

2013 NPT Preparatory Committee NGO Workshop

**The Future of the Peace Process and Prospects for  
a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia  
- 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Korean War Armistice -**

**Palais des Nations, Room XVI**

**Thursday 25 April 2013, 10am – 1pm**

**Co-sponsorship**

Peace Depot (JP), Peace Network (ROK), Peace Boat (JP),

People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (ROK)

**Cooperation**

International Peace Bureau, Nautilus Institute, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, World Council of Churches

## Programme

**Chair:** Ms. Maria Kim, Peace Depot

**Opening** 10:00-10:20

*Opening Remarks*

*Address by National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities/ Mayor of Nagasaki*

*Address by Mayors for Peace/ Mayor of Hiroshima*

**Keynote Speech** 10:20-11:30

**New Approaches to Denuclearization and Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula**

*Mr. Wooksik Cheong, Peace Network*

**The Significance of Achieving a NEA-NWFZ**

*Mr. Ichiro Yuasa, Peace Depot*

**End of the Cold War in Europe and Its Implications in Northeast Asia**

*Mr. Colin Archer, IPB*

**Implementation of a NEA-NWFZ in China and North Korea**

*Mr. Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute \*via Skype*

**Comment: Reflections and the Role of Parliamentarians**

*Mr. Alyn Ware, PNND global coordinator*

**Q&A**

**Special Remarks** 11:30-11:50

*By Diplomats of the 6 party talks nations and Mongolia, and PNND Korea*

**Break** 11:50- 12:00

**Panel Discussion** 12:00-12:50

**Moderator:** *Mr. Akira Kawasaki, Peace Boat*

**Panel:** *Mr. Jonathan Frerichs, WCC*

*Mr. Takao Takahara, Peace Depot*

*Mr. Wooksik Cheong, Peace Network*

**\*We encourage the participants to raise questions and share their views.**

**Close** 12:50-13:00

*Publication of a Joint Appeal on Northeast Asia NWFZ*

*Closing Remarks*

## Profiles

### Chair

**Ms. Maria KIM** works at Peace Depot, doing research and coordinating international partnerships. Before, she worked as a coordinator for Peace Network and Civil Peace Forum in Seoul, Korea. She is also PNND NEA Assistant Coordinator and a member of Ban All Nukes generation (BANg).

### Speakers

**Mr. Ichiro YUASA:** President of Peace Depot. Born in 1949 in Tokyo. Tohoku University Graduate and Former Researcher of National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology Chugoku Center. Doctor of Science. Physical oceanography and marine environmental studies. Ban Seto Inland Sea conference adviser. Publications: "Radioactive contamination of the Sea" (2012), "Ask the Peace City Hiroshima" (1995).

**Mr. Wooksik CHEONG** is one of the founding members and the representative of Peace Network, a non-governmental organization formed in 1999, working for peace and disarmament in the Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula. As a peace activist, an independent researcher, and a journalist, he has organized many campaigns and conferences, written books and essays, and made speeches both in Korea and abroad.

**Mr. Colin ARCHER:** Peace and human rights activist since the early 1970s. Active on nuclear issues in UK during late 1980s, with CND and END. Secretary-General of the International Peace Bureau since 1990. Heavily involved in the World Court Project, Abolition 2000, Hague Appeal for Peace and Global Campaign for Peace Education. Coordinator of IPB's main programme: Disarmament for Sustainable Development, including the Global Day of Action on Military Spending.

**Mr. Peter HAYES** is Professor of International Relations, School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University and Director, Nautilus Institute in San Francisco and of Nautilus at RMIT. He works at the nexus of security, environment and energy policy problems, and has developed techniques for seeking near-term solutions to global security and sustainability problems. Peter has worked for the UN Development Programme, the Asian Development Bank, and the Global Environment Facility.

**Mr. Alyn WARE** is Global Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. He was active in the campaign to ban nuclear weapons from New Zealand, establish peace studies as part of the New Zealand school curriculum and was instrumental in the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons. He also serves as a member of the World Future Council and Consultant for the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms.

### Moderator

**Mr. Akira KAWASAKI** is an Executive Committee member of Peace Boat, and Co-Chair of ICAN. In 2009-2010, he served as an NGO Advisor to Co-Chairs of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. After the 11 March 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster, he initiated Peace Boat's activities to help children of Fukushima and organized Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World in January 2012 as the Conference Director. He lectures at Keisen University, Tokyo, and frequently writes in Japanese newspapers and journals on nuclear disarmament.

### Panelists

**Mr. Jonathan FRERICHS** is programme executive, peace-building and disarmament, for the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, based in Geneva. His work experience includes advocacy and communication responsibilities with humanitarian, relief and development, public health and religious organizations dealing with various aspects of human security.

**Mr. Takao TAKAHARA** is Professor of International Politics and Peace Research at Faculty of International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University; member of the International Peace Research Institute Meiji Gakuin University (PRIME); Vice President of the Peace Studies Association of Japan; member of Pugwash International Council; International Advisory Board member, Peace History Society.

## **Mayor Taue of Nagasaki's Speech Japan-Korea NGO Workshop**

Greetings on behalf of the National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities at this Japan-Korea NGO Workshop. First, allow me to express my deep respect for all those involved in this NGO Workshop, following on from last year, and your dedicated efforts to realize a permanent peace for the Northeast Asian region.

The presence of North Korea, ignoring the restraint from the international community and forcibly conducting missile launch and nuclear tests, is threatening the safety of residents and increasing the tensions in the Northeast Asian region where we live.

2013 marks the 20<sup>th</sup> year since North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT. With its reliance on nuclear armaments, North Korea is also becoming more isolated from the international community. The nuclear issue of North Korea, now improving the capacity of its missiles and reducing the size of its nuclear weapons, is an issue not only for the Northeast Asian region, but an issue which threatens the international community, and must be urgently resolved.

It is thus very meaningful that NGOs from Japan and Korea gather amidst these circumstances to hold a joint workshop on the theme of "The Future of the Peace Process and Prospects for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia." Such civil society efforts will increase momentum for the creation of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and build th foundations for a permanent peace in the region.

The National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities, of which I am Chair, has been conducting activities with the aim of realizing a local community in which residents can live without fear, such as holding exhibitions to relay the reality of nuclear weapons and promote the abolition of nuclear weapons. We believe that the creation of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, the theme of today's workshop, is an effective way to overcome the current serious situation in Northeast Asia, and we are making efforts towards its establishment. Specifically, we have included clauses relating to the creation of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in declarations adopted at our Council's General Assembly, and worked together with NGOs to gather signatures of local municipal leaders to submit as a petition to the Japanese Government. We also continue to appeal about the need of the creation of such a zone through the production of pamphlets to promote the cause.

Of the 1789 local municipalities in Japan, a total of 1566 - 88% - have adopted the Non-Nuclear and Peace Declaration. Our Council will continue to expand the group of non-nuclear declared municipalities, and work closely together with civil society to realise a world free of nuclear weapons.

I am sure that the representatives Japanese and Korean NGOs participating in today's workshop will have a deep discussion, and announce a joint appeal for permanent peace in the Northeast Asian region. I sincerely hope that this will contribute to the recommencing of the Six Party Talks, and for the peaceful resolution of the North Korea related nuclear issues through dialogue.

Finally, I sincerely wish for the success of today's joint Japanese-Korean NGO workshop, and for the health of all present here. Let us continue to work together from now for the realisation of a world free of nuclear weapons.

## **Address by Mayors for Peace / Matsui Kazumi, Mayor of Hiroshima**

Good morning, everyone. I am Matsui Kazumi, mayor of Hiroshima City, and president of Mayors for Peace. Please allow me to say a few words on the occasion of the holding of this workshop.

The organizers of this workshop, including Peace Depot, have been working to promote measures that focus on building peace in northeast Asia and aim for the realization of the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. It goes without saying that the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is one of the main important approaches towards realizing world peace.

Nevertheless, looking at Northeast Asia's state, namely North Korea's ballistic missile launches and conducting of nuclear tests have caused tensions in the region to rise quickly, and one can see that an unpredictable situation persists.

Amidst this concerning situation, I have an appeal to make to everyone as mayor of the atomic-bombed city Hiroshima – a city that holds wishes for peace, which are grounded in the horrible and tragic experiences of the *hibakusha*.

If one witnesses the horrible devastation wrought by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is obvious that nuclear weapons are the most inhumane of any weapon ever developed, and that nuclear weapons are the absolute evil. The very existence of this kind of weaponry should not be legal.

The *hibakusha*, having met a fate of cruelty that cannot be put into words, have overcome hatred, suffering, and despair, and have come to the unshakable conviction that no one else should ever suffer such a grave tragedy. They have since never ceased working to transmit to the people of the world their earnest desire, as human beings, and sincere prayer for all the people in the world to live in peace. Everyone in the international community must listen to the voices of these *hibakusha* and share the earnest hopes of these *hibakusha* for peace and humanity so that they may deepen their resolve to strive for a nuclear-weapons-free world.

Now, the inhumanity of nuclear weapons has been rightfully highlighted, and the move to outlaw nuclear weapons is accelerating. To heighten the acceleration even further, extensive efforts and cooperation are required not only of countries, and international organizations, but also many citizens and NGOs worldwide.

Mayors for Peace now enjoys a membership of 5,587 cities from 156 countries and regions around the world. The population of those cities makes up one-seventh of the total population of the world, or 1 billion people. I feel that now is the time that many people must join powers to transmit to Northeast Asia and the rest of the world the voices of the overwhelming majority of citizens who wish for nuclear weapons abolition, and to solidify the motion towards realizing a world without nuclear weapons.

I keep earnestly hoping that at this workshop, the discussion regarding concrete policies for accomplishing the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone will deepen, and that cooperation among many citizens, NGOs, and government officials may advance the movement to build peace in Northeast Asia one step at a time. In closing, I extend my best wishes for the health and success of everyone gathered here today. Thank you for your attention.

## **New Approaches to Denuclearization and Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula**

### **Wooksik Cheong, Peace Network**

The Year 2013 is the 60 anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement. Also, it has been 20 years since DPRK declared to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). There have been request on making the year 2013 into a tuning point. However, serious tension has been building up in the Korean Peninsula due to the vicious circle created by the brinkmanship posed by North Korea, military demonstration by the U.S., and heated rhetoric war between two Koreas.

What is more concerning is the “no need for diplomacy” theory has been gaining strength recently. But, we would rather find the reason of failure in the lack of diplomacy. The unresolved peace agreement is the leading example of this lagging diplomacy. Six-party talks in the September 19 Joint Statement decided to hold forums to replace the armistice agreement with a peace agreement, but no such forums have occurred since. North Korea has asked for the peace agreement negotiation several times, yet South Korea and the U.S. have ignored the request. Strong discontent caused by this slight is the underlying reason behind the recent provocative words from North Korea.

Six-party talks have also not been held since the rupture of negotiation in December 2008. For the most part South Korea and the U.S. are responsible for the dissolution of six-party talks. Two countries asked for verification on the nuclear declaration form of North Korea, which was not included in the agreement. North Korea, notorious for its fastidiousness, turned down the proposal, which resulted in the halt. Six-party talks have barely held on since then. North Korea were in 2009, and South Korea and the U.S. since 2010 has been hesitant to open up the six-party talks. Dialogue between the two Koreas has practically ended, and talk between North Korea and the U.S. barely exists at all. The missile and nuclear capacity of North Korea has been strengthened in the meantime.

There is a reason behind this shy diplomacy from South Korea and the U.S. for the past five years. The Lee Myung-Bak government became obsessed with the idea of unification by absorbing the North when Kim Jong-Il collapsed with brain disease. The Obama Administration seemed to pursue the engagement policy towards North Korea in the beginning. When North Korea launched a long-range rocket in April 2009, the Obama Administration changed the course and focused on a “pivot to Asia,” rather than engaging in negotiations with the North.

How to react to provocation by North Korea is an important matter. Washington Post wrote “Answer North Korea with financial sanctions.” Financial sanctions on North Korea seemed to strengthen around the U.S. after the third nuclear experiment of North Korea. It tries to put pressure on the elite in North Korea through Banco Delta Asia (BDA) style sanctions. However, one should never underestimate the opposite effect of BDA. If the U.S. had not imposed BDA sanctions, the implementation of September 19 Joint Statement would have been faster.

Ultimately sanctions on North Korea and military demonstration are of no use to change North Korea’s behaviors. For one thing, it is questionable whether sanctions would actually hurt leaders in North Korea, and even if it does, they would rather take more aggressive actions than surrender. The only way to make North Korea’s fist open is that the U.S. will also do. It will be more effective to send a message that the U.S. is willing to enter into a peace agreement by holding a high-level talk and sending special envoy to Pyongyang than to take military actions, via sending B-52, B-2, and F-22 to Korea.

Particularly, diplomacy of South Korea and the U.S. should be directly targeted at Kim Jong-Un, the very leader of North Korea. Considering the North Korean systems in which group thinking prevails, decision from the leader is essential in changing North Korea’s course.

In the middle of 1980s, when the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union reached its highest point, words like “Global Armageddon” and “Nuclear Winter” were widely used around the globe. Distrust between two sides rose to extremes: Ronald Reagan called the Soviet “the evil empire” while Soviet leaders thought the U.S. was preparing for a nuclear war. But Reagan’s change in heart along

with Gorbachev's new thinking brought an end to the Cold War without a single bullet shot. 'Chemical reactions' created through several summit talks made this possible. The way to end the "Korean Armageddon" lies here. U.S. and South Korea have to answer with diplomacy that can ignite chemical reactions within Kim Jong-Un.

Another chemical reactions need to resolve Korean crisis. They are ones among NPT, peace treaty, and denuclearization. North Korea returns to NPT as 'transitional status' that means the North announces what, when, how dismantle nuclear weapons. This is the most sincere measure that North Korea can show its willingness to give up nuke. At the same time, Two Koreas, U.S., and China sign peace treaty. It is also plausible that the peace treaty stipulates the subjects, the methods, and the deadline of the North's nuclear weapons' dismantlement. Peace treaty is the best way that U.S. and South Korea can demonstrate not to have any hostile intent toward North Korea.



## **The Significance of Achieving a NEA-NWFZ**

### **Ichiro Yuasa, Peace Depot**

#### 1. Introduction

The year 2013 marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement. But we can not see the path turning the Korean War Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace regime in spite of long time comparable to the length of life of one person has passed. On the contrary, military tension is growing, such as the satellite launch and 3rd nuclear test by North Korea(DPRK).

Aiming to maintain the current political system, North Korea is pushing forward the development of nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that she expect to be isolated in the world, what is the background to make a choice like that? There is distrust to the United States in the underlying. North Korea was singled out as the axis of evil in the era of the Bush administration. North Korea witnessed the reality that Saddam Hussein of Iraq has been crushed by the US in 2003, and was pushing forward the development of nuclear weapons. And if so, it will be seen that until there is no guarantee being crushed unilaterally by the United States, there is no intention to give up the development of nuclear weapons from her own.

#### 2. In Northeast Asia, Cold War thinking is followed

Still going through the 20 years from the end of the Cold War that began in the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is difficult to say the world is being freed from Cold War thinking. In Europe, after German unification, the formation of the EU, the launch of the European Security Cooperation Mechanism (OSCE), the risk of military conflict in Europe is no longer exist. However, even in the Europe, it remains the tactical U.S. nuclear weapons about 200 has been deployed.

In Northeast Asia, the Korean War has not ended. And due to North Korea's nuclear development, unprecedented military confrontation continues. United States and Russia continue to deploy about 10% of the nuclear weapons they held in immediately alarm armed. In the world, the reality that has not been freed from Cold War thinking still exists.

The existence of the military demarcation line of 38 degrees north symbolizes that the Cold War structure still remains in Northeast Asia, Borderline at sea still not be determined. Therefore, as Yonpyondo shelling, a small collision is repeated.

The nuclear development of North Korea continues, the military cooperation of Japan-U.S. South Korea becomes strong, and China-Russia advance the modernization of military forces. The vicious circle that should be said to the "Security dilemma" in which mutual distrusts invent a nuclear arms race, is maintained.

We can be seen according to this scenario only in the future when a military tension continues constantly. We cannot view the road to peace and security with this structure maintained. Only now, an inclusive frame "Common security" by the conversation and the cooperation between multi countries is requested to be formed to make it out of the vicious circle of "Security dilemma".

The concept of "Common security" is the one that Palme Committee ("Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues") advocated it in 1982. This is an idea said that "Common security" will be formed by the conversation between multi countries to secure it on the assumption that all countries have a right to safety. This idea led the road to the cold war ending, and it led to the formation of the fall of the Berlin Wall and EU in Europe. Furthermore, it is said that it led to the formation of the

regional security mechanism of OSCE in 1995. I came to Geneva with the feeling that want to learn the movement in Europe during the first half of the 1990s from the end of the 1980s.

Unfortunately, in Northeast Asia, it did not become such a move. It is necessary to advance the approach that forms the frame of "Common security" in Northeast Asia only now. So, I want to advocate the formation of a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) with the verification system as a clue of a bigger frame formation to produce "Cooperation security" between multi countries.

### 3. Importance of NEA-NWFZ

If the Cold War maintained still in NEA, we need to consider looking back to the early 90's when the end of the Cold War began in Europe. There was a chance to make change the nuclear strategy and military structure. in Northeast Asia by the ending of the cold war at the beginning of the 1990's. In the meantime *Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula* came into force on 20 Feb.1992.

This is epoch-making, and This *Declaration* included some but not all of the core elements of other NWFZs, including prohibitions on the testing, manufacture, production, receiving, possession, storing, deployment or use of nuclear weapons. Although it was not called a NWFZ, it was in fact the fourth NWFZ to be negotiated following the earlier treaties at that time. Unfortunately, the Declaration was never successfully implemented. The Declaration did not develop a fully-fledged NWFZ treaty structure under which there would not only be verification provisions but also compliance mechanisms.

Anything has not advanced actually without performing the effort of the protocol making by the verification system and the negative security assurance by. the nuclear weapon states (China, Russia, and United States). The U.S-DPRK will become a simmering tension oppositely in only two years late, and Commitment in the joint declaration is not carried out, the plan was derailed.

Six-party talks started on 2003, and set a goal of "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," but, as long as the security of the system retention of North Korea can not be determined, we have been frustrated with the number of times. Twist and turn has continued for 10 years afterwards. For example, in February 2012, US-North Korea agreement by high-level consultation was made. But then, as visiting the satellite launch, sanctions of the UNSC and the third nuclear test, vicious cycle of military tension has continued.

Only due to the idea of six-party talks called "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula", stalemate cannot be resolved. If it sees from the side of North Korea at that time, an unequal feeling that only its denuclearization is urged from the nuclear weapon states, and Japan-ROK relying on US nuclear deterrence will not be able to be wiped. In order to overcome this impasse, Japan and ROK should propose the NEA-NWFZ to change the state that loses such a mutual mistrust, and is agglutinative, and, as a result, the environment that can become an idea that North Korea may dismantle nuclear arsenal at ease be maintained. Proposal of NEA-NWF Z Treaty is the only answer to break down this wall.

But Japanese Government is passive to the NEA-NWFZ. They say that in Northeast Asia the realistic environment for NWFZ is not yet ready. We have to try towards realization of the nuclear abandonment by North Korea for improvement of security environment in Northeast Asia.

So the government has not made the idea of this problem in the past. But various proposals have been done by NGO. In 1995, Dr. Umebayashi (Peace Depot special adviser) presented the "Three plus Three Nations Arrangement" for a NEA-NWFZ. This plan is considered to be a most realistic and fundamental arrangement because it involves key three non-nuclear states of the region, namely the ROK, the DPRK and Japan, as the central players and three neighboring nuclear weapon states, namely the United States, China, and Russia, as supportive players of the arrangement. This idea has the feature that neighboring nuclear weapon states is participating from the start in the treaty, Denuclearization of

Northeast Asia if achieved with legally binding, it will be a major breakthrough in the creation of peace process.

Aiming at securing the current structure of the country, North Korea has declared nuclear possession in fact. Therefore, North Korea will stick to nuclear possession to the last minute. In the process, or in parallel with the consultation aimed to NWFZ concept, taking steps that lead to the end of the Korean War is important. It is that specifically, conduct negotiations going converted to peace agreements truce. What progress of talks with the package NEA-NWFZ and the end of the Korean War is the solution to this problem?

#### 4. To promote the international cooperation of Parliamentarians, Mayors and Citizens

In order to realize a NWFZ, we have to strengthen the public opinion and move the governments through the power of the people. I introduce the efforts in Japan.

First, it is necessary to expand the support of Parliamentarians who has the direct influence power for each government. Unfortunately, by the Abe administration appeared, this movement is shrinking. However, in May last year, PNND Japan has launched the NWFZ Working Team. It has started activities.

The second is support of Local Authorities that assumes the defense of resident's life and safety. In Japan, National Council of Japan Nuclear Free Local Authorities (JNFLA) is a network of 287 local authorities. One of the major themes of the council has been a NEA-NWFZ.

The idea to utilize sister cities relationship will be useful to promote the idea of a NEA-NWFZ. As of today, 129 local authorities in Japan have entered a sister city agreement with local authorities in South Korea. We would like to establish cooperation among local authorities in Japan and South Korea. The first step could be a joint declaration by mayors in Japan and ROK which calls for the promotion of a NEA-NWFZ. Daegu City and Hiroshima will be a good example.

For more than 10 years We, Peace Depot had many workshop jointly held by Japan and South Korean NGOs in Seoul, Tokyo, Shanghai, New York, Vienna and Geneva. In 2004, we announced a Model NEA-NWFZ Treaty drafted in cooperation with activists and scholars. It is a driving force of public opinion formation as civil society to support the action of parliamentarians, Mayors.

In March 2009, We, today`s co-sponsorship groups had launched a campaign calling for endorsements to the "Statement of Support for a NEA-NWFZ". We have listed the endorsements of the 409 Mayors in Japan. In August 2011 and March 2012, Taue Mayor of Nagasaki also cooperated with Peace Depot to submit to the Japanese Government this document.

In addition, it is an important problem to obtain the support to a NEA-NWFZ of China that insist on the negative security assurance fourthly before, and has enormous influence in North Korea Now, especially cooperation's in various areas in such Japan-ROK being requested to be constructed in multilayer. While referring to "comprehensive agreement on peace and security in Northeast Asia" proposed by the former U.S. High officials Morton H. Halperin, we would like to promote the NWFZ.

By the way, there have been five NWFZs established in the world, each of which is stipulated in an international treaty. Five NWFZs embrace 118 countries and areas where about 2.1 billion people live. Almost all of the land in the Southern Hemisphere is covered with NWFZs. Countries of NWFZ recognize that it is not nuclear deterrence but "Non-Nuclear Umbrella" that brings security to them. NWFZs already established were not able to be done easily. The government somewhere proposes the treaty and the resolution of the agreement is adopted in the United Nations, and the early one has taken years to the approval of the treaty for years. Between multi countries of the region with a constant extension, the difficult problem with historical details is sure to exist. The NWFZ treaty has been approved for the first time through a tenacious process of piling the conversation between multi countries, and cultivating the soil that cooperates mutually while untying those difficult problems one by one. Declaring that the Japan-South Korea governments want to make the NEA-NWFZ Treaty in a

public place at early time is extremely important now.

Efforts to expand a NWFZ into the Northern Hemisphere have made through various approaches now. The following should be made in Northeast Asia.

## Ending Cold War – What can we learn from the European experience?

Colin Archer, IPB

I have been asked to do the almost impossible. One cannot cover in 10 minutes the whole geo-politics of this long period, basically from 1945 to 1990 – BUT I can give a civil society perspective and draw some comparisons with NE Asia.

What was the Cold War about?

- yes, nuclear weapons, but...that is the military tip of a huge iceberg.
  - ideology, different views of the good society
  - empires
  - history
  - economy
  - espionage
  - psychology of fear, visions of the Others
- And much more

Easier to tell the story than to draw the lessons, esp for a very different region with a different history. And yet...**there are a remarkable number of similarities:**

1. Political division stemming from catastrophic war
2. Violent history of national struggles – both in Europe and in Asia, some were colonisers, some the colonised
3. Parallel UK and Ireland/Japan and Korea
4. Presence in the region of the big powers
5. Militarisation including subs, bases, land forces
6. Fear of land invasion
7. Memory of WW2 destruction
8. Unfinished business of WW2 - Experience of both fascism and communism in recent history
9. Propaganda on both sides, though NK is extreme case – and yet there is also a history of real negotiations. In the Cold War it was called *détente* and surprisingly it was accepted & even promoted by hawks like Reagan.
10. Economic crisis of NK has parallels with that of the USSR in its final stages
11. Fear of ultimate destruction
12. Possible impact on states and peoples outside the region, indeed the whole planet.

### And several crucial differences

- It is not a bloc-to-bloc confrontation but rather NK + China v. SK + USA + Japan
- There is no buffer zone cf Central and Eastern Europe, which of course played a key role in pioneering the break away from Moscow and the renunciation of communist ideology.
- Seoul is just a stone's throw from NK border and its population is thus more vulnerable to conventional attack than were the populations of Europe East or West in the Cold War.
- The nature of the NK regime and its ideology are arguably different from the Soviet system. It has more of the hallmarks of a state religion and has the dynastic structure characteristic of feudalism.

### ENDING THE COLD WAR [IN EUROPE]

and also America! – the Cold War was a complex global phenomenon, and its ending wasn't only a European story.

**Sociological background:** role of the baby boomers. A highly politicised 60s generation come to maturity. eg Younger ones (me): Those born in 1952 were 16 in 1968. By 1979 (Reagan-Thatcher) we were 27. When the Wall came down we were not even 40.

West: free time and money, no big jobs problem. Travel. There was a personal space to do protest-politics.

East: suffering the decay of communism. No internet but they were watching western TV (in Ger...). For them, freedom was visible but not available.

I will not dwell on the role high level political figures such as Willy Brandt and Olof Palme, let alone Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher who have claimed credit for 'bringing down communism. The most significant politician is obviously Mikhail Gorbachev.

The real credit of course goes to the peoples of Eastern Europe who fought mostly nonviolently and in some cases sacrificed their lives, for their freedom.

**Instead, I will zoom in on one civil society movement, perhaps the most important from a peace movement point of view: END**

END was a Europe-wide movement for a "nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal" that put on annual European Nuclear Disarmament conventions from 1982 to 1992 (ie the last 8-10 years of the Cold War). It was set up in the wake of the Dual Track Decision ie to offer the Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of medium-range ballistic missiles combined with the threat that in case of disagreement NATO would deploy more middle-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe. With the acceptance of the new missiles by the Bundestag this was eventually rejected by Moscow. The stage was set for a massive nuclearisation of Europe with Cruise, Pershing and SS 20 missiles, and a real threat of all-out nuclear war.

What was different to the previously existing peace movements? Remember CND for ex, had been active since 1957, END was a latecomer.

First, END refused to take sides in the Cold War:

*"We do not wish to apportion guilt between the military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world. . ."*

Secondly, it argued not just for disarmament but also for an end to the bloc system that had divided Europe since 1945 – a goal it envisaged being achieved by a novel strategy of "détente from below" or citizens' diplomacy. In the famous wording of the END appeal: *"The remedy lies in our own hands . . . We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state . . . We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East and West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage."*

Its specific genius was to combine disarmament and human rights in a single set of demands, thus drawing support from both sides of the Iron Curtain. Was it utopian? But look what happened in the end!

No war in Europe now but the nukes are still here – see Cameron's justification 'keeping up our guard' against NK/Iran threats.

**Some key figures: Western Europe**

UK – E. P. Thompson, Mary Kaldor, Dan Smith and Ken Coates.

Netherlands – Mient Jan Faber and Wim Bartels.

Bartels was also the president of the **International Peace Coordination Centre (IPCC)**, a cooperation of Western 'like-minded' movements, which linked their commitment to the struggle against nuclear weapons and the support of independent, dissident peace-initiatives in Eastern-Europe. Despite this intensive cooperation there also existed some kind of rivalry between the END network and the IPCC.

Germany. Petra Kelly – though her work was mainly via the Greens.

USA: Jesse Jackson + Joanne Landy

It should be stressed that the Liaison Committee was not so much a grouping of individuals but of

representatives of movements, including parties, labour unions, churches etc.

Other groups more focussed on US nuclear weapons: notably the Freeze Campaign which later turned into Peace Action, and the huge range of loosely-organised movements, both professional groupings like the doctors and lawyers and locally organised groupings – or UK NW (CND) or French NW (Mvt de la paix) etc..

### **E Europe:**

What END was probably best known for was its work with dissidents in the Soviet Union and its east-central European satellite states. Although the END Appeal had won some support from dissidents in the Soviet bloc at its launch, most were hesitant about the western peace movements, which they felt were parroting Soviet slogans and had no sympathy for people living under communist dictatorship. Václav Havel expressed this view forcefully in his essay “An Anatomy of a Reticence” (1985).

Nevertheless, thanks largely to the persistence of END and like-minded activists from other countries, who kept up a constant stream of correspondence with dissidents in the Soviet bloc and visited them whenever they could, by the mid-1980s a fruitful dialogue had been established. END had working groups for each Soviet bloc country.

USSR: Moscow Trust Group, + Sakharov, Medvedev

The Czechoslovakia group exchanged views with and visited Havel and his colleagues in Charter 77 + Dienstbier; the Hungary group did the same with György Konrád, Miklos Haraszi and a small group of young peace activists; the Poland group the same with Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron and many younger activists + Walesa & Solidarnosc; the East Germany group the same with Bärbel Bohley and others who were later to be the core of Neues Forum + R Eppelman (churches).

Both the END Conventions and the UK END group went into decline in the late 1980s after the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty removed the weapons that had given the European peace movement its principal *raison d’être*.

### **TWO CONCLUDING POINTS**

Probably the biggest difference between these two situations – and the biggest obstacle to a citizens diplomacy approach in NE Asia -- is the extreme totalitarian grip imposed by the NK regime, which leaves little space for building relationships with people in other countries. Most observers contend that there is no independent civil society in the western sense of the term. However it would be interesting to hear from our SK friends about their experience, including the experience of the Kaesong industrial park (now abandoned by NK) and from groups like Nautilus and Peace Boat who have done much to try to bring people together at a citizens level.

There have been recent reports suggesting that the real purpose behind NK’s threats is to frighten off investors in the South and thus deal a powerful blow to the SK economy – forcing their leaders to take notice of NK’s demands. The question of the economic dimension to the collapse of Soviet communism is one that interests me greatly and is maybe a lens worth using when examining and trying to solve the Korean crisis.

### **References:**

- David Cortright: *Peace Works: The Citizen’s Role in Ending the Cold War*
- Lawrence Wittner: *The Struggle against the Bomb*, Vol 3 1971-present
- Johan Galtung: *Searching for Peace*, pp219-220 (on Korea conflict)

## **Implementation of a NEA-NWFZ in China and North Korea**

**Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute**

We suggest the United States initiate a strategic conversation with North Korea leading to a regional security settlement reshaping the strategic environment in six defining and reversible stages.

A nuclear-armed North Korea is unacceptable to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, distracts all states in the region from addressing other important security issues, leaves most North Koreans starving, future-less; and imperils the South Korean social and economic miracle should conflict break out. Policies dependent on waiting and hoping the DPRK collapses are unrealistic. China would likely view Korean reunification exclusively under US hegemony as contrary to Chinese interest.

Morton Halperin has proposed a multi-lateral comprehensive security strategy with six defining and reversible stages to address the DPRK nuclear issue in the broader regional security context. Each stage (see below) has been developed with the help of a multi-national and (in the US) bipartisan group.

This paper outlines key issues arising from this strategy for the United States, China, and North Korea. For reasons of time, we do not address herein the issues arising for South Korea, Japan, or Russia in this paper, although ultimately, they are equally as important.

### **I. FOR THE United States**

US vital interests in the region mostly don't revolve around the DPRK. Therefore, the United States should establish a framework that addresses primarily the nuclear insecurities of the five parties, not the DPRK, as the first priority.

The main game is to reduce the risk of Taiwan Strait-induced US or PRC nuclear first-use, and to moderate Sino-Japanese conflict and the potential for Japanese and ROK nuclear weapons. Only a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) can manage the cross-cutting nuclear insecurities of states in this region. A Northeast Asian NWFZ requires:

- Termination of the state of war;
- Creation of a permanent council on security to monitor the agreement
- Mutual declaration of no hostile intent;
- Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy;
- Termination of sanctions.

It's perfectly feasible for the United States to make a guarantee to NPT-Non-Nuclear Weapons States [NNWSs] in the region in a NWFZ, including the DPRK should it disarm and comply with its NPT-IAEA obligations, that it won't use nuclear weapons against the DPRK. Ditto for the other Nuclear Weapons States [NWSs].

Residual nuclear extended deterrence will still exist for the ROK and Japan, only rhetoric and legal form will realign (at last) with the restructured US nuclear forces that no longer include any form of forward-deployed theater or tactical nuclear weapons.

That's good—it's the essence of credibility that this alignment exist, and it's currently badly out of whack, which affects the perceptions (negatively) of US adversaries, allies, and third parties. Meanwhile, nuclear deterrence would continue to flow "around" the NWFZ between the NWSs, and between them and the DPRK while it is nuclear-armed.

Should a NWSs or nuclear-armed state (DPRK) use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a NNWS, then it would face residual nuclear extended deterrence; and render moot NWS' guarantees to not use nuclear weapons in or against the Zone parties.



This approach is tough on the North Koreans, unlike the current US policy of strategic drift, which is soft on the North Koreans. It proffers a diplomatic and geostrategic concert with China, the badly needed but missing flip side of the military-led US pivot in the region.

## II. FOR CHINA

Below are three key issues from an American perspective for China to resolve with regard to its stance moving forward.

### 1. Impact on China of a comprehensive security settlement

Deng Xiaoping foresaw domestic and international stability as a necessary pre-condition for Chinese growth. Stabilizing the Korean peninsula allows China to focus on building a prosperous, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modern country as outlined in the 18th Party Congress work report. Specifically, we anticipate that China could realize major gains in security and related concerns in four key areas also outlined in the Halperin proposal, as summarized from an American perspective below, this framework enables China to: revise relations with great powers; consolidate China's influence in Asia; leverage multilateral venues to facilitate reform of the international order; and protect Chinese rights and interests in the maritime and other domains.

#### a) Revise relations with great powers:

A stable peninsula allows China to move from managing regional instability primarily by exercising power-related capacities to a decision-making framework on security matters based on power sharing on a multi-lateral basis. It also removes some rationale for stronger US alliances and increases the political barrier to building an integrated missile defense system if North Korea no longer has hostile intent. Only a new framework approach, including a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ), moves away from a balance-of-power focus and is broadly consistent with a "new type of great power relationship" which China seeks to establish.

#### b) Consolidate China's influence in Asia:

China can demonstrate leadership and consolidate influence by removing some threats in Northeast Asia that currently strengthen US alliances and missile defense systems before those political and technical relationships are routinized, solidified and are entrenched in a bi-lateral or alliance setting and exist completely outside of an inclusive, multi-lateral setting.

#### c) Leverage multilateral venues to facilitate reform of the international order:

Halperin's proposal calls for creating a permanent council on security. This council would involve generating multi-lateral perspectives and ensure that no one country unilaterally runs afoul of the others without some sort of collective reaction. China can exercise leadership through the multi-lateral venue amplifying its effect. There will also likely be several sub-organizations to handle various specialized elements of the relationship.

#### d) Protect Chinese rights and interests in the maritime and other domains:

North Korea sits atop some mineral wealth but lacks the capital, equipment, management experience and other resources required to take full advantage of the underground wealth. Without a stable regulatory environment, few are willing to invest in North Korea. Once North Korea does develop and sanctions are lifted, many overseas markets will be interested in trade with DPRK. Those goods and products will have to travel on international sea lanes and the accounts settled in an international banking center. China has a vested interest in a stable investment climate, a predictable legal system for settling disputes and unhindered access to sealanes if there is any chance of having an economically positive relationship with North Korea and the world.

### 2. Implications and Considerations for China of a New Comprehensive Security Strategy

Here are specific questions about implications and considerations for China posed by this new

conceptual framework.

- How does this new framework help make the Chinese Communist Party more scientific in all respects?
- How would this new framework allow China to recast the US-China security relationship from a balance-of-military-power to one based on power-sharing or “new type of great power relationship?”
- How much domestic support is required for each of the six new governments in order to discuss new frameworks?
- How does the shift in discussion terms affect other elements of existing US-China strategic agendas?
- How does the framework enable better relations with Japan? ROK? Russia?
- Some have suggested that Japan should neither be in an alliance nor develop a self-reliant posture. What is a reasonable Japanese defense posture to achieve those contradictory goals? Does a “reasonable” Japanese defense posture change if Japan is inside or outside of an alliance structure?
- How does China develop a new type of relationship and reassure North Korea, the relationship between China and North Korea remains “close as lips and teeth ; when the lips are gone the teeth will be cold” as well as “sharing the same rivers and mountains”
- How might a new relationship relieve pressure on disputes in the South China Sea or any other sensitive areas?
- If the situation on the Korean Peninsula is stabilized, what can China do with the diplomatic power no longer expended in crisis management?
- How would a NEA-NWFZ affect China’s nuclear doctrine? Does it require a re-thinking of China’s No First Use policy? How does re-thinking No First Use policy affect relations among the Nuclear Weapons States? Can China assume a leadership role in a NEA-NWFZ and place other Nuclear Weapons States in a situation where they must reciprocate?
  
- Termination of a state of war;
  - Does this make a Taiwan Strait scenario more or less likely?
  - Is there now a lower or higher likelihood of nuclear escalation?
  - How are the “new historic missions” changed?
  - If the “new historic missions” are changed, what does it mean for prioritizing the services, budgets, and arms procurement/development?
  - How might Shenyang Military Region be re-organized or re-equipped if the threat of a resumed Korean War recedes or is eliminated?
  - What does the North Korean government use as an external justification for any hardships if there’s no outside hostility?
  - How best to address “eventual Korean unification”? Under which system? and how to deal with the system which will eventually be subsumed?
  
- Creation of a permanent council on security;
  - Who writes the rules?
  - What mechanisms exist or have to be created to enforce the rules?
  - What kinds of new jobs and training are required to staff the new organization? Where are they trained, headquartered?
  - Who funds this organization?
  - Can the organization be created in ways that strengthen multi-lateral venues like ASEAN, ARF and the UN or does it necessarily dilute other multi-lateral venues?
  
- Mutual declaration of no hostile intent;
  - What new diplomatic space is opened up after mutual declaration of no hostile intent?
  - How does this declared absence of no hostile intent impact stated rationales of developing missile defense to defend against a North Korean missile?
  - What excuses might political parties/leadership use to still resort to nationalism if there’s no expressed hostile intent?

- Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy needs;
  - Who determines what energy needs are valid?
  - What mechanism ensures that validated needs are fulfilled?
  - What new import/export opportunities arise?
  - How is the Russian disposition in the Far East affected by a stable place for a pipeline to pass to the DPRK and ROK if a NEA-NWFZ reduces tension and creates stability in the Korean Peninsula and will these energy flows be in China's interest?
  - Who decides which countries get contracts?
  - What new ports and infrastructure are required to create a meaningful power distribution system?
  - What are the benefits to creating a regional power distribution system?
  - What is the best way to rationalize the power generation system?
  - What confidence building measures between traditional antagonists — Japan and Korea — can create forms of inter-dependence that increase cooperation in areas such as the nuclear fuel cycle and access to space
- Termination of sanctions;
  - What new banking facilities can open?
  - How is yuan convertibility affected?
  - How will an economically vibrant DPRK impact bordering PRC provinces?
  - How might PRC engage with DPRK to encourage economic reform?
  - What new legal guarantees will encourage investment in North Korea?
- Creation of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ)
  - How does a NWFZ complement and develop Chinese nuclear doctrine?
  - How is the new legal basis for China's No First Use declaration changed? How is it promulgated?
  - What are the impacts on China's ability to deploy nuclear forces through the NWFZ, eg nuclear-capable submarines?
    - How does it affect China if there is no need for United States to supply nuclear extended deterrence but replaces it with "existential nuclear deterrence" (that is, residual nuclear deterrence that arises from the mere existence of nuclear weapons outside the region)?
    - What Chinese interests are served by going beyond its No First Use policy to provide a much stronger commitment to not use nuclear weapons against Japan?
- Are there any other frameworks that would better serve China's interests?

### 3. Might China activity support this concept?

China has a key role in the future of Northeast Asian security management, and all steps leading to establishing, defining and maintaining a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. China could help to advance a new framework by:

- hosting a conference in China at the earliest date mutually convenient to all parties?
- facilitating meetings with key North Koreans able to make decisions, or at a minimum, North Koreans able to authoritatively relay discussions?
- undertaking research and analysis on critical outstanding issues that would make or break a regional comprehensive security settlement and a NEA-NWFZ?
- exploring this concept in track 1.5 dialogues with security counterparts in each country?
- engaging relevant media, Korea scholars and other opinion leaders as part of the overall awareness campaign?

### III. FOR NORTH KOREA

The benefits that might flow to North Korea — in particular, a guarantee to not be attacked with nuclear weapons under the Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone — would occur only if the North fully dismantled its nuclear capabilities under monitoring and verification by an agency agreed to as part of the treaty. Non-nuclear states could pull out of the treaty after some agreed timeframe if, by then, the North had not dismantled its nuclear program.

Would the North Koreans find valuable a multilateral, legally binding guarantee that they won't be attacked with nuclear weapons? We don't know. They have consistently said it's one of their most important issues. That may have shifted now that they declared themselves "forever nuclear-armed." Talking to them is the only one way to find out.

If they say no, then the US should ignore them and proceed, because a regional NWFZ is in its interests anyway. The US should not give veto power to the DPRK. The US should focus on shaping the regional environment, not bad behaviors. If they say yes, then the US should make room in the NWFZ for them to enter, either at the outset, or over time. Yes, it can be verified, even in the DPRK.

## CONCLUSION

As we learned after US President Richard Nixon and China's Chairman Mao Zedong met in 1972 and after US President Ronald Reagan met Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986, the world can change overnight. 2013 is such a moment in Northeast Asia—if only the US and China can align.

The last time that the United States set out to shape the strategic environment rather than bad behaviours was when it pulled out tactical and theatre nuclear weapons, in 1991. This made possible a host of regional and inter-Korean breakthroughs on nuclear, military, and political-economic relations that delayed the North Korean nuclear program for decades; and reduced tension and the probability of war in Korea.

It is time for another major shift in US policy. Does the United States want to create an ineffectual concert with China that is doomed to fail to reverse the DPRK's nuclear course, and by outsourcing the management of the DPRK problem to China, enhance its aspirations to be regional hegemon (and allied perceptions thereof)?

Or do we want to solve the DPRK problem in a way that removes them from China's orbit, and even brings them into play as part of the pivot, as silent partners in American strategy? This is a stark choice but unless we make it, we will be befuddled and reduced to managing bad behaviors in the moment, not shaping the strategic environment and outcomes.

The cumulative effects of past incremental decision-making aimed at the short-term and kicking the can containing the hard choices into the future have now caught up with us. We need to make some big changes, not small ones, to succeed. Due to entrenched habits, interests, organizations, worldviews, this won't be easy. Civil society organizations play a key role in ensuring that this strategy is tested, positioned, and enacted in spite of these obstacles.

## **Joint Appeal to promote the Peace Process and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia**

2013 marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice Agreement. However, North Korea carried out her third nuclear test soon after a satellite launch. The current Korean crisis has made Northeast Asia realise the seriousness of the mutual distrust and hatred and also proved that arms race aggravates the strained relations. Therefore, we need to create the peace process on the basis of dialogue and cooperation in order to resolve the security dilemma in Northeast Asia.

On 25 April 2013, Japan and South Korea NGOs in cooperation with international NGOs convened a workshop “The Future of the Peace Process and Prospects for a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia- 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Armistice” at the 2nd Preparatory Committee of 2015 NPT Review Conference in Geneva. In this workshop, we learned from the precedent of peace-building in Europe that helped overcoming the end of the Cold War. And we discussed the need for a comprehensive approach for turning the armistice system into a permanent peace regime in Korea and the promotion of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ).

A NEA-NWFZ is an urgent and timely initiative both for strengthening the global tide toward a nuclear weapon free world and achieving regional stability and peace in Northeast Asia. To set the goal of achieving a NEA-NWFZ will create a new positive dimension in the ongoing Six Party Talks by incorporating its goal of ‘verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula’ within a broader regional vision.

Achieving a nuclear weapon free world is an obligation not only of nuclear armed countries but of all the countries, including those whose security policies rely on a nuclear umbrella. In this regards, it is our common responsibility to find a path toward a security policy without nuclear weapons. And a NEA-NWFZ will provide such a path for relevant nations in Northeast Asia such as Japan and South Korea.

In this basis, we would like to appeal to each government of the Six Party Talks to

- Turn the Korean War Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace regime,
- Promote a NEA-NWFZ that includes the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula,
- Make sure that each country has a legitimate right to safety, abandoning hostility to each other,
- Make a comprehensive consultative body dealing with the peace process in Northeast Asia through multilateral negotiations.

We declare that we will work together for the creation of the peace process and a NEA-NWFZ as earnestly calling for the support from political leaders, citizen groups, and individuals all over the world.

April 25, 2013  
Geneva, Switzerland

### **Signatory Organisations:**

International Peace Bureau  
Nautilus Institute  
Peace Boat, Japan  
Peace Depot, Japan

Peace Network, ROK  
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy,  
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### ***Reference***

If you want to read the report of the workshop <Towards Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia- Six-Party Talks, NEA-NWFZ, Nuclear Fuel Cycle-> which was held on 7 May 2012 at the first preparatory committee of 2015 NPT Review Conference in Vienna, you can find the document on this website:

<http://www.peacedepot.org/e-news/2012NPTWSReport.pdf>