Japan Update

Evaluating Implementation of the NPT 13+2 Steps:

JAPAN’S REPORT CARD

ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

March 27, 2002

	NPT 13+2 Steps	2002	2003	2004	2005
1	Early Entry into Force of the CTBT	D
2	Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Tests	D
3	A Program of Work at the CD to Conclude the FMCT Within Five Years	B
4	A Program of Work to Establish a Subsidiary Body to Deal with Nuclear Disarmament in the CD	C
5	The Principle of Irreversibility	E
6	An Unequivocal Undertaking by the Nuclear-Weapon States to Accomplish the Total Elimination of their Nuclear Arsenals.	E
7	The Preservation and Strengthening of the ABM Treaty and the Promotion of the START Process	E
8	The Completion and Implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the US, Russia and the IAEA	D
9	"International Stability" and the "Principle of Undiminished Security for All"	D
	a. Unilateral Cuts in Nuclear Arsenals	D
	b. Increasing Transparency	D
	c. Reductions in Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons	D
	d. Reducing Operational Status	D
	e. A Diminishing Role for Nuclear Weapons in Security Policies	E
	f. The Engagement of All Nuclear-Weapon States in a Process Leading to 　the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons	D
10	The Placement of Excess Fissile Material under International Control and its Use for Peaceful Purposes	D
11	General and Complete Disarmament as the Ultimate Objective	E
12	Regular Reports on the Implementation of the Obligation of Nuclear Disarmament Recalling the ICJ's Advisory Opinion	D
13	The Further Development of Verification Capabilities	D
+1	Legally Binding Negative Security Assurances	D
+2	Establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones	D

l This is an assessment, from Japanese citizens’ perspectives, of the Japanese government’s efforts from May 20, 2000 to February 16, 2002 for the implementation of the 13+2 steps, that is, the thirteen practical steps to implement article VI, plus two steps which are deeply connected to Japan among the steps on article VII, contained in the Final Document of 2000 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that was adopted by consensus in May 2000.

l We have set forth several TASKs for each step, which are necessary under the present circumstances and are also possible for Japan to carry out. The TASKs will be different from year to year according to the changing situation. Among them, we have identified the “important tasks” which should be given particular focus. We judge “importance” based on the perspectives of achieving early elimination of nuclear weapons, the relevant international political situation, and the Japanese political situation. We have given grades form A to E, based on a consideration of the Japanese government’s efforts on each TASK we have set.

l "Explanation of the Reason of Evaluation" explains the details of the task setting and the grounds for the evaluation.

l The issuance of the Report Card will be continued every year until 2005, when the next NPT Review Conference will be held.

The evaluation was made by the Evaluation Committee, consisting of the following ten members.

(In alphabetical order)

HIRAOKA Takashi	Former Mayor of Hiroshima City
KUROSAWA Mitsuru	Osaka University
MAEDA Tetsuo	Tokyo International University
MORITAKI Haruko	Hiroshima Alliance for Nuclear Weapons Abolition
NIKI Michiko	YWCA of Japan
TAKEMURA Yasuko	Former Member of the House of Councilors
TANAKA Terumi	Nihon Hidankyo
TSUCHIYAMA Hideo	Former President, Nagasaki University
TSURU Yasuko	Tokyo Gakugei University
UMEBAYASHI Hiromichi	Peace Depot (Chair of the Committee)

Comments:

l It is remarkable that Japan’s so-called “nuclear disarmament policy” is directed to “nuclear non-proliferation” rather than to “nuclear disarmament.”

l The question of whether Japan is growing out of its nuclear-dependent policy is the key to measuring whether its efforts are bearing fruits. As far as Japan continues to be dependent on nuclear weapons, its behavior would be viewed with suspicion, and it seems highly likely that Japan will not be able to achieve what it should achieve even when there are the golden opportunities where Japan could make use of its influence.

l Political initiatives that reflect the will of the people should be issued, regardless of whether it is done by parties inside or outside of power. We cannot go beyond dependence on the US if we leave the issue in the bureaucrats’ hands.

l We were struck by the fact that there were few discussions in the National Diet that could be referred to in the evaluation.

l The number of staff in charge of disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who work under the political leadership should be increased. We should seriously consider the establishment of a Disarmament Agency.

l Grades D and E should be regarded as failing grades. The overall grade becomes “D- (D Minus)”, which is also a failing grade.

Explanation for Grading:

A:	Japan has tackled its core task of eliminating dependence on nuclear weapons, or has made a significant contribution for global nuclear disarmament.
B:	Japan has been enthusiastic in tackling the important tasks (underlined in the “Explanation of the Reason of Evaluation”).
C:	Japan has carried out some of the tasks.
D:	Japan carried out none or very few of the tasks. Fortunately, this did not constitute a direct factor setting back the global situation.
E:	Japan carried out none of the important tasks. Or even if Japan carried out some of them, it failed to make the most of its precious opportunity as a country devastated by nuclear weapons.

Japan’s Report Card Evaluation Committee on Nuclear Disarmament
c/o Peace Depot
Hiyoshi Gruene 102, 3-3-1, Minowa-cho, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama 223-0051, Japan
Phone: (81)45-563-5101 Fax: (81)45-563-9907 http://www.peacedepot.org

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Peace Depot

3-3-1-102, Minowa-cho, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-0051 Japan
TEL: 045-563-5101 FAX: 045-563-9907
Email： office@peacedepot.org