

Peace Depot Newsletter

No. 6 June 1, 2000

The Peace Depot (Peace Resources Cooperative, Japan)

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- •The "Peace Depot Newsletter" reports the activities of the Peace Depot, a non-profit and independent peace research, education and information institution.
- •For subscription, please write to the office below. The "Newsletter" is free to overseas subscribers for the time being. Those who read Japanese are encouraged to subscribe to our bi-weekly journal "Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor" by sending ¥5,000 per year.

postal address: Hiyoshi Gruene 102, 3-3-1, Minowa-cho, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-0051 Japan phone: (81)45-563-5101 fax: (81)45-563-9907 e-mail: peacedepot@y.email.ne.jp

website: http://www.jca.apc.org/peacedepot/english.html

Japan Was Asked and Accepted to Homeport a Nuclear-Armed US Aircraft Carrier in 1972

Peace Depot' Revelation Made a Front Top Article of the Asahi-Shimbun

A recent research by the Peace Depot on the declassified U.S. diplomatic documents revealed for the first time that a new interpretation of the "prior consultation" arrangement between Japan and the United States under the Security Treaty was invented when the U.S. Government attempted to homeport the USS Midway, a nuclear-armed aircraft carrier, in Yokosuka Japan in 1971-73. This new interpretation, tacitly approved by the Government of Japan (GOJ), was intended to nullify further than ever the "prior consultation" system which had been established to be utilized whenever the U.S. wanted to "introduce" nuclear weapons to Japan. The GOJ has been explaining to the public that the system is valid and therefore, as long as a prior consultation is not requested by the United States, it believes there is no bringing-in of nuclear weapons into Japan. The Asahi-Shimbun, one of the most respected and most widely distributed newspapers in Japan, carried the Peace Depot's finding at the very top of the front page on April 3, 2000.

Last summer, Professor Kan of Kyushu University, revealed a secret document reporting a 1963 agreement between Ambassador Reischauer, then U.S. Ambassador to Japan, and Ohira, then Japanese Foreign Minister, in which Ohira confirmed the Reischauer's understanding that the "prior consultation" clause applies neither to the transit of vessels with nuclear weapons aboard in Japanese waters nor to the portcall in Japan by such vessels. The GOJ denies the existence of such agreement.

The concept of homeport is different from that of portcall as well as from that of transit, and it is much closer to the concept of "stationing" and "placing" which have been used to paraphrase the word "introduction" appearing in the "prior consultation" clause. Therefore, the plan to homeport a nuclear-armed aircraft carrier necessitated inventing a new interpretation. The U.S. Government suggested that homeporting just meant frequent portcalls caused by the residence in Japan of crew families and could be dealt with under the extended understanding of the Ohira-Reischauer agreement. The U.S. asked about the view of the Japanese Foreign Ministry on this specific point, but the latter didn't comment and tacitly accepted.

The finding was made in the course of study on the whole

Contents of This Issue

- Discussion with MOFA on Nuclear Disarmament and the NPT Review Conference-----2
- The Year 2000 Campaign to Revitalize Grassroots Voices to Abolish Nuclear Weapons-----4
- A Call for an International NGO Conference in Nagasaki to Abolish Nuclear Weapon-----7

process of U.S.-Japan negotiation during the period from 1970 to 1973 regarding the first overseas homeporting of a U.S. aircraft carrier. Among others, two key documents, both labeled secret, are "Memorandum of Conversation" among officials including the U.S. Under Secretary Johnson and Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira at Kuilima Hotel Hawaii in August 31, 1972 and a telegram dated Oct. 16, 1972 from Ambassador Ingersoll in Tokyo to the State Department. A fuller article written by Hiro Umebayashi, President the Peace Depot will be published in the meantime. (Hiro UMEBAYASHI)

The Real Thinking of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Discussion with MOFA on Nuclear Disarmament and the NPT Review Conference

It is not easy for an author to summarize another's views, especially views which the author finds inherently self-contradictory. The following is an account that is the result of such an attempt by the present authors. We have extracted typical questions and answers from discussions between Japanese citizens and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Japan, regarding the Government of Japan's (GOJ) nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy. Since the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament convened by the GOJ in 1998, discussions have taken place at five NGO meetings attended by guest speakers from the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of MOFA. Where necessary, comments by the authors follow the Q and A.

Q1. Why did the Government of Japan (GOJ) abstain from voting on the New Agenda Resolution in the UN General Assembly?

A1. There are two reasons. One is that Japan, though it shares the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, takes a different approach from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) countries. We need to have the cooperation of the nuclear weapon states and it is not necessarily constructive to take a confrontational attitude vis-a-vis these states. The last resolution, though improved, still betrays a degree of skepticism towards the commitment of the nuclear weapon states.

The other reason is that Japan, as a country that relies on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for its national security, cannot support proposed intermediate measures, such as no-first-use, which might reduce the effectiveness of that deterrent.

Q2. We cannot understand why Japan, the only country which has been devastated by the Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and witnessed the Hibakusha's

tragic deaths and damaged lives, relies on nuclear weapons for national security. You are, in effect, creating more Hibakusha.

A2. The government fully understands the terrible experiences and the inhumane nature of the A and H bombs; however, the international security circumstances surrounding Japan are quite severe. The GOJ embraces the ideal and goal of nuclear abolition, but at the same time, in practice, it cannot help but rely upon security policies which include nuclear deterrence. We sincerely invite citizens to understand the practical challenges we face in the real world of international relations.

(Authors' comments) We don't believe the GOJ's claim that it "fully understands the terrible experiences and the inhumane nature of A and H bombs." Full understanding of the "inhumane nature of A and H bombs" should naturally lead to an analysis of the legality of nuclear weapons based upon international law. One of the fundamental principles of the foreign policy of the GOJ is respect for the UN system. But, the GOJ has never respected the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UN's paramount legal body.

In addition, it is not at all clear what accounts for the perceived severity in the international security circumstances surrounding Japan. If any security consideration really matters regarding nuclear weapons, why didn't Japan move to substantially lessen the role of nuclear weapons in its security policy at the end of the Cold War when the claimed threat of the former Soviet Union and China had been drastically reduced? We have never seen any Japanese initiatives in this direction.

Q3. What is the difference between Japan and the NAC countries regarding international security circumstances?

A3. Japan has been located at the front line of the Cold War, with Russia and China nearby. It can be said that the situation is much more severe than that of NAC countries such as New Zealand or Sweden.

Q4. You cannot condemn India and Pakistan for developing nuclear weapons, while at the same time insisting on the necessity of nuclear weapons for Japan's national security.

A4. India and Pakistan should be condemned for not participating in the NPT regime, which is crucial for international peace and security. Without the NPT regime, the number of nuclear weapon states would increase dramatically. If the number increases, it would be more difficult for the current five Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) to reduce their nuclear arsenals. This outcome would be contrary to international peace and security. If the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), for instance, should have nuclear weapons upon the collapse of the NPT regime, Japan might have to consider possessing its own nuclear weapons for national security purposes.

(Authors' comments) The stated policy of Japan regarding India and Pakistan is to call upon them to accede to the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Therefore, the logical consequence of Japan's policy is that it urges India and Pakistan to come under nuclear umbrellas of any of the five NWSs, just as Japan does. It then follows that a growing number of states would rely upon other states' nuclear weapons. This means that the role of nuclear weapons would grow as more targets become necessary to defend allies. The GOJ should realize that the desire for nuclear weapon possession itself and the demand for nuclear umbrellas have similarly destructive effects on nuclear disarmament.

Q5. Can Japan demand that the United States reduce its nuclear arsenal while at the same time requesting U.S. nuclear deterrence against alleged biological or chemical weapons of the DPRK?

A5. Japan can request the U.S. and the other NWSs to reduce their nuclear arsenals by an amount that does not affect U.S. nuclear deterrence upon which Japan relies.

(Authors' comments) The GOJ says that the acceleration of the START process is one of its priorities for nuclear disarmament. However, if Japan adheres to a first-use option against DPRK, this means, by implication, that it is asking the U.S. to maintain many nuclear targets. It then follows that Japan has to support the claim by the U.S. that it cannot reduce its arsenal if it is to remain able to respond the request of Japan as well as those of other allies. Therefore, the GOJ's nuclear weapons policy is self-contradictory.

Q6. Do you believe that the U.S. really uses nuclear weapons to protect Japan even though there is no doubt that the U.S. would be retaliated against by nuclear weapons?

A6. It is difficult to answer this question. While we understand that the international norm restricts the level of counter-attack because its intensity has to be proportionate to the intensity of the original attack, the option of nuclear weapons is still included within the framework of Japan-U.S. military cooperation.

(Authors' comments) We don't think that U.S. citizens will support the use of nuclear weapons for Japan's sake when it is obvious that the U.S. will be retaliated against by nuclear weapons.

Q7. Why don't you propose a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) as an alternative security arrangement?

A7. The GOJ generally supports the creation and expansion of NWFZs. However, as for Northeast Asia, the international security circumstances are so severe that it is premature to consider such a NWFZ in this region.

(Authors' comments) The very initiation of a proposal to establish a NWFZ could contribute to the easing of tensions in this region. The GOJ appears to need regional tension in order to rationalize its development of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and the advancement of other military capabilities.

Q8. Please explain the GOJ's position towards the upcoming NPT Review Conference.

A8. It is crucial that a document tentatively named, "Additional Objectives," which is built upon the Principles and Objectives (P&O) of 1995, be adopted by consensus at the Conference. The Additional Objectives is not to replace the P&O of 1995. There was some misunderstanding on the wording of "Updated Objectives" which was included in the Japanese resolution at the UNGA last year. Many countries abstained from that paragraph of the resolution because they thought that Japan didn't think much of the implementation of the P&O.

We can say that the conference would be successful if the Additional Objectives are adopted. If not, international trust in the NPT regime would be severely weakened. Japan is now carefully consulting with other countries on the wording of the Additional Objectives, but the contents will be as follows:

- 1. Promotion of the ratification process and early entry into force of the CTBT.
- 2. Early commencement of the FMCT negotiations and conclusion of it by 2003 or 2005.
- 3. Further reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the NWSs, especially through START II, III and beyond. Japan would not be satisfied with the level of START III, even if concluded, and would request further negotiation.
- 4. Some kind of multilateral negotiation for nuclear disarmament. Japan does not support the idea of holding an international conference, such as Non-Aligned countries propose. The disarmament negotiation must be done primarily by the NWSs, but Japan thinks it is necessary to have some kind of multinational negotiation.
- 5. Expansion of NWFZs. Japan assists the negotiation for Central Asia NWFZ by providing conference venue and logistics.
- 6. Safeguards. It is important to promote the Additional Safeguards Protocol with the IAEA.

(Authors' comments) This is a continuation of the conservative "wish list" of Japan. There is no strong statement nor proposal to call upon the NWSs to fulfill their NPT Article 6 obligation. We welcome the GOJ's constant efforts to promote the entry-into-force of the CTBT and to facilitate the establishment of a Central Asia NWFZ.

Q9. The Additional Objectives should be discussed based on the serious review of record of the past five years. Without reviewing the record carefully, the adoption of a new document will result in a mere repetition of failures of the past five years.

A9. It is important to review the past, but we have to avoid a breakdown of the conference because of differences in the various evaluations of the past.

Q10. How will the recommendations of the Tokyo Forum Report be incorporated into the NPT Review Conference?

A10. The 1999 Japanese UNGA resolution incorporates the recommendations of the Tokyo Forum. The Additional Objectives will also adopt those elements.

(Authors' comments) The UNGA Japanese resolution failed to incorporate the key recommendations of the Tokyo Forum such as the reduction of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads down to 1,000 each, establishment of a permanent secretariat of the NPT, and restriction on the role of nuclear weapons to only the core function of deterring others' nuclear weapons.

Q11. How has Japan made efforts to advance U.S. nuclear disarmament policy before the NPT Review Conference?

A11. On March 8, Japan and the U.S. established the U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Verification. In high-level discussion in the Commission, Japan honestly expressed its negative evaluation of the past five years' progress on nuclear disarmament. The U.S. said it shared the evaluation and agreed that the NPT RC was very crucial. There was various discussion on the Additional Objectives.

Q12. How does Japan work at CD?

A12. Negotiation of the FMCT is the priority. If the negotiation does not progress because of conflict over existing stockpiles, we need to restrict the scope of the treaty only to future production. China is not going to join the FMCT negotiations, insisting that the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space) should be established at the same time. NAM is insisting on an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. It is regrettable that those countries do not show a sincere commitment to join the FMCT negotiation. As for nuclear disarmament, Japan is ready to accept the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament such as that proposed by five NATO countries.

(Authors' comments) The position of the GOJ is very unbalanced. The GOJ claims the FMCT is the priority. But the GOJ explains that China and NAM don't think it is the only priority, and that they have other priorities: Nuclear Disarmament Committee and PAROS Committee, Just as the GOJ criticizes "those countries do not show a sincere commitment to join the FMCT negotiation," they would say "Japan does not show a sincere commitment to set-up nuclear disarmament committee and PAROS committee." We believe that the GOJ should develop proposals to advance these priorities in parallel. One logical approach is to place the FMCT as a priority theme of the established Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. As long as the GOJ

continues to stick to the line in which the FMCT will serve only to non-proliferation rather than to disarmament, the GOJ will continue to be regarded as a dummy of the United States. (Akira KAWASAKI and Hiro UMEBAYASHI)

NOTE: This article was written in April 2000 before the NPT Review Conference began. The Peace Depot welcomes comments on positions described in this article.

The Year 2000 Campaign to Revitalize Grassroots Voices to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

Strong Response from the Public

It was a surprising event. On January 5th of this year, as soon as the telephone receiver was put down, it rang again in the calm office of the Year 2000 Campaign. This happened over and over. Even though it was still the New Year's holiday for many people in Japan, they responded to a tiny article which appeared in the Asahi Shimbun that morning to report on the initiation of a campaign to collect 2000 opinion leaders' signatures. The signatures would be to appeal to Japan to take responsibility for the abolition of nuclear weapons. People expressed their support for the campaign over the telephone and asked how they could join in and what they could do at their own places. We received sixty-six calls on the following two days, and the number reached one hundred by the end of a week. This surge of public response has inspired both journalists and campaigners in Japan, whose role is to channel such voices to effect change in government policy, to reflect deeply on their sense of the public's awareness of the critical issue of nuclear abolition.

Brief History up to the Birth of the Campaign

On December 22, 1999, "The Year 2000 Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons" was officially launched at a press conference in Tokyo. Preparations for this campaign were made by independent citizen groups in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo/Yokohama which had been organizing a series of counter-conferences to the Tokyo Forum, a government-led, expert conference for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, in 1998 and 1999. After the Tokyo Forum completed its final report, these groups felt compelled to revitalize nation-wide grassroots voices to ask for a Japanese initiative to abolish nuclear weapons and they thought the year 2000 would be a crucial year for that effort. They started drafting a unified set of demands of the people to be addressed to the Government of Japan, a set of demands which could be endorsed by a broad spectrum of people across various political lines and organizations.

The 2000 People's Appeal

The pillar of this campaign is to organize the "The 2000 People's Appeal: Toward the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons

— Japan's Mission" which will be signed by 2000 opinion leaders from various professions. The full text of the appeal is attached at the end of this article. At the time of the press conference we had 619 signatories. As of April 21, 2000, the Appeal has now been signed by 1,351 individuals including popular actors, actresses, singers, writers, artists, cartoonists, scholars, lawyers, presidents of organizations, business people and campaigners. Names of some signatories of international interest are listed at the end of this report. The campaign's plan is to attain 2000 signatories by the end of June or July. Following this, a large mission of signatories will be organized to present the Appeal to the Prime Minister and heads of major political parties and to ask for actions to implement the set of demands contained within the Appeal.

Campaign Activities

Since there are already several national organizations working for nuclear abolition in Japan, the Year 2000 Campaign is not meant to add yet another one to undertake similar activities. Instead, it is meant to play a catalyst role to reach new people and encourage them to start fresh initiatives. To this end, the Year 2000 Campaign is engaged in the following activities in addition to the 2000 People's Appeal mentioned above.

- 1. To maintain a web-site to publicize abolition activities of various organizations and groups all around Japan, including those of traditional national organizations and local citizen groups.
- 2. To introduce overseas activities for nuclear abolition to Japanese audiences and conversely to inform overseas audiences of Japanese activities.
- 3. To support the Nagasaki NGO International Assembly in November and to help in the planning, advertising and mobilizing for its success.

Abolition Week in Japan

The Year 2000 Campaign played a role in exchanging information about activities all over Japan during Global Abolition Week, March 1-8, 2000. The following activities took place:

February 26, Kawasaki City: A Public Meeting to celebrate the annual general assembly of the Peace Depot included a special speech by Rebecca Johnson on the NPT Review Conference. A summary of the talk has been printed and circulated by the Peace Depot as an educational resource for activists and journalists.

March 3, Tokyo: Women's groups organized a forum to hear Angie Zelter, a successful defendant in one of the Trident Plowshare court cases in Scotland, and to discuss ways to abolish nuclear weapons. The title of the forum was, "We Can Abolish Nuclear Weapons!"

March 4, Tokyo: An all-day event took place in Tokyo entitled, "Our Abolition Day! Symposium on Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone." In the morning Angie Zelter spoke about her non-violent direct action. In the afternoon there was a symposium to discuss approaches to establishing a Northeast

Asia NWFZ, with panelists Hiro UMEBAYASHI (the Peace Depot), KIM Hong-Soo (Co-President, Union of Korean Youth in Japan), KIM Ji-Yong (Reporter, *Choson-Shimbosa*, A Japanese Newspaper Related to DPR of Korea), Mari KUSHIBUCHI (Co-Chair, the Peace Boat), and Masao KUNIHIRO (Former Senator), with the guest participation of Angie Zelter.

March 5, Tokyo: The code-named "Sunflower Operation — A Street Performance" took place on the street during No-Car-Sundays, Shinjuku, Tokyo. Young anti-nuke people, called Nuclear Abolition Beni-Tengu, made a Sunflower objet d'art and had a live music performance. The sunflower is known as the symbol of the global network of Abolition 2000.

March 11, Nagasaki: A symposium was organized in Nagasaki as the first pre-event of the Global Citizen's Assembly in Nagasaki for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons, which is reported about in the previous section of this Update. Robert Green (Middle Powers Initiative), Kate Dewes (Disarmament & Security Center), and Angie Zelter (Trident Plowshare) were invited to the Assembly as panelists. Japanese panelists were Hideo TSUCHIYAMA (Former President, Nagasaki University) and Masao TOMONAGA (Professor, Nagasaki University).

In addition to these activities which were specific to Global Abolition Week, many other actions took place to commemorate Bikini Day during the time period from February 29 to March 3 in Shizuoka and Tokyo. They were sponsored by Gensuikyo, Gensuikin, the Japanese Consumers' Cooperative Union and others. Also meetings related to Angie Zelter's speaking tour were held in many places other than those cited above, including Sapporo, Hakodate, Osaka, Saga, Hiroshima and Okinawa during the time period from March 3 to 15.

Co-chairs and Campaign Office

The Year 2000 Campaign nominates the following ten co-chair as of April 20, 2000.

Hideo TSUCHIYAMA (Former President of Nagasaki University) Senji YAMAGUCHI (Co-Chairperson, Japan Confederation of A and H-Bomb

Sufferers Organization (Nihon Hidankyo)

Masahide OTA (Former Governor of Okinawa Prefecture)

Shigenori TAKEMOTO (President, Japanese Consumers' Cooperative Union)

Mihoko EJIRI (President, YWCA Japan)

Yoshino OISHI (Photographer)

Hiromichi UMEBAYASHI (President, the Peace Depot)

Mitsuo OKAMOTO (Professor, Hiroshima Shudo University)

Haruko MORITAKI (Hiroshima Citizens Group for Promoting Peace with People of

India and Pakistan)

Sadao KAMATA (Director, Nagasaki Peace Institute)

Campaign Office:

The Japan Year 2000 Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 3-3-1 Minowa-cho, Kohoku-ku, Yokohama, 223-0051 Japan Tel: (81)45-563-5164, Fax: (81)45-563-9907

E-mail: 2000campaign@jca.apc.org

Website: http://www.jca.apc.org/2000campaign/

The 2000 People's Appeal

Toward the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons — Japan's Mission

We have now entered the last year of the 20th Century.

It appears that humankind will carry into the 21st Century the same follies that it devised in the 20th Century. Nuclear weapons, which can incinerate hundreds of thousands of citizens in an instant, remain at the core of international politics. Over 30,000 nuclear warheads exist on this planet, with a significant number on hair-trigger alert. While the overwhelming majority of citizens, including those who live in nuclear weapons states, want a nuclear weapon-free world, the political process to bring this about has been ponderous and slow, with few substantial gains.

We believe that the Japanese people bear a special responsibility for this situation. We have listened closely to the hibakushas of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in their plea that, "Nuclear weapons should never be used!," as they speak about the hellish scenes branded on their eyes after the blast. For over a half century we have lived in a society that is dominated by fears that the physical and social after-effects of the atomic bombing can continue for generations. Do we as Japanese citizens not have a responsibility to use these experiences for the benefit of the future of the earth and of humanity?

Contrary to what we often hear, it is not true that there is no hope. Some middle-power governments stood together and took bold action in June, 1998. These governments, called the New Agenda Coalition, declared: "We, on our part, will spare no efforts" towards the abolition of nuclear weapons. Non-governmental groups (NGOs) around the world are encouraging these governments, and movements in which governments and NGOs cooperate are gaining strength. In addition, a model nuclear weapons convention, which NGOs drafted, has become an official UN document and has been circulated among governments.

Unfortunately, the Japanese government refused to join the New Agenda Coalition when it was invited to do so. The Japanese government continues to embrace nuclear deterrence doctrine and is obsessed with the idea of defending Japan with nuclear weapons.

Is the Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment, which must be stronger than that of any other peoples in the world, powerless? Does Japanese democracy not work? It is acknowledged that the Japanese anti-nuclear movement has sometimes created impediments within itself to achieving its goals over the past five decades. However, isn't it high time for us to call into being an overarching human ethos and create opportunities for Japanese citizens to once again speak to this critical issue in their own words?

At the dawn of a new century and a new millennium, we call upon the people of Japan to speak vigorously for nuclear abolition with a renewed purpose that goes beyond the

differences often created by 'isms' and beliefs.

The first thing that we need to do is to change our own government's nuclear weapons policy. Toward this end, we have the following challenges:

1. To create a non-nuclear law in Japan

In addition to turning the three non-nuclear principles into a law, a security policy is needed in which Japan will not rely on nuclear weapons and come out from beneath the US nuclear umbrella. In addition, the current plutonium policy of Japan needs to be reviewed as it raises concerns about nuclear-proliferation.

2. To establish a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia

The establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia will be a significant step towards easing tension and building confidence in this region.

3. To activate nuclear free-local authorities

It is time for the more than 2,300 local authorities that have declared themselves to be nuclear-free to take action. Citizens must take steps to activate them.

4. To make the Government of Japan a leader in promoting nuclear disarmament in its international relations

Citizens in Japan need to urge the Government of Japan to play an active role in promoting nuclear disarmament in international diplomacy in cooperation with like-minded nations such as the New Agenda Coalition states.

We make an appeal to all the fellow citizens. Let us build an immense wave of support and activity for nuclear abolition in the year 2000, and inform the world what we have done. Please begin where you are. Each of your actions, as tiny as it may be, will make a change. Each of us, too, signs this '2000 People's Appeal' as one of those who commit to undertake such actions.

Some Names of Signatories to the 2000 Peoples' Appeal of International Interests

Campaign Organizers:

Chieko AKAISHI (Women's Democratic Club), Yoko FURUYAMA (Peace Boat), Masanori IKEDA (JALANA), Kazuo ISHIWATARI (Sokagakkai), Shigetoshi IWAMATSU (Gensuikin), Michiji KONUMA (Pugwash), Kiyokazu KOSHIDA (PARC), Michiya KUMAOKA (JVC), Yasuhiro MATSUI (Gensuikyo), Yayori MATSUI (VAWW NET Japan), Baku NISHIO (CNIC), Kenichi Otsu (NCC Japan), Yoshinao Otsuka (Catholic Justice & Peace), Kazue TAKAHASHI (Shinfujin), Jun UI (Environmental Network), Kenji URATA (IALANA), Kenjiro YOKORO (IPPNW), Yoshikiyo YOSHIDA (Peace Office), Yuichi YOSHIKAWA (Citizens' 30 Opinions)

Others:

IRUKA (singer), Kosetsu MINAMI (singer), Yuzo TOYAMA (orchestra conductor), Reiko YUKAWA (music commentator), Hiroki KOKUBO (baseball player), Masatake YAMANAKA (baseball manager), Makoto ODA (writer), Rokusuke EI (writer), Wahei TATEMATSU (writer), James MIKI (scenario writer), Yotaro KONAKA (writer), Sadako KURIHARA (poet), Hisakazu FUJITA

(international law), Yoshikazu SAKAMOTO (international politics), Katsuko SARUHASHI (geochemistry), Toshiyuki TOYOTA (physics), Koji FUSHIMI (physics), Atsunosuke NAKAJIMA (nuclear chemist), Tetsuya CHIKUSHI (journalist), Isao FUKUTOME (Newscaster), Mitsuko SHIMOMURA (journalist), Soichiro TAWARA (commentator), Hiromitsu TOYOSAKI (photojournalist), Bunyo ISHIKAWA (photo-journalist), Sakae TAKITA (actor), Sayuri YOSHINAGA (actress), Susumu HANI (movie director), Yoji YAMADA (movie director), Kei ISHIZAKA (cartoonist)

Nagasaki Must Be the Last Bombed!

A Call for an International NGO Conference in Nagasaki to Abolish Nuclear Weapons: November 17-20, 2000

A fortunate convergence of two motivating forces for peace occurred in Nagasaki City where the second atomic bomb was dropped on August 9, 1945.

First, the Mayor of Nagasaki, who attended the Hague Appeal for Peace Conference in May 1999 to witness the empowering NGO activities for peace, has come to believe that it will be the concerted work of NGOs that will vigorously advance the cause of nuclear abolition. Subsequently, in his Peace Declaration on August 9, 1999, he emphasized the importance of NGO roles in future efforts for nuclear disarmament, and then he expressed his willingness to host a major international NGO assembly in Nagasaki in the year 2000 to demand nuclear abolition.

Second, long-term efforts by the Nagasaki Peace Institute, a citizen-based institute, to maintain a neutral relationship with various local citizen groups have made it possible to unite these groups for nuclear abolition conferences. A two-year test run of a non-partisan committee in Nagasaki to intervene in the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament process ended successfully last year in cooperation with independent national NGOs, including the Peace Depot. This committee has now become "The Year 2000 Nagasaki Citizens' Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition." It is a truly history-making coalition of the broadest range of Nagasaki citizen groups as it transcends the differences of 'isms' and beliefs. The primary objective of this coalition is to bring the Mayor's idea of international NGO Assembly for nuclear abolition into reality.

Objective of the Assembly

The title of the Conference is tentatively: "Global Citizens Assembly in Nagasaki: Challenging the 21st Century to Abolish Nuclear Weapons — Nagasaki Must Be the Last Bombed!" As the 20th Century comes to a close, the Assembly aims to rally the will of NGOs to abolish nuclear weapons in the earliest days of the new century. To that end, the pioneering activities of NGOs will be highlighted and shared at the

Assembly. Also, the Assembly is intended as a venue to launch specific campaigns (programs) in the cause of nuclear abolition by a variety of NGOs. The Assembly will issue a declaration to demonstrate the will and the strategy of the participants.

Programs

A four-day (tentative) conference planned from Nov. 17 (Fri) to Nov. 20 (Mon). An optional field study tour will be organized by local groups before and/or after the Assembly. The schedule of events is tentatively set as follows.

Nov. 17 (Fri) Rooms are available for NGOs' preparatory meetings

Nov. 18 (Sat) Opening Plenary

Nov. 19 (Sun) Workshops

Nov. 20 (Mon) Closing Plenary (close about noon, but rooms are available for NGOs in the afternoon.)

Work shop themes will include the following:

- 1. Nuclear Weapon Convention
- 2. Refuting Nuclear Deterrence (including No First Use)
- 3. New Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
- 4. Youth Forum
- 5. Women's Forum
- 6. Hibakusha and Victims of Tests
- 7. Abolition 2000 Network
- 8. New Agenda Coalition and Middle Powers Initiative
- 9. Bringing-in of Nuclear Weapons and NCND
- 10. Laboratory Tests and Subcritical Tests
- 11. BMD and Nuclearization of Space
- 12. Culture of Peace and Peace Education

Each workshop is being organized by at least two convenors, one from overseas and one from Japan. In addition to the above workshops, the Organizing Committee intends to provide rooms for independent programs related to nuclear disarmament and encourages NGOs to bring their own plans.

Organizing Committee Launched

On April 15, the official inaugural meeting of the Organizing Committee took place in Nagasaki. Four entities are sponsoring the Assembly: Nagasaki City, Nagasaki Prefecture, Nagasaki Foundation for the Promotion of Peace (a subordinate foundation of Nagasaki City) and The Year 2000 Nagasaki Citizens' Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, the above mentioned coalition of local citizen groups. The Governor of Nagasaki Prefecture and the Mayor of Nagasaki City are advisors to the Organizing Committee. Prof. Hideo Tsuchiyama, former President of Nagasaki University was nominated as the Chair of the Organizing Committee. Five vice-chairs were elected: four from the four sponsoring entities and one (Hiro Umebayashi, President of The Peace Depot) from Abolition 2000 Coordinating Committee. The Organizing Committee also calls upon a civic fund-raising campaign for the Assembly to supplement the budget allocated by City and Prefectural Governments, as well as to strengthen the civil society involvement.

Toward a Nation-Wide Event

It is the desire of Nagasaki citizens that this Assembly be a joint project of all the NGOs which have been working for nuclear abolition. To that end, a nation-wide liaison committee will be organized on June 3. NGOs from all over Japan will be encouraged to join and cooperate for the success of this major end-of-the-century Assembly. In addition, active discussion will start and be on-going on the nature of the outcome of the Assembly. The demand to start a ban-the-nuclear-weapon process similar to the Ottawa process for the land-mine treaty is among such agenda items. Nagasaki citizen groups are really enthusiastic and pray for a productive Assembly.

JOINT PRESS STATEMENT

U.S.- JAPAN COMMISSION ON ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION AND VERIFICATION

Tokyo, 8 March 2000

Today is a historic occasion. The Governments of the United States and Japan have decided to intensify and expand their diplomatic and technical cooperation to achieve goals they both value highly:

- Strengthening the international regime to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
- Ending the testing of nuclear weapons for all time by putting into force the Comprehensive Nucleal Test-Ban Treaty;
- Working together to prevent an arms race that would inevitably lead to instability and greater tension in the international community.
- Negotiating protocols to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention to protect all people from the scourge of biological weapons; and
- •Combining efforts in the Conference on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on a critical treaty to halt the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

To these ends, we are anuouncing here today the formation of a U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Verification. The Commission will meet every six months to review, discuss and implement our joint goals for strengthening the international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation regime. To further mutual understanding, the Commission will also encourage nongovernmental experts in both countries to undertake enhanced collaboration efforts in pursuit of the Commission's important goals.

As a first step towards closer technical cooperation, the Commission has established a Technology Cooperation Working Group. The use of technology to verify arms control and nonproliferation treaties and agreements is critical. It cuts across national and international security concerns. The activities of the new U.S.-Japan Technology Cooperation Working Group will leverage the joint expertise and funding of the U.S. and Japan to speed progress on important verification issues.

Last week, in Tokyo, this experts group met to discuss initial joint projects. Focussing on measures that enhance the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification regime, the Technology Cooperation Working Group developed a concrete plan for proceeding with three projects to improve the effectiveness of the CTBT's International Monitoring System's seismic network. These projects will specifically address:

- •Methods of seismic location calibration using chemical explosions
- Developing earthquake ground truth data
- · Promoting seismic transparency

The experts in the Technology Cooperation Working Group expect to complete detailed work plans by mid-April so that funding sources and work schedules can be developed for joint Project implementation.

The terms of reference of the new Commission read as follows:

- Japan and the United States recognize the inportance of
- maintaining and strengthening the international arms control,
- disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Continuing bilateral talks provide a firm basis for cooperation in these areas.
- •In this connection, the two countries have established "the U.S.-Japan Commission on Arms Control, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Verification" to hold periodic and intensive discussions on the wide range of diplomatic and technical activities in this field, The Commission will augment
- and provide a context for existing bilateral discussions. Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and bringing about the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-ban Treaty are the immediate priority items on the Commission's agenda. In the near term, the Commission will focus on efforts to ensure that the 2000
- NPT Review Couference reinforces the continued important role of the NPT to global security.
- As part of the Commission's activities, Japanese and American experts will explore possible measures to enhance the effectiveness of the verification system as provided in the CTBT.