and the Netherlands. At this conference, 18 Foreign Ministers issued a "Joint Ministerial Statement on the CTBT." Though the Statement contains nothing new, its appeal for the significance of the Treaty and the importance of continuous international interest in it was made at the right time by Foreign Ministers, including those of such NWSs as France, Russia and the UK. Taking into consideration the concern over the decline of political interest in the CTBT, as it was stated in Task 2, we believe the GOJ's endeavor was a successful one.

              Japan's "Path Resolution" submitted to 2002 UNGA (A/RES/57/78) was quite disappointing as a whole. Nevertheless, as far as the early EIF of the CTBT is concerned, the GOJ acted positively by incorporating a clause stressing "the importance and urgency of signature and ratifications ... to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty" into the "Path Resolution" in the same way as the previous year.

However, the GOJ has not vigorously pressured the US regarding Task 3. Neither the aforementioned Amano speech nor the "working paper" made any strong demands on the US to change its position vis-a-vis the CTBT. The working paper simply states that "the countries that have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, especially those whose ratification is a requirement for its entry into force, are strongly urged to do so at the earliest possible date" and does not refer to the negative influence precipitated by the fact that the US, the most powerful NWS, has refused not only the ratification of the CTBT but also denied the CTBT itself. Even without mentioning the name of the State, the GOJ could have made its intentions more apparent.

              In a series of dialogues between Peace Depot or the Evaluation Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the MOFA explained that the GOJ has clearly appealed its position to the US through bilateral negotiations. It claimed, for example, that the aforementioned "US-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Verification" established in March 2000, is still in operation. In the fourth conference on August 26, 2002. Ambassador Amano vigorously conveyed Japan's position attaching primary importance of the CTBT to US Under Secretary of State John Bolton. However, the GOJ should have made its protest against the US visible to the public in a way that made it more accountable to its citizens, because the public has interest in the GOJ's policy on early EIF. The US has unilaterally abrogated a joint policy based on an agreement reached at the highest political level. The GOJ should fulfill its accountability to citizens by making a strong protest against the US. The protest against the US must be the basis for starting bilateral negotiations on the future of the CTBT.

              The GOJ's ambiguous attitude vis-a-vis the US has made it difficult for many other states as well as NGOs to understand its diplomatic effort to promote the early EIF.

With regard to Task 4, which urges the GOJ to work with the 12 states other than the US, the Evaluation Committee was able to get a concrete explanation from the MOFA. According to the MOFA, it has begun classifying countries into three categories: those with comparatively minor political obstacles, such as Indonesia, Vietnam, Democratic Republic of Congo, Columbia, Algeria; those burdened with regional security problems such as India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Iran, China; and one final categorization, a special country, North Korea, and is trying to formulate the best plan to cope with each situation. Although we have doubts as to the appropriateness of this categorization (China and the special country, North Korea should be classified into the same category because they face the same threat posed by the US), we believe that the MOFA is making a systematic effort to examine each respective state's circumstances. We also heard specific explanations concerning the situation of Vietnam, Iran, and China.

As to the Task 5, the GOJ is enthusiastically trying to get approval for the IMS monitoring station, which it has established. Also, it has cooperated with the CTBTO by providing technical training for international experts and by granting the necessary equipment required by the monitoring regime. Columbia and Algeria have been selected as recipient countries because they are states whose ratification is required for the EIF of the CTBT.

As a whole, though the GOJ's demands towards the US have not been vigorous, and the GOJ has not been fully accountable to citizens, we can rightly say that it willingly took up other tasks. Therefore, we give it a B grade on this item. 

 

(2)     Moratorium on Nuclear Weapon Tests

 

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the CTBT.

 

Task 1: The GOJ should resist US moves to resume nuclear weapon tests by dissuading it and by rousing international public opinion against it with a sense of urgency.

Task 2: The US "Nuclear Posture Review" made it apparent that subcritical tests are being conducted in preparation for the resumption of nuclear explosion tests. The GOJ should clarify its position against subcritical tests.

Task 3: At the 2002 NPT PrepCom or the UNGA, and on other occasions, The GOJ should call for the continuation of the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests and support similar proposals made by other states.

 

Grade: D

 

TASK SETTING

 

TASK 1 (Response to the US Move)

             The evaluation period of this Report was one when the US resumption of underground nuclear testing attracted a great deal of serious concern within the international community. This critical situation is worsening as time passes.

             In March 2002, US newspapers and NGOs disclosed classified sections of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). In particular, excerpts from the NPR appeared on the website (www.globalsecurity.org) and came to have significant impact. (Peace Depot translated the whole document and published it as a small booklet.)

              The NPR describes the need to resume nuclear weapon tests from two perspectives.

             First, it says that the US is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain the credibility and safety of current US nuclear arsenals without resuming underground nuclear weapon tests. For example, it states:

"The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the United States is making every effort to maintain its stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future. Some problems in the stockpile due to aging and manufacturing defects have already been identified. Increasingly, objective judgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become far more difficult."

             Secondly, it claims that the current nuclear arsenal was developed during the Cold War era; this weaponry does not meet the military needs of the post Cold War era. The US needs new capabilities including new warheads, making the resumption of testing unavoidable (see "9e").

"DOD and NNSA will also jointly review potential programs to provide nuclear capabilities, and identify opportunities for further study, including assessments of whether nuclear testing would be required to field such warhead...In order to address these concerns... NNSA proposes over the next three years to enhance test readiness..."

             Steps toward the resumption of nuclear test explosion went one step further with Section 3142 of the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2003" (November 13, 2002). The US Congress ordered the Department of Energy (DOE) to make a plan to shorten the preparatory period required for testing resumption to 6 months, 12 months, 18 months and 24 months respectively. The law provides that the DOE must submit materials for the testing plan (including the budget outline) attached to the annual budget for FY 2004. This is to ensure that the plan is prepared and submitted within a year.

             Mounting pressure to resume the tests was also evident in an interview conducted by a professional journal with Dr. Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. He told the reporter that, "The US has no choice but to restart nuclear testing to certify that its stockpile of nuclear weapons is safe and reliable, especially if new warhead designs are developed in the coming years..." (January 21, 2003. GovExec.Com). Taking into consideration that the heads of US national weapon laboratories such as Los Alamos are in a position to advise the President on whether or not the moratorium should continue to be observed, we judge the present conditions as critical.

             A show of resolve by the GOJ will be of the utmost importance for the early EIF of the CTBT. It should declare itself to be against such moves to step backward from an early EIF. Therefore, it should not only oppose the US position vigorously, but must also make appeals on the problem to the Japanese and world public.

TASK 2 (Opposition to Subcritical Nuclear Tests)

             The NPR has also made it clear that there is a close linkage between preparations for a nuclear explosion test resumption and subcritical nuclear tests. In this regard, the NPR mentions the following three points (quotations from the NPR):

1. "Test Readiness is maintained principally by the participation of nuclear test program personnel in an active program of stockpile stewardship experiments carried out underground,”
2. “Not all of the techniques and processes required to carry out underground nuclear tests…are exercised with the subcritical experimentation work,”
3. To address these concerns... NNSA proposes over the next three years to enhance test readiness by... conducting additional field experiments including additional subcritical experiments …"

             The link between the two is obvious now. The GOJ, which made a commitment to the promotion of the CTBT and to the continued observation of the nuclear test ban moratorium, must cease acquiescing to the subcritical nuclear tests and vigorously oppose them.

TASK 3 (Call on The International Community)

              With regard to the resumption of nuclear testing, the US is the most dangerous state at the present time. However, the international community should maintain pressure upon other NWSs and on other states such as India and Pakistan to continue the moratorium on nuclear weapon tests. To fulfill this task, the GOJ should repeatedly appeal for the continued observation of the moratorium in such international conferences as the 2002 NPT PrepCom and the UNGA.

 

EVALUATION

 

             During negotiations between the Evaluation Committee or Peace Depot and the MOFA, MOFA officials commented that they have taken the revealed parts of the NPR into consideration in developing their policy, even in the absence of an official US admission. For instance, the GOJ conveyed its concern to John Bolton, US Under Secretary of State, at the US-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Verification (August 26, 2002).

              However, in light of Task 1, we assert that the GOJ's demands toward the US have been too timid. Moreover, we do not feel a sense of urgency in the GOJ's efforts to invoke public opinion. At the Peace Memorial Ceremony in Hiroshima in 2002, The Prime Minister "stressed the importance of the early entry-into-force of the CTBT," but neither referred to the coming crisis regarding the resumption of nuclear testing, nor to dangerous movements in general occurring within US nuclear policy circles in general. Furthermore, the GOJ failed to voice its concern in the ""Friends of the CTBT" Foreign Minister's Meeting" on 14 September 2002.

              Concerning the subcritical nuclear tests, as mentioned in Task 2, the MOFA officer-in-charge did not know that NPR contains a description regarding subcritical tests. During the evaluation period of this Report, the US undertook three subcritical tests: the 17th "Oboe 9" on June 7, 2002; the 18th "Mario" on August 29, 2002; and the 19th "Rocco" on September 26, 2002, all after the NPR had been disclosed. Nevertheless, the GOJ did not unequivocally speak against these subcritical nuclear tests.

              There is an argument within MOFA circles that opposing subcritical nuclear testing will push the US to resume full nuclear testing instead. Certainly, during the Clinton Administration era, there was an argument that the SSMP (Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program), including subcritical testing, was enough to maintain the US nuclear stockpile without undertaking underground nuclear test explosions. Taking into consideration the need to persuade conservative CTBT opposition groups in Congress, the SSMP was said by some proponents of arms control to be a method of expedition for the ratification of the CTBT .

              However, as can be seen from the NPR and refusal to ratify the CTBT, US policy moves according to the dynamics of its domestic politics without regard to agreements with Japan. Therefore, the GOJ should speak out based on its primary objective of the abolition of nuclear weapons, and stress the importance of the test ban from its unique historical perspective. The problem is that Japan's dependence on the US nuclear umbrella has made it impossible to take this line of action.

              The US' moves to resume nuclear testing pose a problem which brings into question the core of Japan's nuclear policy. When the US says, "if we did not resume the underground nuclear testing, we would be unable to provide the nuclear umbrella required by Japan," will Japan acquiesce to the US position on nuclear testing or will it stop depending on the nuclear umbrella provided by the US? To clarify its position toward subcritical nuclear tests would be a first step in answering this question. However, during the evaluation period, the GOJ's consciousness and attitude on this issue has been ambiguous.

             Concerning Task 3, requiring "a continuation of the moratorium on nuclear test explosions" in the NPT PrepCom and in the UNGA, the GOJ has followed its past policy. It has also continued its appeal for a continuation of the moratorium at the "Friends of the CTBT" Foreign Ministers' Meeting (September 14, 2002), albeit without any sense of urgency.

             As a whole, we could not see any earnest response against the US moves toward a resumption of nuclear test explosions. Therefore, we give it a D grade on this item.

 

TASK SETTING

 

TASK 1 (Support for PAROS and Normalization of the CD)

              The GOJ has promoted the FMCT process by attaching an importance to it that parallels that of the CTBT. The biggest obstacle to realizing the FMCT is that the CD, which was set up as a forum for negotiation, is not functioning. Therefore, the normalization of the CD constitutes the most important task for the GOJ in this environment.

              The impasse in the CD can be explained by unresolved disputes over the objectives or mandates of the Ad Hoc Committees and/or Working Groups which are supposed to be established to address the four issues of nuclear disarmament, the FMCT, PAROS, and legally binding Negative Security Assurances (NSA). During the evaluation period, the most obvious confrontation was between the US and China over PAROS. It is obvious that the US Missile Defense (MD) plan was behind this confrontation.

              The US MD plan has had a destabilizing effect on international relations. This is especially true of its relationship with China, which is concerned that its nuclear retaliatory capability may be severely curtailed. Even without regard to problems related to China, however, we cannot deny the fact that MD has shed light on the importance and urgency of PAROS. Since the Bush Administration nullified the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) on June 13, 2002, there have been no legal restrictions on the deployment of weapons into outer space - except for the Space Treaty of 1967, which banned the deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in outer space. The deployment of MD in space has become a feasible plan. Moreover, when President Bush unveiled his initial 2004-2005 Missile Defense Deployment Plan on December 17, 2002, he said that "kinetic energy interceptor missiles" would be included into the next enhancement plan (DOD). This means that an unprecedented weapon deployment in outer space is going to be realized within a few years. Therefore, the argument to grant the Ad Hoc Committee dealing with PAROS a mission to negotiate a treaty is becoming increasingly urgent.

              Though the US accords the highest priority to the FMCT (February 7, 2002, John Bolton, Under Secretary of State), it also "opposes the idea of negotiating a new outer space treaty" (June 27, 2002, Ambassador Eric M. Javits). If Japan follows the US lead in this regard, placing emphasis only on the FMCT, its impartiality within the CD will be doubted - especially at a time when the importance of PAROS is becoming increasingly obvious.

              The GOJ should not be too preoccupied with the idea that China is sticking to PAROS only to obstruct the FMCT process. It should take an impartial stance and attach equal importance to both PAROS and the FMCT. By doing so, it would be able to make a better contribution to the CD normalization.

 

TASKS 2 (Time Frame of the negotiation)

             At the 2001 UNGA, the GOJ received overwhelming support for its proposal that contains more specific objectives regarding the time frame of the FMCT negotiation than that of 2000. It proposed "the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD as early as possible during its 2002 session to negotiate 〔a FMCT〕... with a view to its conclusion within five years." (56/24N) The GOJ should hold fast to this position.

             There is even a possibility that the aim to conclude the Treaty "within five years," from the commencement of the treaty negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee, could be shortened if vigorous discussion and deliberation increase understanding on this issue, particularly through implementing Task 3 as follows.

 

TASKS 3, 4 (Working Outside of the CD Framework and Inventory Making)

            We deem it necessary to proceed with a technical preparation for FMCT outside of the CD framework until the treaty negotiations commence within the CD. In the past, Japan and Australia co-sponsored a FMCT workshop in Geneva inviting government officials as well as experts. Within the workshop, views were exchanged as to the fundamental obligations under the Treaty, verification and organization of the Treaty. The GOJ should continue such efforts.

           During the course of its efforts, the GOJ should take notice of the CD agreement to "consider both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation" as the country devastated by nuclear weapons. For such countries as the US and Russia which have surplus nuclear material stockpiles for military use, the obligations towards nuclear disarmament cannot be fulfilled merely by "prohibiting the future production" of fissile materials for military use. In this regard, Japan should encourage discussions which highlight how to deal with fissile materials "produced in the past." It may be difficult to include regulations on nuclear materials stockpiles into the Treaty because these regulations will go beyond the conditions set out in the NPT agreement, namely "in accordance with the special coordinator's statements made in 1995." (The agreement is called the "Shannon Report." It is translated in the Peace Depot's Yearbook "2002 Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Weapon-Free Local Authorities"). However, the Shannon Report also says that the FMCT negotiation process does not "preclude any delegation from raising points to consider in the Ad Hoc Committee, any of the above noted issues," including past production.

           We consider it useful to make an inventory of all nuclear fissile materials possessed by every state regardless of their military or commercial use and make it one of the bases for the FMCT negotiations. This is consistent with the present need to strengthen the control of nuclear materials for weapons so that terrorists cannot obtain them easily. This inventory should be added to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs database of weapons of mass destruction.

EVALUATION

 

              As for CD normalization, the so-called Amorim proposal (August 2000, CD/1624. Amorim is a name of the Brazilian Ambassador) has been pivotal; and Japan's Ambassador on Disarmament, Seiichiro Noboru, has also called support for it (14 February 2002). Various new efforts have been made during this Report's evaluation period. Among others, a mediation plan (August 29, 2002) proposed by five former chairmen of the CD, Dembri (Algeria), Lint (Belgium), Reyes (Columbia), Salander (Sweden), and Vega (Chile), has had a great impact on the CD normalization process.

             The plan proposes to set up an Ad Hoc Committee for each of four important issues -- nuclear disarmament, the FMCT, PAROS, and Negative Security Assurances -- as explained in Task 1. Following the suggestions of the Shannon report, a negotiation mandate should be given to the FMCT Committee and more limited mandates should be given to the other Committees. The plan takes note of the hotly debated PAROS as follows:

             "The Ad Hoc Committee shall identify and examine, without limitation and without prejudice, any specific topics or proposals, which could include confidence-building or transparency measures, general principles, treaty commitments and the elaboration of a regime capable of preventing an arms race in outer space."

             The mediation plan of the five former chairmen was attentive to the concerns of both the US and China. However, it did not ease the tensions in the US-China relationship in a significant manner, despite the fact that the most states were ready to accept it.

             The GOJ supported this plan in principle, as exemplified by a remark made by the Ambassador on Disarmament, Kuniko Inoguchi, that "I am especially encouraged" in her speech delivered at the last session of the 2002 CD. Nevertheless, we failed to note any occasions where Japan played a unique role in normalizing the CD, through its own approach, including attaching equal importance to PAROS as well as to the FMCT. We can postulate, however, that Japan held a position to request compromise from both the US and China. This was indicated by Ambassador Inoguchi's first speech delivered at the 2003 CD, which encouraged the US and China to make a compromise, specifically mentioning their names (February 20, 2003).

             With regard to Task 2, the GOJ proposed a draft resolution calling for the commencement of negotiations within a year and their conclusion within five years at the 2002 UNGA and received overwhelming support for it. The GOJ's intention remains the same as in the 2001 UNGA except for a change in the figures. The resolution proposed "the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament as early as possible during its 2003 session ... with a view to its conclusion within five years ..." (November 22, 2002 A/RES/57/78). It was meaningful that the GOJ continued to demonstrate a proactive posture in setting a time limit for the FMCT in the UNGA, especially during a time when the CD was at a standstill.

             As for Task 3, which calls for the convening of a FMCT panel of expert outside of the CD framework, we should take notice of the fact that the Netherlands held informal sessions to discuss details of the Treaty in June and September 2002. Though the GOJ did not organize any events during this evaluation period, it prepared for a meeting on the subject and has unveiled its plan to hold a workshop in Geneva together with Australia and the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research on March 28, 2003. The theme of the workshop will be "Promoting Verification in Multilateral Arms Control Treaties," and will focus on issues related to FMCT verification measures.

             Regarding Task 4, the GOJ has done nothing concrete to make an inventory of fissile materials.

 

              As a whole, we saw a positive posture by the GOJ toward the FMCT. Though the GOJ's creative mediation role at the CD remains unsatisfactory, its appeal for mediation between the US-China should be looked at positively. Therefore, we give it B grade on this item.

 

(4)      A Program of Work to Establish a Subsidiary Body to Deal with Nuclear Disarmament in the CD

 

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

 

Task 1: The GOJ should repeat its appeals for the importance of an Ad Hoc Committee on nuclear disarmament utilizing such fora as the UNGA and the CD. As a country once ravaged by nuclear weapons, it should play a leading role in ensuring that the Ad Hoc Committee be given effective mandates for its goal.

Task 2: The GOJ should maintain its diplomatic independence as the country devastated by nuclear weapons so that it can broker a mediation proposal to break the impasse in the CD. In particular, it should demonstrate its proactive attitude towards the PAROS.

Task 3: The GOJ should stress the urgency to promote nuclear disarmament at a time when problems related to nuclear weapon development by Iraq and North Korea and the possible use of nuclear weapons by terrorists are attracting international concern. As a country which understands the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons, it should attempt to influence international public opinion in innovative ways.

 

Grade: D

 

TASK SETTING

 

TASK 1, 2 (Breakthrough in the CD Impasse)

              The 2001 "Path Resolution" called for the establishment of an objective to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament in the CD "as early as possible during its 2002 session." As we referred to in the last section, it makes sense for the GOJ to advocate a constantly renewed time frame - particularly when the CD has been paralyzed. The GOJ should maintain its position regarding this proposal.

             At the same time, however, the GOJ should take pains to ensure that the Ad Hoc Committee be given enough power to effectively promote nuclear disarmament. In the aforementioned Amorim proposal (which is designed to break the impasse in the CD), the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee is to "exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this nuclear disarmament objective." Since the Ad Hoc Committee is precluded from being used for the consultation and negotiation of nuclear disarmament issues, states that have been active in disarmament, such as New Zealand, have duly noted that this type of Committee does not correspond to a subsidiary body under the NPT agreement. With the awareness that Japan is a country that was once victimized by nuclear bombs, the GOJ is requested to play a leading role to ensure that the Ad Hoc Committee be given effective mandates to promote nuclear disarmament.

             As was mentioned in the previous section, the impasse in the CD continues. This impasse must be overcome in order to reach an agreement on a programme of work that includes the establishment of a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament issues. It is important as well to establish a tradition of diplomatic independence　based on Japan's unique circumstances as a nation that was desolated by the horror of atomic weaponry. In relation to this, Japan should establish a proactive and impartial posture towards the PAROS as well.

 

TASK 3 (Invocation of International Public Opinion)

             If we are to go beyond the impasse in the CD, establish a Ad Hoc committee and empower the Committee with a concrete mandate, we must consider a rise in international public opinion calling for nuclear disarmament to be an important element towards this goal.

             Under the stimulation of such concerns as the development of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and nuclear weapons in North Korea, and the possibility of a nuclear attack by terrorist groups, the international community's interest in and concerns about problems related to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are increasing in strength. The GOJ should respond to this international concern and appeal the urgent need to abolish nuclear weapons altogether, based on a moral position which stresses the inhumane nature of such weapons. Japan would be able to make appeals to the world by transforming its own policy, such as enacting a "Non-Nuclear Law." It is also conceivable for the GOJ to support municipal governments, such as the cities of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, in assuming a leadership role in educating the public of the inhumane nature and the danger that nuclear weapons pose to humankind. Thus, the GOJ should emphasize the importance of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament in the CD by raising global public awareness in an innovative way.

 

EVALUATION

 

              With regard to Task 1, the GOJ followed its former policy in the 2002 Path Resolution and called for "the establishment of an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament in the CD as early as possible during its 2003 session in the context of establishing a programme of work" (A/RES/57/78).

             Nevertheless, the GOJ has made barely any comment at the CD about the mandate of this subsidiary body. It appears that it has not paid any attention to the substance of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament, and only sees importance in the FMCT. This position is a direct result of its infamous "step-by-step approach." Certainly, the FMCT should be taken as a realistic next step, in the sense that it will possibly reach the stage where earnest negotiations for a treaty will begin. However, we believe that the GOJ should concurrently bring forward many issues at once, regardless of differences in feasibility.

             In fact, the new initiative of Ambassadors Dembri, Lint, Reyes, Salander and Vega ("Five Ambassadors' Initiative") proposes that a mandate to "examine approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral character" be included in those of the Nuclear Disarmament Ad Hoc Committee, in addition to the mandates of the Amorim proposal, in which the committee's mandate is "to exchange information and views on practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to attain this [nuclear disarmament] objective." Though the new proposal has not been adopted, we would welcome it if it could be taken up in the future. As we mentioned earlier, the GOJ has supported it Nevertheless, the GOJ has not acted positively in promoting the initiative.

             As for Task 2, which calls for a breakthrough in the impasse in the CD, the GOJ has not made any independent contribution either in appealing the importance of the PAROS, or in the role of a mediator to resolve this political deadlock.

             In relation to both Task 1 and 2, we regret to conclude that the Japanese representative did not seize the opportunity at the CD on August 22, 2002 when the Malaysian representative, speaking on the importance of nuclear disarmament, conveyed an invitation that the Mayor of Nagasaki put forward to hold a CD conference in Nagasaki. Though Ambassador Inoguchi, who spoke after the Malaysian representative, mentioned that the GOJ was doing its best to respond to the impassioned wishes of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, she did not express the sense of urgency for nuclear disarmament. Instead, the GOJ focused its attention purely upon FMCT and advertised its policy priority.

             Our criticism regarding Task 3 is a direct result of the GOJ's stance on this issue. Despite the growing tension in the world over issues involving WMD, such as Iraq, North Korea and terrorism, the GOJ has continued to be somewhat weak-kneed in projecting its unique position as a nation victimized by atomic bombs. The GOJ followed the US lead in only highlighting nuclear proliferation to "rogue states," and has made few statements regarding the abolition of nuclear weapons.

 

              As a whole, we see very little effort on the part of the GOJ on Item 4. Therefore, we give it a D grade on this item.

 

 

(5)      The Principle of Irreversibility

 

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

 

Task 1: The GOJ should demand that both the US and Russia abide by the principle of irreversibility in their implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

Task 2: The GOJ should vigorously protest the US' neglect of the principle of irreversibility manifested by such key words as "responsive forces," "resumption of nuclear tests," "new nuclear weapons," etc., contained in the US NPR and should strongly call upon the US to observe this principle.

Task 3: The GOJ should call upon the Bush Administration not to neglect but to maintain its commitment to Negative Security Assurances.

Task 4: The US Missile Defense (MD) has been a primary cause of the reversal of the trend in nuclear disarmament and other arms control programs. The GOJ should criticize the US MD Plan and terminate its cooperative technical research with the US on MD, which is a breach of a resolution passed in the Japanese Diet .

Task 5: In order to prevent the re-deployment of tactical nuclear weapons aboard ships and aircraft, Japan should codify its Three Non-Nuclear Principles into Law and establish these principles as an irreversible national policy.

 

Grade: E

 

TASK SETTING

 

TASK 1 (Requirements for the Moscow Treaty)

            Since the US announced the abrogation on December 13, 2001 of the ABM Treaty (which came into effect six months later), we expected the termination of the Treaty together with the actual end of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process early in the evaluation period of this Report. Even though the US and Russia continued negotiations on a new strategic framework, the US unveiled a policy to unilaterally reduce strategic nuclear weapons without the framework of a treaty. Behind this US policy transformation was a newly formulated concept disclosed by the NPR. The concept of "responsive force" is the idea of retaining the weapons reduced under the Treaty in an active state with the possibility of future redeployment. It is understood that these US actions break the principle of irreversibility. The GOJ should have persuaded the US to withdraw its unilateral plan to abrogate the ABM Treaty and to maintain the START process. Furthermore, the GOJ should have called upon both the US and Russia to take seriously the principle of irreversibility .

             While the US and Russia signed the "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" (Moscow Treaty) on May 24, 2002, it is too simple to have means for verification and does not oblige the parties to dismantle delivery vehicles as was the case with START. Though the Treaty contains an agreement to reduce the number of strategic weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads, it does not refer to the problems caused by the redeployment of reduced weapons. Therefore, we believe that the GOJ should point out these defects in the Moscow Treaty and call upon both states to discuss issues related to the principle of irreversibility at this stage of the ratification process.

 

TASK 2 (Protest against the US NPR)

              The US NPR, which was disclosed in early 2002, makes it evident that the US does not care about the principle of irreversibility at all.

             First, the NPR brings to light the US policy of keeping its reduced warheads active as "responsive forces." Second, it stresses the necessity to resume nuclear testing (cf. Item 2). Third, it insists on giving new capabilities to nuclear weapons, reversing its previous policy of not developing new types of nuclear weapons (cf. Item 9e). The GOJ should vigorously protest on these three points.

 

TASK 3 (Appeal for Negative Security Assurances by the US)

             All nuclear weapon states made a commitment not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear parties to the NPT, in the United Nations Security Council Resolution adopted on April 11, 1995 (Negative Security Assurances). Nevertheless, the Bush Administration has repeatedly forwarded its view placing nuclear weapons as a retaliatory weapon against all WMDs including non-nuclear WMDs, neglecting its commitment to NSAs. This amounts to a breach in the principle of irreversibility.

             Out of seven countries (Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya) which the NPR lists as potential targets, five (all except Russia and China) are non-NWS parties to the NPT. Moreover, the "National Security Strategy" (September 2002) and "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction" (December 2002), indicate that the US may resort to a nuclear strike not only to retaliate against the use of WMDs, but may also carry out a preemptive strike to destroy the WMDs of the adversaries. Newspaper dealing with the US strikes against Iraq have frequently referred to this US policy. This is dangerous policy indeed. Not only will it become an obstacle for the continuation of the irreversible trend in nuclear disarmament, but it will also reduce the threshold of restraint for using nuclear weaponry. Therefore, the GOJ should strongly insist that US observe the NSA commitment.

            

 

TASK 4 (Criticism of the MD)

             In Items 3 and 4, we have already pointed out that the US MD plan has been a major reason for the impasse in the CD. It will also effectively attach new military value to nuclear weapons by precipitating a new arms race. In fact, the "Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)" (30 September 2001), which serves as the basis for the US NPR, advocates a newly-defined "New Triad" of defense capability which integrates MD and nuclear weapons. This kind of security structure cannot help but influence other states' nuclear strategies.

             On the other hand, the Japan-US cooperative technical research program on Theater Missiles Defense (TMD) places the principle of irreversibility in danger in East Asia. Even though it is only a research project, the Japan-US inclination to support MD strategies is placing a great deal of strain on the East Asia security environment and has triggered a new arms race. It may cause China not only to take a harder line in its nuclear policy, but also to reverse its traditional policies, including no-first-use and unconditional negative security assurance policies.

             Moreover, the Japan-US cooperative research project has studied a system called a "Sea-based Midcourse Interceptor System," which occupies a central place in the overall US MD plan. This means that the joint research is going against the trend of disarmament not only in East Asia, but also throughout the world. On the part of Japan, this technical research program violates the Japanese Diet Resolution "On the Fundamentals regarding the Development and Use of Outer Space" (May 9, 1969), as well as "the principle of irreversibility to apply to ... other arms control measures" as stipulated in this item of the 13 steps.

             Therefore, the GOJ should oppose the US MD Plan and bring the Japan-US cooperative research program to an end.

 

TASK 5 (Prevention of Redeployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons aboard ships)

             In 1991 and 1992, President Bush and Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin agreed to measures to eliminate and withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from ships and aircraft by "unilateral reciprocal measures." It is especially important to ensure that these measures are irreversible. Japan is a direct beneficiary of this measure because it has been liberated from suspicions regarding the introduction of nuclear weapons by US ships and aircraft, at least during peacetime. It is appropriate to enact the Three Non-Nuclear Principles into a binding law as a way to ensure the irreversibility of this measure in a host nation of ships and aircraft.

 

EVALUATION

 

              Though the principle of irreversibility was one of the most important agreements made at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the GOJ has not shown any sign of willingness or eagerness to respect it.

             Passively standing by the sidelines, the GOJ has seen a series of events unfold since the US announced its abrogation of the ABM Treaty. It also has given the wrong impression to citizens that the situation is getting better, by referring only to the fact that the US and Russia are considering a substantial reduction of their operational nuclear strategic weapons.

             On Task 1, the GOJ optimistically depicted future prospects for further reductions in a working paper submitted to the 2002 NPT PrepCom which was held before the signature of the Moscow Treaty. It wrote that: "Japan welcomes the recent announcement that the United States and Russia intend to reduce their nuclear arsenals... This is a positive step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons...following the completion of START I at the end of last year" (April 2002).

             Since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty, the GOJ has neither made speeches nor expressed its concerns with regard to the uncertain assurance of the principle of irreversibility. On the day of signature of the Treaty, a MOFA spokesperson made a purely positive remark and expressed MOFA's wish for the Treaty to "promote the international movement toward arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation" (May 24, 2002). In the same vein, the speech delivered by Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi in the First Committee of the UNGA did no more than touch upon the name of the Moscow Treaty, saying that "we highly value the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions between Russia and the United States, and expect that this Treaty should serve as an important step toward nuclear disarmament efforts." (October 1, 2002)

             As for Task 2, we have already discussed in detail the GOJ's lack of response to the NPR.

             With regard to NSAs in Task 3, the Washington Times on January 31, 2003 disclosed a crucial fact. The "National Security Presidential Directive 17 (NSPD17)," a classified document which provided the basis for the aforementioned "National Security Strategy to Combat WMD," outlined the use of nuclear weapon as follows:

             "The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force - including potentially nuclear weapons - to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies" (NSPD 17).

             The GOJ has not referred to these US moves to nullify its commitment to NSAs.

             Regarding the MD (Task 4), the GOJ is moving in the opposite direction of where it should be going, and is weakening the principle of irreversibility. The joint statement made by the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee says that Japan "expressed its intention to address this subject on its own initiative during review of its defense posture, based on the rapidly evolving state of technological developments relating to all elements of the ballistic missile defense program," and "acknowledged the need to continue current U.S.- Japan cooperative research on ballistic missile defense technologies and to intensify consultation and cooperation on missile defense." (December 16, 2002) In fact, Director General of the Defense Agency (DA) Shigeru Ishiba went beyond this statement in expressing the DA's intention to "consider the development and deployment of MD." Though he later moved backward on this earlier statement, mentioning that it was not a departure from the GOJ's previous policy that "the transition to the development and implementation stages"...will be judged separately." (Chief Cabinet Secretary's Statement on December 25, 1998), we see this as a manifestation of the DA's implicit intention to promote the MD program.

             Japan is responsible for developing improved interception under the Japan-US technical research cooperation, and this obviously comes under category of "objects to be launched into the space and rockets to be used for launching such objects for military purposes" that are banned by the 1969 Diet Resolution. It seems that the GOJ itself is proceeding toward violating the principle of irreversibility.
We also must take into account the fact that the MD could impede the promotion of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Initiative in Northeast Asia; an objective set forth in the item (+2).

             As for Task 5, which calls for the GOJ to ensure the principle of not allowing the introduction of nuclear weapons, the GOJ has not taken any action pursuing the legislation of the three Non-Nuclear Principles. To make matters worse, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda told the press that the GOJ might "reconsider these Three Non-Nuclear Principles in the future" (June 3, 2002). His remark caused a great deal of turmoil and resulted in an intensive session in the Ad Hoc Committee on Emergency Legislation in the House of Representatives (June 10, 2002). Though Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi repeatedly confirmed that "the GOJ has chosen the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a policy," his reply was far from an endorsement of the Principle to be legislated.

 

              As a whole, based on the above evaluation, we regretfully give the GOJ an E on this item.

 

 

(6)      An Unequivocal Undertaking by the Nuclear-Weapon States to Accomplish the Total Elimination of their Nuclear Arsenals

 

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

 

Task 1: The GOJ should clearly criticize the NPR, whose idea is premised upon the semi permanent existence of nuclear weapons, and call upon the US to cancel it.

Task 2: Japan should include, within its UNGA resolution "A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons," contents "calling upon all nuclear weapon states to formulate their plans of action to implement their 'unequivocal undertaking for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.'"

Task 3: The GOJ itself should formulate a plan of action to completely eliminate its dependence on nuclear weapons.

 

Grade: E

 

TASK SETTING

 

TASK 1 (Criticism of the US's NPR)

              The "unequivocal undertaking" contained in the 2000 Agreement is a jewel upon which we can build our nuclear-free world. Nevertheless, nuclear weapon states (NWSs) failed to show any sign that they would substantially change their nuclear posture, even after making a commitment to this "unequivocal undertaking." They also failed to show any improvement in their attitude at the discussions in the CD. The US, in particular, seems to be promoting a policy that runs counter to the above undertaking.

             The NPR explicitly highlighted the fact that the US wishes to retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. The NPR reconfirms the importance of nuclear weapons in that they will "play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the US, its allies and friends." It goes on to stress the need to obtain new Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) by 2018, develop new strategic submarines and new submarine-launched ballistic missiles by 2029, and work toward the development of a new strategic bomber by 2040. In short, the US, under the NPR, plans to renew its arsenals on the assumption that nuclear weapons will continue to play a decisive role until the middle of the 21st century.

             It is inconceivable for a state which has agreed upon "an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals" to have developed such a plan. The GOJ should vigorously criticize the US and request that the US change its way of strategic thinking.

 

TASK 2 (Call for the Plan of Action)

              The GOJ submitted a new draft resolution entitled "A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" at the UNGA in the autumn of 2000. We praise this initiative, as the new title of the resolution may allow the GOJ to include a request for an implementation plan of the 'unequivocal undertaking' for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The GOJ should repeat concrete attempts to push the nuclear weapon states, through the resolutions, towards the implementation of the "unequivocal undertaking."

             One of the essential requirements to be included in the resolution is a demand that the nuclear weapon states formulate "plans of action for the implementation of the total elimination," as a next step, since they have already committed themselves to the "unequivocal undertaking." The plans of action could be different for each nuclear weapon state, and therefore it would be realistic to include, in the draft text of the Path Resolution, contents that merely request them to formulate and submit plans of action for the implementation of the "unequivocal undertaking."

 

TASK 3 (Total Elimination of Dependence on Nuclear Weapons)

              The task of achieving the total elimination of nuclear arsenals is not only one for the NWSs themselves but also for states such as NATO members, Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), in which the dependence on nuclear weapons is an important part of their respective security policies. Since the adoption of the "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals," nuclear-dependent states have also made an "unequivocal undertaking" to totally eliminate their dependence on nuclear weapons. Therefore, the nuclear-dependent states are urged to formulate plans of action for the implementation of such unequivocal undertaking. Japan should play a leading role in this movement.

 

EVALUATION

 

             With regard to Task 1, the GOJ has not acted against the US NPR, which goes contrary to the 'unequivocal undertaking.' It seems to us that the GOJ is completely indifferent to the US nuclear posture highlighted in its NPR. The MOFA has expressed the view that the US and Russia's reduction of nuclear arsenals is proof of their commitment of the implementation of the 'unequivocal undertaking.' However, the NPR clearly indicates that this reduction in capability is premised on the semi-permanent possession of nuclear weapons. The MOFA has turned a blind-eye to this fact.

             The GOJ has adopted strange behavior in the draft text of the 2001 Path Resolution. This could be interpreted as an intent to discard the gains of the 'unequivocal undertaking.' The natural course of logic is as follows: the 'unequivocal undertaking' has already been made, so the next step should be demands made on the premise of the undertaking. Along this course, Japan placed the rhetoric 'unequivocal undertaking' into the preamble and welcomed it in the 2000 Path Resolution. The New Agenda took a similar stance as well.

             However, in the 2001 Path Resolution, the GOJ put the 'unequivocal undertaking' into one of the operative paragraphs; in other words, it downgraded the 'unequivocal undertaking' into one among a series of steps to be taken in the future. In response to strong criticism by the New Agenda countries, Japan added the modifier of "as agreed in the 2000 NPT Review Conference" to the 'unequivocal undertaking,' but did not amend the place where it was placed. That was one of the major reasons why the New Agenda countries abstained from voting on the 2001 Path Resolution. Nevertheless, the GOJ treated the 'unequivocal undertaking' in the 2002 Path Resolution in the same manner as in the 2001 Path Resolution. It is reported by observers that the GOJ did this in order to gain a 'yes' vote from France.

             The Path Resolution should also have stressed the urgency for the implementation of the 'unequivocal undertaking' in a transparent manner - especially when the US posture to break the 'unequivocal undertaking' had become obvious in its NPR. The GOJ was insensitive to this situation in the 2002 Path Resolution.

             The record of the GOJ on Task 2 raises serious doubts as to whether it understands the importance of the 'unequivocal undertakings.'.
What's more, in regards to Task 3, the GOJ has shown no signs of being aware that the "unequivocal undertaking" is an issue on which it must act on its own.

 

              As a whole, it is regretful that the GOJ has made little effort to fulfill the tasks set forth in this important item, especially since the Japanese people were once devastated by nuclear weapons. Thus, we give the GOJ an E.

 

 

(7)      The Preservation and Strengthening of the ABM Treaty and the Promotion of the START Process

 

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

 

 

(8)      The Completion and Implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the US, Russia and the IAEA

 

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

 

Task 1: Japan should lend its support to the Trilateral Initiative.