Demilitarizing for True Peace and Stability

Civil Society’s Initiative for Northeast Asia
Regional Security Frameworks
(a report)

Project: Peace Depot Northeast Asia Security Forum

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This paper is the English translation of the summary part of a more comprehensive report of the same name. For more detail, please see the full report at http://www.peacedepot.org/theme/toyota/report.html (Japanese only)

Currently, most national security policies depend on military power. We believe that true peace and stability supported by justice can be achieved through renouncing such policies. “Demilitarizing” refers to the renunciation process. This report explores alternative paths toward demilitarization, beginning with an analysis of the current situation in Northeast Asia. It was written by Dr. Hiromichi Umebayashi, based on the findings of the research project.
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Introduction: Increasing Concern and Anxiety

According to public opinion polls conducted every three years by the Cabinet Office, concern among the Japanese people has been increasing regarding peace and security. In 1998 a Teapo Dong missile fired by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) flew right over Japan, throwing the Japanese Diet into a furor. The idea that Japan might be directly involved in a military conflict is now wider spread among the Japanese people. In 2001, as the Bush administration was formulating its policy toward DPRK and declaring it to be a member of the “Axis of Evil,” the problem of DPRK’s ballistic missiles and nuclear weapon program took the limelight as a critical international problem. On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the US, and the US declared a global “War on Terror,” which led to a war against Afghanistan (2001-), then Iraq (2003-). Accordingly, a majority in Japan began to recognize that they could no longer be indifferent to “war.”

As Japanese politicians have implicitly connected the DPRK problem to the international “War on Terror,” Japan has dramatically changed course and is now clearly taking the stance that military power is a realistic guarantee of national security. In a January 2004 appearance before the Diet, Prime Minister Koizumi said, “The United Nations cannot defend Japan, but the US can.” This remark typifies that transformation. Japan joined the US in joint research on a ballistic missile defense system (1998). Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001), and Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq (2003) were enacted, and the Maritime Self-Defense Force was sent to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea (2001). Later, the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces were sent to Iraq (2004-), so we find ourselves involved in overseas military operations in a rush.

Nevertheless, we have lived for sixty years under our Peace Constitution, and we have not lost our peace consciousness much as some people are now claiming. The people are certainly more worried about peace and concerned about Japan’s security, but they display decidedly mixed feelings about military involvement. For instance, Cabinet Office public opinion polls conducted before 9.11 (January 2000) and after 9.11 (January 2003) show that the number of people supporting a higher defense budget of Japan has increased, but the number favoring cutting that budget has increased as well.

It is true that the public is wavering in its support of Article 9 of the Peace Constitution, which renounces war and the right of belligerence. One of the main factors behind this wavering is their inability to envision how peace can be preserved under Article 9. There has been no enthusiastic,
practical discussion of a peace mechanism, especially a security structure for Northeast Asia, as an example of a security and foreign policy based on Article 9.

Accordingly, if we can logically demonstrate, based on case studies, the effectiveness of peaceful involvement in international problems, a large segment of the Japanese population will resonate with such an approach and choose such policies. This report is an effort to contribute to the creation of such a vision. It explores a number of concrete possibilities and recommends a phased transition.
Chapter 1 – Four Key Concepts

We begin by presenting the significance of the four basic concepts utilized in the report. The four concepts are as follows:

(1) Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone
(2) Exclusively defensive defense status and its regionalization
(3) Northeast Asia missile control systems
(4) Utilization of the ASEAN Forum

The Peace Depot has been investigating and analyzing these concepts as regional themes of interest in its involvements in the international peace movement. In particular, (1) (2) and (3), as stated in the following sections, fit well with conventional wisdom in Japanese civil society and with decades of dialogue in Japan regarding security issues since World War II, and have been identified as key concepts leading toward a collective security framework for the Northeast Asian region.

1. Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone

As indicated by the fact that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons issue is one of the greatest security concerns in the region, the mutual threat perception regarding nuclear weapons is one of the root of regional tension. Uni-dimensional reporting by the mass media in Japan would have us believe that the DPRK’s “rogue behavior” is the source of all this tension, but the problem is far more complex and historical.

A long history of war and distrust in Northeast Asia (Japan’s war of aggression and cruel colonial policies in Korea, Japan’s defeat, the division of Korea into north and south by the US and Russia, and the subsequent Korean War) has created thick filters through which the parties view each other and laid the groundwork for regional security problems. For several decades during the US-USSR Cold War, US and Soviet military power controlled the area, which greatly reinforced that distrust. However, at the pinnacle of that distrust is the fact that we have been staring each other down with nuclear weapons. The fact is, until the early 1990s, the US deployed tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea on the premise that they would actually be used. After the Cold War, enthroned as the lone superpower, the US has been the overwhelmingly dominant element in the regional security picture. The US nuclear deterrent still lies at the core of the bi-lateral security relationships between the US and South Korea as well as between the US and Japan.
About 40 years ago when China conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964, Japan obtained a firm commitment that the US would defend us with nuclear weapons, then domestically adopted the three non-nuclear principles. Thanks to our tragic experience of the atomic bombings and strongly anti-nuclear public, Japan has not, fortunately, sought to possess nuclear weapons on its own. However, this was a political expediency not derived from a rejection of nuclear weapons as immoral or inhumane. Nor did it represent a cooperative effort to remove the threat by forming a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone. It merely positioned Northeast Asia as relying on the superpowers within a global balance of terror. Such a framework remains to this date the backbone of regional security.

Meanwhile on the Korean Peninsula, the suspicion persists that Japan, with its famous Peace Constitution AND one of the most powerful modern military forces in the world, secretly intends to obtain nuclear weapons. The flip side to that conviction is the deeply rooted belief that Korea has a “right to have nuclear weapons.” Many Koreans continue to advocate possession of nuclear weapons as the ultimate assurance of Korean independence. A public opinion survey by the “JoongAng Ilbo,” a Korean newspaper, found that 82.3% of South Koreans think they should retain the option of nuclear arms (Feb. 1999). This is up from 81.9% in Sept. 1996. In the latter survey, 82.6% answered “yes” to the question, “When North and South Korea are unified, should Korea have nuclear weapons due to threat from the Asian superpowers?” It was obvious at that time that “Asian superpowers” include Japan.

Given these multifaceted circumstances, with countries in this region perceiving a potential threat in one another, establishing a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone has critically important implications—alleviating regional military tension, preventing a regional nuclear arms race, and ensuring a regional security framework based on a mutual trust.

Our planet already has four nuclear weapon-free zones established by international treaties, and the effectiveness of the basic concept has achieved a certain level of recognition. The concept appeared in the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Article 7), and has subsequently been expanded and strengthened repeatedly in NPT Review Conferences. Nuclear weapon-free zones have been helpful in building trust and security in their respective regions because they include the following three factors:

1) The banning and absence of nuclear weapons – development, testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons are prohibited,

2) Negative security assurances – the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapon states against the zone is prohibited, and
3) Establishment of a mechanism for enforcing the treaty – a body is established to discuss and verify compliance with the treaty.

Thousands of Hiroshima and Nagasaki hibakusha, survivors of history’s only nuclear attacks, live in Japan and on the Korean Peninsula. The urge to establish a nuclear weapon-free zone is easy for the people of the area to understand; the goal would win easy acceptance internationally as well.

2. Exclusively defensive defense status and its regionalization

In Japan, the term “exclusively defensive defense” is quite popular as a key term defining Japan’s Self-Defense Force under Article 9 of the Constitution. The Self-Defense White Paper of 2003 explains this concept as follows: “Self-defense forces may be used only in the event of an enemy attack, and the reaction must be the minimum required to defend against the situation. Moreover, the self-defense force maintained must be the minimum required for to defend against such attack.” However, the exclusively defensive defense concept is not limited to Japan. It is used to restrict the military in many other countries and is a concept widely used when discussing the transition of this planet from a collection of aggressive nations ruled by military might to a civil society ruled by law. After the Cold War, for example, this concept was used to advocate disarmament, and the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs prepared a report entitled, “Study on Defensive Security Concepts and Policies” (1993). In 1999 at an international conference held by civil society (The Hague Appeal for Peace, 1999), NGO “Global Action to Prevent War” announced a 5-stage plan for the prevention of war, and the 5th stage was designed to “limit the role of national armed forces strictly to defense of national territory.” Namely, the goal is to establish a global situation with exclusively defensive defense policies.

If the exclusively defensive defense concept can be properly developed, it could still be an effective security concept. In fact, the UN Charter today allows the use of military force only for individual and collective self-defense. Therefore, some may say, “Aren’t the military in all nations defense-only?” Japan’s neighbors in Asia believe the Japanese government’s much vaunted “exclusively defensive defense” is nothing but words. They do not accept it as a message they can trust. Worse, they see it as a shield behind which Japan hides its true intentions, and they repeatedly express their fear that Japan will re-emerge as a military superpower.

The primary reason for this suspicion is that Japan does not meet the requirements of an international commitment to exclusively defensive defense policy, nor does it try to make an
internationally recognized commitment.

Actually, thanks to the exclusively defensive defense policy, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, while not adequately defense-oriented, do at first glance have special defense-only characteristics not found in other countries. For example, Self-Defense Force planes and ships lack certain basic equipment deemed necessary for attacking cities and ground military targets of other countries, and the Self-Defense Force commits not possessing aircraft carriers, which enable expeditionary offense. Yet these self-restrictions have never contributed to alleviating regional tension or to disarmament because they do not derive from our peace constitution or the ideology behind it. Rather, they derive from the division of labor between the US and Japan, under which the Self-Defense Force is expected to maintain a defense-only appearance. In other words, Japan’s defense-only policy is a pretense. The Self-Defense Force is the shield; the US forces wield the sword. These are the roles. But if Japan were ever forced to take up a sword, it could easily build an offensive system. Thus, the fear arises. If US forces are reduced, an offensive Self-Defense Force will emerge. Many Asian countries see American forces as less threatening than Japanese forces.

Given this situation, this report will explore methods by which that exclusively defensive defense concept can be preserved, developed and communicated. In reality, our task will be to rebuild Japan as a country possessing true exclusively defensive defense security, but it will not be completed as a mere Japanese domestic policy. It will be vital to clarify the concept of Japan’s exclusively defensive defense so that it can be presented to the international community. In addition, we will have to find ways to implement exclusively defensive defense policies through dialogue and discussion with neighboring countries. Doing so will facilitate the transition from the current pretense to real exclusively defensive defense policies.

3. Northeast Asia missile control systems

In Northeast Asia, the missile threat is generating as much concern as the nuclear weapons themselves, and missiles are a key factor keeping military tension high. Concretely, the direct causes of concern have been 1) DPRK’s firing of the Teapo Dong missile without warning (1998) and subsequent missile development, and 2) the development and deployment by the US and Japan of the so-called missile defense system.

It goes without saying that an indirect factor behind the concern about missiles is the deeply rooted historical distrust mentioned earlier. However, even taking historical tensions into account, the
The missile problem seems rife with confusion, controversy, and lack of objectivity that only amplifies the fear. It is necessary, of course, to fiercely criticize the DPRK for its firing, with no warning, a missile that flew right over Japan. Rules to prevent recurrence must be established as soon as possible. However, objecting to the no warning flight and demanding that DPRK totally abandon all development of long-range missiles are completely different dimensions of the problem.

This report begins with some fundamental observations about the actual situation and why missiles are a threat in Northeast Asia. It then seeks a point of departure for missile control in the region.

In this process, it is important to distinguish between problems that can be solved regionally and those that must be addressed globally. Many of the problems are the same as those involved in controlling nuclear weapons. The reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons by the US, Russia, and China will inherently require global disarmament negotiations in fora such as the NPT Review Conference or the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. However, this report finds positive significance in the effort to promote a process of regional de-nuclearization, that is, to establish a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone, independent of global frameworks.

In the case of missile control, the problem is more complex. Complicating factors include the diversity of missiles possessed by the countries in question, the relative immaturity of the international consensus regarding the need for missile control, and the lack of sufficient historical precedent. Speaking broadly, comprehensive missile control is uncharted territory for the international community.

In this report, the primary objective is to explore and propose concrete regional prescriptions to address the specific missile problems that cause present tension in Northeast Asia. Such regional efforts will inevitably require parallel discussion on aspects of the global missile control.

The deployment of a full-scale missile defense system, a specter raised by the US, could potentially ignite a new global arms race. This problem has to be addressed by global arms control and disarmament negotiations. However, the fact that the US and Japan are working together on missile defense is obviously generating tension in Northeast Asia, evidenced by China’s reported efforts to modernize its nuclear weapons and DPRK’s radical high-alert, confrontational posture. Accordingly, this report considers missile defense and offensive missiles to be part of the same problem in the region.

4. Utilizing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

To this point we have discussed three frameworks within which to build cooperative regional security. Here we will consider the process through which those frameworks could be formed. None of
these concepts---nuclear weapon-free zone, defense-only policies, and missile control systems---will progress toward implementation without a process of disseminating and promoting these concepts, extending and deepening understanding, and developing the political will of the governments concerned, which must then undertake the required negotiations.

Peace Depot has long been in a cooperative relationship with the Pacific Campaign for Disarmament and Security (PCDS), a network of peace activists and researchers in Asia Pacific. Since 1994 when the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was established, the PCDS has monitored its activities and expressed its opinions to the forum. ARF is the only multinational forum at the foreign minister level that deals solely with security in the Asia Pacific region. Led by ASEAN nations, it is a limited forum in which ministers meet only one day per year. However, during the rest of the year, forum activities are supplemented by various thematic inter-governmental meetings and so-called “Track 2” meetings, attended by specialists and governmental officials in their private capacities. In addition, DPRK joined the 7th ARF (2000), which made it a universal conference with participation by all the main countries of Northeast Asia. It also offers the merits of participation by Canada and New Zealand and other nations passionate about disarmament. ARF has, since its first meeting, displayed sustained concern regarding the problem of Northeast Asia, especially related to the Korean Peninsula.

Thus, in this report, we decided to study the feasibility and effectiveness of using ARF to place the various issues discussed above onto the agenda for governmental discussion. We looked at indications of ARF concern regarding Northeast Asia, the ARF conference management system, and the system of cooperation with non-governmental organizations. We also found it quite valuable to study PCDS’ experience lobbying the ARF.

Meanwhile, Six Party Talks regarding the DPRK nuclear development began in August 2003 and had convened four times by August 2005. At the 4th meeting, a first joint statement was adopted, leaving some difficult issues unresolved. Some are now expressing the opinion that the Six Party Talks should be developed into a body that would regularly discuss the overall security of Northeast Asia. This report also referred to the potential effectiveness of using the Six Party Talks as such a body.
Chapter 2  Developing the Themes

This chapter summarizes our concrete findings regarding the basic concepts presented in Chapter 1.

1. Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone

1) The merits of “Three plus three initiative”

After the Cold War, a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone became more than a slogan. Several concrete proposals appeared. Among those proposals, we want to emphasize the advantages of the “three plus three initiative.” Using this approach, the three non-nuclear weapon states in the area—Japan, North and South Korea—would take on the leading role in establishing a geographical nuclear weapon-free zone. The US, Russia, and China, the three nuclear-weapon states with strong interests in the area, will support the zone. The most important duty of the supporting countries would be to offer assurance that no nuclear weapons would be used against the nuclear weapon-free zone. In contemplating the situation in Northeast Asia, this idea appears the most realistic because it recognizes the fundamental composition of the nations involved. It is no accident that these six nations are already members of the Six Party Talks.

Proposals for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

CHRONOLGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Originator</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>Endicott, et al.</td>
<td>Limited Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (LNWFZ) applicable to non-strategic nuclear weapon only. Circular LNWFZ consisting of a circular area with a 2000-kilometer radius from a center point at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. Later, Elliptic LNWFZ with its major axis extending to part of Alaska.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Andrew Mack</td>
<td>NWFZ involving the ROK, DPRK, Japan and Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1996</td>
<td>Kumao Kaneko</td>
<td>Circular NWFZ consisting of a circular area with a 2000-kilometer radius from a center point at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the Korean Peninsula. Obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states within the zone would differ from each other.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>Hiromichi Umebayashi</td>
<td>Three Plus Three Arrangement involving three non-nuclear weapon states (ROK, DPRK, Japan) and three nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, US)</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1997</td>
<td>Endicott, et al.</td>
<td>LNWFZ involving non-nuclear weapon states (the ROK, Japan and Mongolia (DPRK) ) as a Phase I</td>
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</table>
Using the three plus three initiative, the three non-nuclear weapon states can base their participation on their present declared policies. In other words, North Korea and South Korea can build on the foundation of the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which went into effect in 1992.

Japan has its three non-nuclear principles (no production, no possession, and no introduction of nuclear weapons) and its Atomic Energy Basic Law prohibiting the military use of atomic energy (1955). These could easily be extended to support a nuclear weapon-free zone.

Of course, the DPRK is suspected of developing nuclear weapons. In February 2005, the DPRK Foreign Ministry stated, "we ... have manufactured nukes for self-defense." However, it remains unclear exactly what that means. The important point here is that neither DPRK nor South Korea has taken the position that the 1992 Joint Declaration is void, and they are both taking part in the Six Party Talks with the objective of making the Korean Peninsula nuclear free. The foundation of the three plus three initiative remains intact.

2) Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula is not enough.

In connection with the DPRK nuclear problem, “denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula” is an accepted international goal. That would, of course, be a desirable outcome and could be a step toward a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone. However, as shown below, it is quite possible that the discussion will turn to the need to make the entire area nuclear weapon-free, including Japan. Therefore, we should consider in advance, from the viewpoint of regional security, the difference between a “denuclearized Korean Peninsula” and a “Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone.”

First, denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula would leave intact one main source of tension in Northeast Asia—the tension between Japan and China. As we mentioned earlier, at the heart of Japan’s reliance on the US “nuclear umbrella” lies the fear of China’s nuclear weapons. Removing all nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula would effect no change in this relationship. However, a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone would, as stated above, legally bind China and other nuclear-weapon states to provide negative security assurances. Japan would be liberated from a major perceived threat, and tensions between Japan and China would be greatly alleviated.

Second, as we mentioned in Chapter 1, the strong distrust of Japan by both North and South Korea must be taken into account. In the Joint Declaration of 1992 it was agreed that facilities for enriching uranium or separating plutonium would be prohibited, but Japan already has such facilities in
operation. Though they are under IAEA inspection, this imbalance could not be stable. Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula would not reduce suspicion of Japan on the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the suspicion would intensify. To solve this problem, all three nations would need to subject themselves to a system of mutual inspections, and a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone would establish such a system.

Third, denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula would not necessarily assure opportunities for the Koreas and Japan, which ought to play important roles, to deepen dialogue among them. The US exerts an extremely strong influence in the Six-Party Talks, and that situation will continue for some time even after the present problem is solved. Thus, international relations in the region could be greatly affected by US unilateralism. A Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, particularly, with the three plus three structure, the three non-nuclear weapon states would play the leading roles.

3) Creating a model treaty

Based on the above observations, we have proposed a Model Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. This very realistic proposal contains the following main features.

(1) Six-Nation Treaty

The treaty would be signed by six nations with a three plus three structure. The parties would be placed in two categories: “Intrazonal States” (Japan, DPRK, South Korea) and “Neighboring Nuclear Weapon States “ (China, Russia, US).

(2) Obligation to non-reliance on nuclear weapons

One of the non-nuclear obligations of the intrazonal states would be, “To eliminate all dependence whatsoever on any nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device in all aspects of its security policy.”

(3) Negative security assurances built into the treaty itself

Existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties include negative security assurance as clauses in the protocol. In the Model Treaty, they are incorporated as requirements of the treaty itself.

(4) Prior consultation obligation for ships carrying nuclear weapons to enter ports or transit territorial
Existing nuclear weapon-free zone treaties leave the problem of ships or planes suspected of carrying nuclear weapons entering ports or passing through sea or air territory up to the individual parties directly involved. The model treaty takes this a step further and incorporates an obligation of prior consultation in all such situations in advance. Permission or denial of permission resulting from such discussion is left up to the parties involved.

(5) Obligation to cooperate with energy

The Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula prohibits the possession of “nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.” Nearly all observers agree that application of such a prohibition to Japan would make it impossible to conclude the treaty. However, without a change of some kind, the treaty would perpetuate an obvious imbalance between Japan and the Koreas with respect to securing energy. The model treaty recognizes the importance of this problem and establishes the following obligation. “The Intrazonal States shall pursue and develop cooperation among themselves in good faith to secure stable and sustainable energy for each of the Intrazonal States.”

(6) Obligation to transmit the A-bomb experience and provide nuclear disarmament education

In light of the fact that the Intrazonal States are home to many A-bomb survivors, the treaty includes an obligation to educate coming generations regarding nuclear disarmament and the damage to humans and societies inflicted by nuclear weapons.

4) Remaining issues

The model treaty is a point of departure for discussion. However, in giving shape to such a treaty, several important unresolved issues have been demonstrated.

One major problem is the verification system. Any such system must fully utilize the capabilities of the IAEA. In addition, we should develop a regional verification system in a way that builds trust and cooperation among the nations of the region. Another important issue is energy cooperation, and here we must be content with initiating a wide-ranging discussion. Formulating an agreement will take time and many obstacles must be overcome. Also, the matter of ships and aircraft suspected of carrying nuclear weapons will clearly require deeper discussion and experiential exchange within civil society in Japan and South Korea. Both sides accept the same principle, but differences
remain regarding some practical approach.

The above issues remain, but we would like to emphasize that rapid establishment of even a minimal Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone will contribute greatly to peace and stability in the region.

Finally, we have a question of approach how we can put the issue of Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone onto the political agenda of governments. We will discuss it in Chapter 3.

2. Exclusively defensive defense status and its regionalization
   1) Present status of Japan

The term “defensive weapon” is used quite frequently, but distinguishing defensive from offensive weapons is quite difficult just by looking at the weapons. In the prologue to the UN report mentioned in Chapter 1, then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pointed to the “difficulty …of distinguishing between offensive and defensive weapon systems.” And the report stated, “Offensive or defensive character of a weapon depends as much on the full context in which it is used as on its intrinsic properties.” In other words, whether a nation’s defensive system is defense-only or retains offensive aspects must be judged comprehensively through analysis of the nation’s security ideology and policies regarding both diplomacy and defense, the capabilities (types and nature) of its weapons and their scale, its forces posture (deployment modes of forces, level of alert, etc.), military doctrines (operation concepts for forces and weapons employment), and training programs.

As was stated in Chapter 1, analysis of the above factors reveals that Japan’s exclusively defensive defense security policies today are a “pretense,” not a true exclusively defensive defense policy. The offensive weapons rejected by the government due to Japan’s defense-only stance, according to the replies in the Diet, include aircraft carriers and Tomahawk cruise missiles. However, the Japanese government has permitted the US to deploy American aircraft carriers and cruise missiles in Yokosuka, Japan. This represents the fact that the Japanese defense-only policy is mere pretense. It is more so when we see the fact that Japan is the only place in the world where these weapons are deployed overseas. Japan’s security policy includes our own Self-Defense Force plus the US-Japan Security Treaty arrangement. We need to work to ensure that both the Self-Defense Force and the US-Japan security system are thoroughly “exclusively defensive defense.”

2) Clarifying the concept
What are the requirements of a true “exclusive defensive defense” military force? Given the actual situation in Northeast Asia and Japan’s favorable geographic position as an island nation, we believe it appropriate for Japan to develop its own concept of an exclusively defensive defense policy. Based on the results of this study, to assert that Japan is an exclusively defensive defense nation, the following conditions would have to be met. In other words, the following are the necessary conditions of any claim to be exclusively defensive defense.

(1) Security policies must be firmly based on the principle of “common security.”

Regardless of geographic conditions, exclusively defensive defense policies in any nation require a fundamental diplomatic policy designed to alleviate regional tension. To that end, Japan’s security policies must be recognized as non-threatening by its neighbors. This would be realized when Japan pursues peace through methods that would enhance security of its neighbors at the same time. Namely Japan should adopt “common security” concept as its security policy principle. It also implies that “exclusively defensive defense” policy inherently requires a bilateral or multilateral approach.

As a consequence of this principle, security policies relying on nuclear deterrence are unacceptable. Deterrence is designed to obtain one nation’s security by threatening to inflict the ultimate destruction on an opponent. And in contemplating the transition from the present situation to exclusively defensive defense, we believe it possible to shift US military activity to exclusively defensive defense based on the US-Japan Security Treaty. US military forces that are operated within the framework of “exclusively defensive defense” in Japan would gradually shrink until, eventually, it becomes unnecessary.

(2) Possession of no capability to project military force to threaten another country

Given Japan’s geographic conditions, it should be possible to make clear restrictions on armaments for this purpose, for example, by precluding the ability to launch an air to ground attack and by possessing no missiles with a range of more than 100 km.

(3) Employments of armed forces are allowed only against adversary offensive forces that enter Japanese territory or a certain restricted area around Japan.

The argument that we must have the ability to pre-empt an enemy missile attack by striking the enemy launch site destroys the exclusively defensive defense concept. We must deny on principle the
idea of expanding offensive operation in the name of defense. In this study, the question of the outer periphery range of the sea and air territory of Japan within which exclusively defensive defense force is allowed to be employed is left open to be discussed further in the future. In relation to this sub-section of force employment, the issues on BMD will be discussed later in section 3).

(4) Good-faith efforts to establish a Regional Council for Disarmament and Threat Reduction

Exclusively defensive defense policies must establish or make persistent efforts to establish a forum in which Japan and its neighbors would discuss mutual perceptions of threat. This council would naturally handle issues related to regional arms control and disarmament for threat reduction.

3) Procedures

It took time for New Zealand to assuage the anxiety of its people when it decided to abolish its fighter airplanes in 2000. In Japan, such moves will take even more time and strong leadership. However, Japan definitely has the potential to become a true exclusively defensive defense nation, given the long-standing public support of the concept of “the exclusively defensive defense.” Naturally, our constitution demands it. The key is to adopt a phased transition from the pretense. This report recommends the following initial approach.

(1) Stage One

Propose a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone and begin working toward its establishment. Through this process, alleviate regional tension and make a persuasive case for taking Japan in the direction of common security.

(2) Stage Two

Propose a UN General Assembly resolution regarding Japan’s defense-only position that clarifies the definition of such status, including the necessary conditions described above, and the national system supporting it. This approach would refer to Mongolia’s “UN General Assembly Resolution regarding Nuclear-free Status” (1998). Prior discussion with the US and neighboring countries would be required.

(3) Stage Three
On the basis of the international recognition of Japan’s “exclusively defensive defense status,” establish a Northeast Asia Council for Disarmament and Threat Reduction. Such a council would guarantee the transparency and reliability of Japan’s exclusively defensive defense policy. Then and only then would it become possible to discuss a missile defense system as part of an exclusively defensive defense system. Of course at that stage, it is extremely doubtful that a missile defense system would be seen as militarily, technically and economically rational.

3. Northeast Asia missile control systems

1) The missile threat

First, we must come to an objective understanding of the enormous and unnecessary “missile threat.” The fear of missile attack derives from the ability of missiles to attack highly populated cities from a long distance with little or no advance warning and the ability to carry nuclear, chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The US began making an issue of DPRK’s ballistic missiles when they developed the ability to reach the US mainland. From the time an approaching missile is detected, the attack, possibly with WMD, will arrive in 10 to 30 minutes.

Given these capabilities, when discussing the threat of missiles in the relatively limited geographic area of Northeast Asia, there is no meaningful difference between ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Ballistic missiles propelled through space by rockets fly vastly faster than cruise missiles flying through the atmosphere propelled by jet engines. However, the US Tomahawk cruise missile flies 880 kph and low enough to make it extremely difficult to detect on radar. Therefore, any city within 100 km of a coast can be suddenly attacked with at most a 10-minute warning. Thus, any fair argument for missile limitation must simultaneously discuss both ballistic and cruise missiles.

In addition, discussion of this kind of threat within a small physical area would also involve suicidal aircraft attack and other measures of surprise attack. Therefore, an important premise for any discussion of missile control must include the pursuit of the complete elimination of WMD, which lie at the root of that threat, and the establishment of mechanisms for reducing the instability caused by a potential surprise attack.

2) Diversity and fairness

In 2002, the United Nations issued a report entitled “The issue of missiles in all its aspects.” As the report says, the missile problem has highly diverse aspects and so far there is no universal rule or
international framework applied to all of them.

This situation holds true for Northeast Asia. In this report, to grasp the current situation, we created a database of missiles with a range of 50 km or more. The six countries involved with the region plus Taiwan collectively possess more than 80 types of missiles. In accordance with the situation in the respective countries and regions, governments choose range, launching platform (land, sea, or air), method of propulsion, and method of guidance. Therefore, when studying missile control systems, a well-balanced framework must be adapted to the specific situation.

This report begins with the specific problem of shrinking the reciprocal menace posed by the missiles possessed by small countries in Northeast Asia. In other words, our priority is to be focused on missile control among Japan, DPRK, and South Korea, and when necessary, we consider global problems involving the U.S., Russia, and China in relation to such priority issue. Not all global problems start from or can be resolved in Northeast Asia, but when analyzing regional problems, it is important to be aware of the global problems that are inextricably involved.

Meanwhile, it is important to make use of precedent global attempts to control missiles. We can make four broad classifications of these accomplishments.

① Missile limitations and reductions as WMD delivery vehicles by the US and Russia (SALT, START, SORT, etc.)

② Multilateral limitations on missiles as delivery vehicles for WMD (Outer Space Treaty, Latin America and the Caribbean NWFZ Treaty, etc.)

③ Export controls on missiles and missile technologies (Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, etc.)

④ Advance notice mechanisms for missile launches (Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRC) Agreement between the US and the Soviet Union, The Lahore Declaration between India and Pakistan, etc.)

3) Initial confidence-building measures

As an entry point to dialogue on the structure of a regional missile control system, initial confidence-building measures must first be agreed. Immediate fears, including many baseless ones, must be assuaged. Here, we propose three such measures.

① Japan, South Korea, and DPRK must agree on reciprocal prior notification of launches (for testing or training) of missiles with a range of 100 km or more.
Japan, South Korea and DPRK must agree on a five-year moratorium on any activity (except safety maintenance, reduction, and elimination) regarding nuclear, chemical (only DPRK is not party to the NPT and CWC) and biological weapons. To address nuclear weapons, the parties will commence exploration of a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone.

US, Russia, and China agree to providing unconditional assurances for five years to Japan, South Korea and DPRK. At the same time, the parties reaffirm not only the UN Charter, but also any bilateral non-aggression agreements or declarations remaining in force between the former and the latter. (e.g. Japan-PRC Peace and Friendship Treaty (1978), Japan-USSR Joint Declaration (1956))

With such initial confidence-building measures, Japan, South Korea, and DPRK should be able to start constructing a regional missile control system that will serve as a global model. This report proposes a three-stage process, which will be detailed in the full report.

Stage one: Ban missiles with a range of 300 km or more. Ban missile defense systems.
Stage two: Ban missiles with a range of 180 km or more.
Stage three: Ban all land-attack missiles
Chapter 3  Approaches for implementation

In consideration of the above themes and with knowledge of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the report, representing the perspective of civil society, proposes the following approach toward “Northeast Asia Regional Security Frameworks.” The approach will progress simultaneously along multiple paths. In the following, the steps proposed for each path are governmental measures, followed by concomitant efforts by civil society.

1. Step One

Path 1—Place establishment of a Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone on the domestic political agenda of each participating country. The government of Japan officially declares its intent to pursue establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone.

[Efforts by civil society]

- Use the proposed model treaty.
- Promote further civil society cooperation between Japan and South Korea.
- Create a movement among parliamentarians to build supra-party support in the Diet.
- In South Korea, popularize the concept at the grassroots level while approaching members of Parliament.
- Raise awareness and interest in the issue among international NGOs and political experts.

Path 2—Lay groundwork for a draft UN General Assembly Resolution on Japan’s Exclusively Defensive Defense Status

[Efforts by civil society]

- Further develop the concept of exclusively defensive defense policy.
- NGOs draft the UN General Assembly resolution and encourage discussion and debate.
- Approach national government officials and parliamentarians.
- Work to popularize the concept globally; in particular, energize the debate at the non-governmental level in South Korea, China, and DPRK.

Path 3—Agree on an advance notice system among Japan, South Korea, and DPRK for launches of all missiles with a range of 100 km or more

[Efforts by civil society]
• Joint lobbying efforts at the civil society level in Japan and South Korea.
• Encourage general envisioning of a Missile Control Framework for Northeast Asia.
• Raise awareness and interest in the issue among international NGOs and political experts.

Path 4—Establish a five-year moratorium on all WMD activities (except for safety maintenance, reduction, and elimination) in Japan, South Korea, and North Korea to ease regional tensions and to set the conditions for negotiations that promote cooperative regional security. The U.S., Russia, and China pledge security assurances for five years. At the same time, the parties reaffirm not only the UN Charter, but also any bilateral non-aggression agreements or declarations remaining in force between the former and the latter.

2. Step 2

Path 1—Put formation of Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone and the missile launch advance notice system on the agenda for the ARF Track 2 seminar.
(Note: ARF positions Track 2 as “official” forum for discussion.)
[Efforts by civil society]
• Promote joint efforts by ARF member countries, particularly New Zealand, Canada, and Mongolia.
• Enlist cooperative parties among participants in ARF Track 2 forum.
• Deepen research on verification systems for the Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone treaty.

Path 2—Put the Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone, a missile launch advance notice system, and a ban on WMDs on the agenda for discussion at the Six Party Talks.
[Efforts by civil Society]
• Observing development of Six-Party Talks closely, determine the appropriate period for debating these issues.

Path 3—Attain adoption of a UN General Assembly resolution on Japan’s exclusively defensive defense status.
• Offer a series of briefings to concerned national governments and diplomats.
3. Step 3

**Path 1**—Conclude the Northeast Asia nuclear weapon-free zone treaty.

**Path 2**—Commence discussions on resolving energy issues deriving from imbalances in existing nuclear energy policies.

[Efforts by civil society]
- Develop concrete and innovative proposals.
- Stimulate active dialogue on energy sources other than nuclear energy and cooperation in development of the same.

**Path 3**—In accordance with Japan’s exclusive defensive defense status, establish a Northeast Asia Council for Threat Reduction and Disarmament.

[Efforts by civil society]
- Stimulate civil society dialogue in Northeast Asia and explore potential for establishing a zone for defense-only policies in the region.

**Path 4**—Begin negotiations on a missile control system in conformance with the three-stage process table described in the full report. In Stage 1, adopt as a goal a ban on missile defense systems.

[Efforts by civil society]
- Establish a system through which to obtain the cooperation of international specialists in implementing the process table
“Project: Peace Depot Northeast Asia Security Forum” is a project team established for a three-year research project titled “A Civil Society Initiative for Northeast Asia Regional Security Frameworks” funded by the Toyota Foundation (November 2002-October 2005). The NGO and academic researchers collaborated with participation from South Korea, China, Canada and Japan. The project team consists of the following members:

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