Evaluating Implementation of the NPT(13+2) Steps: JAPAN'S REPORT CARD ON NUCLEAR DISARMSMENT
Acronyms

ABM  Anti-Ballistic Missile System
BCW  Biological and Chemical Weapons
ADW  Agent Defeat Weapon
CD  Conference on Disarmament
CTBT  Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CWC  Chemical Weapons Convention
DOE  Department of Energy
DPRK  Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EIF  Entry into Force
FMCT  Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
GOJ  Government of Japan
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency
ICJ  International Court of Justice
IMS  International Monitoring System
JNC  Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Organization
MD  Missile Defense
MOFA  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
MOX  Plutonium/Uranium Mixed Oxide
MPF  Modern Plutonium Pit Facility
NAC  New Agenda Coalition
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCND  Neither Confirm Nor Deny
NPR  Nuclear Posture Review
NPT  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSA  Negative Security Assurances
NWFR  Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
NWS  Nuclear Weapon State
PAROS  Prevention of Arms Race in Outer space
RNEP  Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
R&D  Research and Development
SDF  Self Defense Force
SORT  Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Talks)
TMD  Theater Missile Defense
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction

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"Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament" is a project of the Peace Depot, Japan.

As a “Citizen’s Think Tank for Peace,” the Peace Depot conducts research activities and information dissemination, with the aim to build a security system that does not rely on military power. Its major programs include the publication of a bi-weekly periodical, Nuclear Weapon & Nuclear Test Monitor (in Japanese), and other books and pamphlets, organizing various workshops and seminars, and training NGO activists and researchers.

The Peace Depot is supported by membership fees, as well as group and individual contributions. Your contribution and support are highly appreciated.

For further information about the Peace Depot, please visit: http://www.peacedepot.org
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Our activities to give grades to the Japanese government’s nuclear abolition efforts were launched in 2002.

The immediate background for this idea was the NPT Review Conference in May 2000. At the conference, the nuclear weapon states made it “an unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and the member states unanimously agreed to the Final Document with interim measures for action. Among these measures, we saw thirteen practical steps stipulated under Article VI, and two more measures under Article VII as being of utmost importance.

These measures contain important implications not only for the nuclear weapon states but also for all member states of the NPT, especially those, like Japan, which have chosen the option to take advantage of a “nuclear umbrella.” This is why we started our activities to examine in detail and grade the Japanese government’s efforts to implement the 13+2 steps up until the next Review Conference in 2005.

It goes without saying that we have high expectations of the Japanese government in regard to its implementation of the 13+2 steps. Japan has experienced the inhuman nature of nuclear weapons through bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and public opinion in our country emphatically calls for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we believe it is imperative to spell out concrete tasks designed specifically for Japan for each step, and to evaluate them individually. The Evaluation Committee, consisting of the 10 individuals listed on page 2, undertook the evaluation. Grades from A to E were given for each step. The criteria for the grades are outlined at the end of page 4.

The role of the Evaluation Committee was to prepare a draft report card each year along with the reasons for the evaluation, and to present it for discussion at a series of evaluation sessions held in various districts of Japan. Based on the outcome of these sessions and other citizens’ comments received via the Internet, the Committee reexamined the draft report and came up with a final conclusion. The final report each year was widely distributed to people interested with the issue, including, among others, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Diet members. The reports were also translated into English for distribution among delegates, diplomats and NGOs participating in the NPT Review Conference. The Report Cards for 2002, 2003, and 2004 can be found on the website of the Peace Depot (www.peacedepot.org).

The Year 2005 is a turning point for us. The NPT Review Conference will be held in May, and we will also commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Since our evaluation project will come to an end this year, we decided to evaluate not the previous year alone, but the last five years as a whole. We believe that this booklet contains valuable resources for gaining an understanding of the current status of the Japanese government’s efforts toward nuclear disarmament. The final Report Card will be translated into English, be distributed widely, and will be uploaded onto the website of Peace Depot, in the same way as Report Cards in previous years.

In closing, we would like to remind you that this “Report Card” is also a “Check Sheet,” so to speak, for citizens to review our own campaign efforts. We sincerely hope that this booklet will provide you with deep insight and courage for action and, by so doing, help you to change the Japanese government and international public opinion toward the goal of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, we very much hope you will read the “Comments and Recommendations” on Page 5.

March 2005
# Japan’s Report Card on Nuclear Disarmament 2005

The 2005 grades are a comprehensive evaluation of the efforts made since 2000, while the ones given to 2002-2004 are to evaluate the efforts of the respective previous years.

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**Total Average**

|                | D | D | D | D |

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**Explanation for Grading:**

- **A**: Japan has tackled the principal “task” of eliminating its dependence on nuclear weapons, or has made a significant contribution to global nuclear disarmament.
- **B**: Japan enthusiastically tackled the important “tasks” (underlined in the “Reasons for the Evaluation”).
- **C**: Japan has carried out some of the “tasks”.
- **D**: Japan carried out none or very few of the “tasks” and “important tasks.” Fortunately, this did not constitute a direct factor setting back the global situation.
- **E**: Japan carried out none of the important tasks, or even if Japan carried out some of them, it failed to make the most of its unique position as a country devastated by nuclear weapons. (Therefore, there is no “E” grade for the items that have no “important tasks.”)

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**Abbreviations:**

- ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile System
- CD: Conference on Disarmament
- CTBT: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
- FMCT: Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
- IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
- ICJ: International Court of Justice
- START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Talks)
The Japanese government must take action.

- If Japan Changes, the World will Change.
  
  Sixty years have passed since the A-bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, today there are serious obstacles on the path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. These impediments are so serious that we cannot even imagine a concrete path to the goal. In order to overcome this difficult situation, we need to stimulate international public opinion and call for unflinching leadership on the part of our government. For each of these objectives, the Japanese government can play a decisive role. After all, as Japanese we know in our hearts the inhumane nature of nuclear weapons, unlike anything else in history.
  
  We evaluated the Japanese government’s nuclear disarmament efforts for the five years beginning from the NPT Review Conference in 2000. Though it is deeply regrettable that we had to rate its overall efforts with a failing “D” grade, we still believe it is possible to change the situation for the better. If Japan changes, then the world will follow its lead. Therefore, we call upon our government to rouse itself to action.

- Begin by Ending the Nuclear-Dependent Policy.
  
  We have examined each of the Japanese government’s efforts in light of the 13+2 interim steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In the process of evaluation, we have come to recognize more clearly how Japan’s nuclear disarmament policy is being distorted by its dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrence policy. For example, the government has failed to explicitly criticize the subcritical tests conducted by the U.S., even though such tests may well be a prelude to the resumption of underground tests. This is because the government has no choice but to accept the claim of the U.S. government that these tests are required to maintain the reliability of its nuclear arsenals, which, in turn, are needed to protect the security of Japan. The government is also reluctant to declare that nuclear attacks against non-nuclear weapon states are illegitimate, because such a policy would undermine the effects of the “Nuclear Umbrella.” Moreover, one of the reasons for the Japanese government’s eagerness to advance its missile defense plan, provoking a new arms race in the region, is its interest in ensuring policy harmony with the U.S. government.
  
  The moral standing of the Japanese has been harmed by its policy of nuclear dependence. Therefore, we demand that, before all else, it rid itself of this policy.

- Shift to Cooperative Security
  
  Japan’s national security can certainly be secured without depending on nuclear weapons. The alternative is to build on the peace constitution and concretely develop a multilateral framework for cooperative security. For the past five years, we have urged the Japanese government to establish a “Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone” equipped with a strict verification regime, in an effort to promote the implementation of the 13+2 steps. However, the government remains reluctant to apply this idea as its own policy, even though it recognizes the idea of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones in theory and has provided support for the establishment of a Central Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in practice. We call upon it to proclaim its political will toward establishing a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. This policy would demonstrate its intention to take a more cooperative stance toward regional security in Northeast Asia, which, in turn, would have a positive influence on the on-going Six Party Talks.

- Invigorate Political Leadership
  
  During the process of evaluation, we came across an incident in which foreign policy directives issued from the top of the government undermined disarmament efforts made at the bureau level within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Japanese government’s outstanding support for the War on Iraq is a case in point, since this policy completely nullified the efforts that had been made to implement the 13+2 steps so far. On one hand, the government had already contributed resources to strengthening the UN verification regime in an attempt to bring about a “Nuclear-Free World” and produced certain results; on the other hand, it supported the use of force against Iraq in defiance of UN efforts to enforce verification measures.
  
  We must stress here that Japan’s contribution to nuclear disarmament is inconceivable without the support of unflinching political leadership. Therefore, we hope that Diet members will become much more attentive to and assume a wider responsibility for nuclear disarmament issues.

- Establish a Disarmament Agency
  
  Our final recommendation is the establishment of a “Disarmament Agency,” a specialized government agency working exclusively on disarmament issues under the guidance of strong political leadership. This organization should deal comprehensively with disarmament issues (including, among others, nuclear disarmament issues), including consistency with the structure based on the US-Japan Mutual Security Agreement. The government should allocate much more personnel than currently available to disarmament sections and strengthen its cooperative relationship with NGOs as well. We know that our government is seizing every opportunity available to voice its long-held wish to abolish nuclear weapons from around the world. This is in stark contradiction to the fact that a severely limited number of personnel are forced to bear the heavy burden of disarmament-related jobs.
In accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) concluded in 1996, a total of 44 states with nuclear technologies must ratify for the treaty to enter into force (EIF). At the time that the agreement was reached at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, 13 out of 44 states had still not ratified. Among these 13 states, three — India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) — had not even signed. The other 10 — Algeria, China, Columbia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Vietnam — had signed, but not ratified. Among these, the absence of China and the U.S. is especially troublesome, because they are the nuclear weapon states (NWS). In particular, the fact that the U.S., by far the leading nuclear weapon power, has yet ratified it has remained a severe stumbling block to achieving the EIF of the CTBT.

Because the Government of Japan (GOJ) sees the EIF of the CTBT as one of its most important disarmament objectives, it became the first to ratify the treaty (July 8, 1997) and has continuously appealed for the importance of the early EIF on many occasions such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The GOJ also agreed to set up a “Japan-U.S. Committee on Arms Control, Disarmament, Non Proliferation and Verification” which characterizes the early EIF of the CTBT as “an issue of the highest priority for the moment” (March 8, 2000).

We are concerned that international interest in the CTBT is weakening since more than nine years have passed since the conclusion of the Treaty, and five years since the Review Conference, but there is still no light at the end of the tunnel. Countries must give full play to their leadership ability, urging the EIF of the CTBT, in order to put the brakes on the slipping interest in the Treaty. Taking these circumstances into account, the GOJ should: 1, continue to advocate the EIF of the CTBT emphatically, seizing opportunities such as UNGA, and strive for the maintenance and strengthening of international public opinion in support of it; 2, strongly urge the U.S. to ratify the Treaty; and, 3, encourage ratification by the twelve other states in a manner suitable for each state.

Since the Bush Administration took office, the U.S. has turned into the state with the highest potential of violating this provision. The “Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)”, a U.S. policy document disclosed in March 2002, cites the need to resume nuclear tests. The NPR justified this need for two reasons: one is a need to maintain the credibility and safety of its nuclear arsenals; another the need to develop new types of nuclear weapons. NPR also made it obvious that subcritical nuclear tests had contributed to training personnel and maintaining the level of technology essential for resuming nuclear tests. Moreover, subcritical tests will play an additional role as an exercise to enhance its readiness for resuming nuclear tests. In the spring of 2002, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) even started to propose a set of legislative measures to Congress with the purpose of reducing readiness time for the resumption of nuclear tests (estimated to be about 2-3 years at present).

Therefore, the GOJ must: 1, invigorate national and international public opinion for maintaining the moratorium on nuclear explosion tests; 2, protest against the U.S. moves to resume nuclear tests with a sense of urgency, requiring a change in its own quiet acquiescence to subcritical tests, and 3, explicitly proclaim its opposition to subcritical tests.

The GOJ has accorded primary importance to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) on the same level as the CTBT, and given support for its further development. At the UNGA held in the fall of 2000, for instance, the GOJ proposed a “Path Resolution” which called for “a conclusion (of the FMCT) at the earliest time before 2005.” This requirement was even more demanding than that of the NPT agreement.

However, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the only forum for negotiations on the FMCT, has not been functioning effectively, going round and round and getting nowhere. The CD requires unanimous agreement on a program of work for each year. However, disputes continue over what the CD should do. The impasse in the CD has been caused by unresolved disputes over the objectives and mandates of the Ad Hoc Committees and/or Working Groups which are supposed to be established to address the four issues of nuclear disarmament, i.e., the FMCT, Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and legally binding Negative Security Assurances (NSA). The most notable confrontation has been between the U.S. and China over the issues of nuclear disarmament and PAROS.

Therefore, the GOJ ought to: 1, appeal emphatically for the commencement of the FMCT negotiation and its conclusion at the earliest time; 2, strive for the normalization of the CD with eagerness, keeping a fair diplomatic stance toward the four aforesaid important issues; and 3, pursue an opportunity to convene a panel of experts outside the CD framework with the objective of examining technical problems regarding a verifiable FMCT.
The number of states having signed the CTBT increased from 155 to 174, and ratifications from 61 to 120 during the period from the agreement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference to the end of January 2005. However, out of the 13 states that have not ratified among the 44 whose ratification is required for the EIF, only two - Algeria (July 11, 2003) and Democratic Republic of Congo (September 28, 2004) - newly ratified, and so there are still 11 remaining. As for the U.S., the situation has even worsened because the Bush Administration, which came into power in 2001, made a decision not to support the CTBT regime. Since then, the U.S. has repeatedly made it clear in official documents that it has no intention of ratifying the CTBT. This stance is exemplified by the following statement made at the 2004 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the NPT Review Conference: “the U.S. will neither support CTBT nor become its member state” (May 3, 2004).

The GOJ’s policy wavered temporarily due to this policy change by the U.S. government. The GOJ once called for the “EIF before 2003” in its “Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons” (hereafter, “Path Resolution”) submitted to the UNGA in Fall 2000 (November 20, 2000, 55/33R). This “EIF before 2003” was more progressive than the requirement agreed in the PrepCom agreement. However, in the draft 2001 “Path Resolution” (A/C.1/56/L.33), the GOJ stepped back even from its call for the “early EIF.” This trend was brought to the attention of citizens, who voiced strong objections to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The mayors of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki joined this movement and submitted petitions to the Prime Minister of Japan (September 1, 2001). Since then, the GOJ has revised and upheld its call for the early EIF in the “Path Resolution” (A/C.1/56/L.33/Rev.1). The subsequent series of resolutions have maintained calls for the early EIF of the CTBT, contrary to the policy of the U.S. government (the latest resolution was 58/6, December 3, 2004). In this respect, the GOJ has been playing a leadership role, and has received positive evaluations from other countries not only at occasions such as the UNGA, but also in the Conference on Facilitating the EIF of the CTBT held under Article 14.2 of the Treaty (the 2nd session was held on November 11-13, 2001, and the 3rd on September 5-7, 2003) as well as in the “Friends of the CTBT” Foreign Ministers’ Meeting (the 1st session was on September 14, 2002, and the 2nd on September 23, 2004).

On the other hand, however, it is also true that the GOJ has failed to strongly criticize the U.S. For example, it failed to respond when the U.S. unilaterally abrogated the bilateral agreement to promote the early EIF. Though the bilateral meetings have continued (the latest was the 8th, on July 27, 2004), the GOJ merely touched upon this issue with no intention to take it up as a serious subject for negotiation. In the GOJ has seized various opportunities to call on states other than the U.S. to sign and ratify. It has also provided technical assistance to developing countries so that they can fulfill their own share of responsibility for the establishment of the CTBT regime. Taking all these points into consideration, we decided to give a B grade to the GOJ’s efforts.

Along with the early EIF of the CTBT, the GOJ has stressed the importance of maintaining the moratorium on nuclear tests, seizing all available opportunities such as the UNGA, Conference on Facilitating the EIF, “Friends of the CTBT” Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, and other forums. In this sense, the GOJ has surely made some general efforts to achieve these objectives. However, during this period, however, it became more urgent than ever for the GOJ to proclaim its opposition to the U.S., and to call for the termination of a series of policies that brought the moratorium regime into crisis. In fact, Section 3142 of the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003” (November 13, 2002) ordered the DOE to make plans for reducing the readiness time required for the resumption of nuclear tests to 6, 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months respectively. Moreover, Section 3113 of the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004” (November 24, 2003) stipulated that “Commencing not later than October 1, 2006, the Secretary of Energy shall achieve, and thereafter maintain, a readiness posture of not more than 18 months for resumption by the United States of underground tests of nuclear weapons.” Though the budget for Fiscal Year 2005 was reportedly curtailed due to pressure from both international and U.S. public opinion, we should not be too optimistic. During this period, the GOJ never questioned the U.S. policy for reasons that the GOJ had kept its promise of “the continued observance of moratorium” at NPT PrepComs. The same holds true for subcritical tests. The GOJ was indifferent on this issue, merely repeating the claim that tests are required to “maintain the credibility and safety of nuclear arsenals.” This statement clearly echoes those of the U.S. government. Taking into consideration that the GOJ has failed to cope with this important issue, we decided to give it a D grade.

Many states have given support to the GOJ’s call for the “establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate the FMCT in the CD as early as possible” during the following year’s session “with a view to its conclusion within five years” (the latest resolution is 58/76 on December 3, 2004) stipulated in the “Path Resolution” submitted to the UNGA every year. The GOJ also emphasized its eagerness by submitting a working paper to the CD, proposing more specific measures for details of the FMCT (August 14, 2003). Later this became CD1714, Annex II. However, this proposal was never replied to consistently, as seen for instance when the GOJ failed to respond adequately to the statement made by Ambassador Jackie Sanders, U.S. representative to the CD, in 2004. While Ambassador Sanders said that the U.S. supported the FMCT as a priority issue for negotiation, she stated, “the U.S. believes that an FMCT cannot be verified effectively” (July 28, 2004), a stance which diametrically opposed to the GOJ’s.

Several arbitration plans were proposed, though in vain, to overcome the impasse in the CD. For example, the Amorim arbitration plan was issued as early as August 2000 (CD/1624). “Amorim” is the name of the Brazilian Ambassador. In August 2002, we saw the plan proposed by five former chairman of the CD — Dzembi (Algeria), Lint (Belgium), Reyes (Colombia), Salander (Sweden), and Vega (Câile) — which was later called the five ambassadors (Ad) proposal (this proposal eventually became a formal document as CD/1693, January 23, 2003).

This proposal was revived in the following year so that the U.S. and China could come to terms with each other more easily (June 26, 2003). As a result, following support by Russia (July 31, 2003) for the proposal, China expressed its support, saying, “China would like to demonstrate flexibility once again” (August 7, 2003). However, the impasse was not overcome because the U.S. continued to stick to its position. In this process, though it cannot be said that the GOJ assumed a leadership role, we noted that the GOJ gave willing support to the arbitration plan, appealing for the normalization of the CD.

Nevertheless, it is impossible for the GOJ to exercise fair, convincing authority in the CD. One of the confrontations in the CD is taking place between China and the U.S. While the former insisted on providing the PAROS Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate the treaty, the latter vociferously objected to this idea. It is obvious that the U.S. Missile Defense (MD) plan lies behind this confrontation and that the GOJ itself is taking side with the U.S. as a partner in it...

With regard to an expert panel outside the CD framework, the GOJ has been active, cohosting, for instance, conferences on FMCT (May 14-15, 2001) and verification issues (March 28, 2003).

Though the support for MD is weakening Japan’s moral position, we see a certain amount of efforts on the part of the GOJ, and therefore give it a B grade.
4 Set up a Table for Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

Two competing tasks have to be implemented in order to set up a forum for the nuclear disarmament negotiation in the CD. First, the CD must be normalized with an agreement on work programs for four important issues. Second, the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament should not be limited to a formal exchange of views, but should be a forum for substantial negotiation. Although these problems will be difficult to solve, the GOJ should turn its historical experience as a victim of nuclear bombing into a moral asset, which can be used as strong leverage for negotiation. We also deem it imperative for the GOJ to articulate an obligation of nuclear disarmament on the part of nuclear weapon states (NWSs), especially when the U.S. is stressing the obligation of non-proliferation on the part of non-nuclear weapon states alone, by using such provocative phrases as “rogue states” or “axis of evil.” This policy, in turn, must be accompanied by increased international public opinion which calls for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the GOJ must: 1. appeal the urgent need of a normally functioning CD and the establishment of a subsidiary body for nuclear disarmament. This has to be done with independent diplomatic efforts, making the best use of the moral assets of a nation once destroyed by nuclear bombings; 2. make creative efforts to invigorate a viable international public opinion in order to stress the urgency of nuclear disarmament.

Conveying the reality of nuclear disaster would be an essential part of this attempt.

5 Don’t let Nuclear Disarmament Go Backward (Principle of Irreversibility)

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

This principle is extremely important for achieving the abolition of nuclear weapons. At the time of the 2000 agreement, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the U.S. and Russia was still ongoing, and Russia was arguing vociferously for the continued observation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). At that time, the important task for Japan was to ensure that these disarmament measures would not retreat from their own achievements. Since the Bush Administration started adopting a new policy on nuclear weapons, unilaterally abrogating the ABM (EIP on June 13, 2002), however, Japan’s role has changed accordingly. Now, the task should be to apply the principle of irreversibility to a new treaty between the U.S. and Russia (Moscow Treaty, EIP on June 1, 2003) and to constrain the Bush Administration’s reactionary nuclear policy. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), among other policies, enumerates many proposals that go against this principle. Research and development (R&D) on earth penetrating nuclear weapons is, for example, a reversal of the U.S. policy “not to develop new types of nuclear weapons,” which runs directly counter to the principle of irreversibility. The development and deployment of MD system will have the effect of provoking a new nuclear arms race and needs to be halted from the point of view of this principle, as well.

Therefore, the GOJ must: 1. urge both the U.S. and Russia to prohibit the revival of any previously reduced weapons under the Moscow Treaty; 2. protest strongly against any violation of the principle of irreversibility by the U.S., such as the “lifting of ban on the research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons” and emphatically demand that the U.S. observe the principle again; 3. bring its participation in the development and deployment of MD to an end; and 4. codify its Three Non-Nuclear Principles into law in order to prevent the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons aboard U.S. ships and aircrafts and establish these three principles as an irreversible national policy.

6 Unequivocal Promise to Abolish Nuclear Weapons

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all state parties are committed under Article VI.

This important section contains a commitment on the part of the NWSs. It was the NAC that made diplomatic efforts to make NWSs to pledge their words, with the strong backing of international public opinion to this effect. Despite this commitment, however, the U.S. NPR demonstrated that the Bush Administration had the intention to retain nuclear weapons on a semi-permanent basis. In line with the U.S., other NWSs have also been reluctant to implement this commitment. However, we believe that all NPT member states are obliged to think through their own measures for implementation. This is especially the case for a country like Japan, which does not possess nuclear weapons, but relies on them for its own national security. Therefore, Japan’s role should be to transform its own policy and deny whatever utilities nuclear weapons have.

More specifically, the GOJ must: 1. request all NWSs to make plans of action to implement their commitments to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons in its “Path Resolution” at the UNGA, and 2. make its own action plan to completely eliminate its dependence on nuclear weapons.
The GOJ has upheld its call for the establishment of a subsidiary body under the CD within a definite period of time, saying “as soon as possible during the current year,” in its “Path Resolution” submitted to UNGA every year (the latest resolution was 59/76, December 3, 2004). In this sense, the GOJ has certainly been attentive to this issue. However, unlike in the case of the FMCT, the whole spectrum of Japan’s security policy has to be brought into question in order for the GOJ to make the best use of its moral assets in the negotiation on nuclear disarmament. As we have already mentioned in the previous section, nuclear disarmament and MD have characteristics which are mutually contradictory. The GOJ has lost most of its bargaining power in the disarmament negotiation in the CD, since it has developed a very close cooperative relationship with the U.S. in terms of MD. The GOJ’s criticism towards the NWS touched on the crux of the matter, when (then) Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi delivered the following speech at the CD: “NWS should take seriously the fact that, to date, almost all countries have committed to renounce the option of nuclear armament under the NPT regime...NWS must respond...by demonstrating tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament” (September 4, 2003). On the other hand, however, the GOJ has not voiced unequivocal criticism against the U.S. moves towards the development of new types of nuclear weapons and the reduction of readiness time for the resumption of nuclear tests. Therefore, Japan cannot but be seen as a powerful ally of the U.S. by other countries.

Nuclear Disarmament: exchange of information and views, examine approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral nature, FMCT negotiation via a treaty, PAROS, identify and examine specific topics or proposals

Negative Security Assurance: negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements (These arrangements could take the form of an internationally binding instrument).

We can see from the above that the mandates assigned to the ad hoc committee on Nuclear Disarmament are extremely tall.

The U.S. NPR delineated new types of nuclear capability, called “responsive forces.” The U.S. official document submitted to the 2004 PrepCom reaffirmed the possibility of restoring nuclear weapons once reduced under the Moscow Treaty in case of the need for redeployment in the future (Fact sheet by the U.S. delegates, May 4, 2004). In contrast to the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which repeatedly voiced their objections to such a policy in their UNGA resolutions and others (the latest example was the Foreign Ministers’ statement on September 21, 2004), the GOJ did not even allude to this issue. For instance, “the Path Resolutions” have consistently stressed the positive aspects of the Moscow Treaty.

Moreover, the GOJ’s countermeasures against the series of reactionary U.S. nuclear policies since the appearance of the NPR have been quite halfhearted. We have already noted our concerns about the “reduction of readiness time required for the resumption of nuclear tests” in Section 2 of the following year’s resolution, but there are other concerns as well. The U.S. DOE succeeded in passing the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004” (November 24, 2003) through Congress. With this act, the DOE repealed the Spratf-Furse provision (Section 3116), which had imposed a ban on research and development of low-yield nuclear weapons, ending the ban from the post-Cold War era. A year earlier, the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003” (November 13, 2002) had conditionally approved “research and development of Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” (RNEP, the so-called “bunker buster”) (Section 3146). While the NAC clearly articulated its opposition to these movements in international forums, the GOJ failed to take such action, simply conveying its concern on low-yield nuclear weapons to the U.S. in a private conversation.

With regard to MD, the GOJ has continued to undertake a joint research project on MD technology with the U.S. since 1998, and finally made a decision to purchase and deploy the U.S.-made system (December 19, 2003). The GOJ even revised its National Defense Program Outline in order to place this system as a building block of its national defense (December 10, 2004). However, MD has already provoked a new nuclear arms race in the region, as was a general concern. This is exemplified, for instance, by Russia’s recent experiments with new ballistic missiles (based on a remark by President Putin on November 17, 2004). The GOJ is playing not a restraining role, but, on the contrary, is encouraging the trend.

As for the enactment of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles into law, the GOJ has demonstrated no intention to this effect, despite continuing appeals from non-governmental organizations, municipal governments and NGOs. In 2002, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda caused a controversy when he said at a press conference that “the amendment of the three non-nuclear principle is conceivable” (June 3, 2002). This incident led to an intensive discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Emergency Legislation of the House of Representatives (June 10, 2002). In the Committee, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi confirmed that “the GOJ chooses the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as a policy,” however, he did not show the political will to enact the principle into a law.

On the whole, the GOJ is indifferent to this principle. Therefore, we give it a grade of E.

Though we have already expressed our concerns about the new nuclear plan and legislative measures of the U.S., this is not the whole story. In fiscal year 2004, budget was allocated to design a new production facility called the “modern plutonium pit facility” (MPP). This facility produces “a primary plutonium explosion activator”, a heart, so to speak, of nuclear warheads called the "pit." It has a capacity to produce 450 pits per year, comparable to production in the Cold War era. Though the budget allocation for this plan was curtailed in large measure in fiscal year 2005, the plan itself remains intact. Unfortunately, however, the GOJ has turned a blind eye to these moves against the “unequivocal undertakings.” Though the GOJ’s “Path Resolution” since the fall of 2000 was an outgrowth of these “unequivocal undertakings,” the GOJ has not tried to bring this measure into practice, turning its back on the reality by persisting to the “Path Resolution” every year with minor modifications until 2004. During this period, the GOJ had not even thought out a plan to bring more attention to the “unequivocal undertakings” at all, to say nothing of a call for “a plan of action.” The GOJ has shown no understanding of the fact that the “unequivocal undertakings” also apply to its nuclear-dependent policy. Accordingly, we have observed efforts on the part of the GOJ.

It is deeply regrettable that the GOJ made no efforts on this item. The grade is an E.
7 Don’t Renounce Bilateral Disarmament Treaties between the U.S. and Russia

At the time of the 2000 agreement, the most effective framework for nuclear disarmament between the U.S. and Russia was thought to be the path by which the two countries would reach an agreement in the 3rd round of Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START III), while maintaining the framework of the ABM. Indeed, many crucial items were already on the agenda of START III, including the pace of strategic weapons reduction (faster than the subsequent Bush proposal), confirmation of the principle of irreversibility, and reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, it was seen as extremely important to keep START III process going, by preserving the ABM in accordance with the strong request by Russia, and by restraining the U.S. MD plan. The U.S. breached the agreement in this section when the Bush Administration took office with a pledge to renounce the ABM and promote the MD plan in its place. The U.S. announced its denunciation of the treaty (December 13, 2001), making the treaty ineffective after a six-month period (June 13, 2002). In place of the ABM, the U.S. and Russia initiated a new Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty). The U.S.-led negotiation on this treaty culminated in its signature in Moscow (May 24, 2002), and ELF about a year later (June 1, 2003). However, there have been continuous debates on the defects of the Moscow Treaty.

Taking into consideration the fact that the GOJ has repeatedly stressed the importance of the START process in parallel with the EIF of the CTBT, the GOJ must: 1. keep the START process going by voicing strong objections to the U.S. MD Plan; and 2. make sure that the Moscow Treaty becomes transparent, verifiable, and irreversible.

8 Have a Third Party Monitor Nuclear Materials

With regard to the excess fissile materials produced as a result of nuclear arms reductions by the U.S. and Russia, the Trilateral Initiative was launched in 1996 to establish a verification system, including the IAEA, to prevent them from being used again for weapon purpose. If this regime is fully developed, it will be possible to apply it to other nuclear-weapon states as well. This will have significant implication for the fulfillment of the obligations for the total elimination of nuclear weapons under Article VI of the NPT with transparency and irreversibility.

In September 2002, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei noted in his speech delivered at the IAEA General Conference that preparatory work for the Trilateral Initiative had been largely completed and a legal framework for the verification system was in place. Therefore, the GOJ must 1. lend vigorous support to and urge the completion of the Trilateral Initiative from the perspective of enhancing the verification system and ensuring the transparency of nuclear weapons states.

9 Ensure the Principle of “Security for All”

This ninth item contains six phased measures, a1 of which are characterized by key phrases such as “international stability” and “the principle of undiminished security for all.” Though the NWSs preferred to use the phrase “strategic stability,” the NAC and others, who did not wish to accept stability guaranteed by the balance of nuclear power, strongly insisted on using the phrase “international stability.”

“The principle of undiminished security for all” can be used, however, as a rationale against nuclear disarmament. A good example is the argument opposing the U.S. non-first (preemptive) use policy of nuclear weapons for the purpose of dealing with threats posed by the DPRK.

This is not, nevertheless, a plausible argument. The GOJ should take the stand that measures such as reducing nuclear weapons, de-alerting, enhancing accountability for nuclear weapon arsenals, and banning first (preemptive) use policy can create an environment favorable for promoting nuclear disarmament and, in consequence, advance “international stability” and “security for a1.”
Though Japan’s first “Path Resolution” (G533R, November 20, 2000) called for the preservation of the ABM and START process, the “Path Resolution” in 2001 (G542M, November 29, 2001) stopped short of this, even though it was formulated before the denunciation of the ABM by the U.S. At this stage, the GOJ should have made efforts to restrain and prevent the U.S. from withdrawing from the treaty. Until a more effective way to abolish nuclear weapons than START process could be found, the GOJ should have continued its calls for the preservation and strengthening of the ABM regime together with the promotion of the START process.

Alternatively, the GOJ could have criticized the U.S. MD Plan due to its negative ramifications for nuclear disarmament, making a decision to suspend, at least for a certain period of time, U.S.-Japan joint technical research project on Theater Missile Defense (TMD). To the contrary, averting its eyes from reality, the GOJ continued to promote the MD Plan, making the false argument that the joint research project had nothing to do with the problem of the ABM Treaty. Since then, the GOJ has become a leading partner of the U.S. in its promotion of the MD Plan. But this very plan, as we already know, has provoked a new arms race and caused great difficulties for arms control as well.

The newly established Moscow Treaty is beset by many defects.

As we already pointed out in the previous section, it goes against the principle of irreversibility by allowing the redeployment of once removed nuclear warheads. There are other defects as well, including the lack of a verification regime, the slow pace of arms reduction compared to that of START III (c.f. Section 9), and the absence of an obligation to dismantle delivery systems. The GOJ has only seen the positive side of the Moscow Treaty, making no efforts to shed light on the defects and call for improvement. We already touched upon this point in item 5.

We did not see any efforts made by the GOJ. Therefore, we give it a grade of E.

Although the three parties have reached agreement in large measure, there has been no tangible progress on the Trilateral Initiative. In the 2003 IAEA General Conference, IAEA Director General ElBaradei remarked that although the legal framework was ready to be used as the basis for the implementation of the verification system, “we (IAEA) have yet to receive a request by either of the two states” (September 15, 2003). In the 2004 PrepCom, representatives from the IAEA confirmed that this situation has not changed (April 26, 2004).

Japan’s “Path Resolution” submitted to the UNGA has not specifically touched upon the issue of the Trilateral Initiative. We cannot take this to mean that the GOJ is opposed to the initiative. Rather, it seems to read this measure into the 10th of the 13 steps, which calls on all NWSs to make similar efforts. However, it is important to ensure that the US-Russia nuclear disarmament process is verified by the IAEA because, as we stated, the Moscow Treaty is not equipped with a functioning verification system.

The GOJ’s efforts have not been sufficient. Therefore, we give it a grade of D.

The principle stipulated in this section should be understood in the context of pursuing the “common security,” in which the security of one nation is achieved along with that of the international community as a whole. From this perspective, it presents a grave concern for us that the GOJ has started to put exclusive stress on the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the course of events leading up to the War on Iraq and beyond. The U.S. and the U.K. launched war on Iraq (March 20, 2003), ignoring the international community’s efforts to avoid the war in accordance with the UN Charter. The GOJ made a decision to support the war immediately, followed by the Cabinet’s adoption of the “Humanitarian Relief and Iraqi Reconstruction Special Measures Law” (July 26, 2003) in order to dispatch the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq. The Diet was forced to give an ex post facto approval to this law at a time when the SDF operation had already taken place (February 9, 2004). Although the objective for sending the SDF is explained as humanitarian assistance, everything has been carried out in the context of strengthening “the relationship of mutual trust” between the U.S. and Japan. Prime Minister Koizumi went so far as to state that the U.S.-Japan security alliance is more credible than the UN, making the remark that “the United Nations will not protect us from an invasion” (January 27, 2004). A new National Defense Program Outline (December 10, 2004) says nothing counter to this policy, depicting it as “a strategic dialogue with the U.S.”

It goes without saying that the apex of U.S. military power is nuclear weapons. It seems that Japan will continue to give high priority to maintaining a favorable relationship with the U.S. rather than moving nuclear disarmament forward. The GOJ has rarely taken action with the definite confidence that nuclear disarmament is the key to easing international tensions and, consequently, will contribute Japan’s own security.

The GOJ’s grade on this item is a D.
Take the Lead in Reducing Nuclear Weapons

9a. Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

Nuclear disarmament has been facilitated not only by treaties, but also by voluntary efforts by the states concerned. Unilateral reductions facilitate the political environment for disarmament. The intent of the Moscow Treaty is to reduce the number of nuclear warheads in operational deployment down to a range between 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012. This pace is, however, slower than that under START III, which was signed by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Helsinki (March 21, 1997). If we count the number of warheads using the same method as the Moscow Treaty, the reduction objective of START III could have been achieved five years earlier than the Moscow Treaty. Therefore, both the U.S. and Russia should implement unilateral measures to accelerate the pace of reduction. In addition, they should dismantle once-removed warheads in order to prevent them from being deployed again. The U.K., France and China should also contribute to the promotion of nuclear disarmament through unilateral measures. In particular, China, the only NWS that has not yet announced any such measures, is requested to take action.

Accordingly, the GOJ should: 1. call on the U.S. and Russia to reduce and dismantle nuclear warheads at a faster pace than that called for under the Moscow Treaty by taking unilateral measures; and 2. call on other NWSs, especially China, to take unilateral measures as well.

Build Confidence with Transparency

9b. Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon states with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.

In early 2002, the U.S. in its NPR adopted a long-term plan for the improvement and maintenance of strategic weapons and cited the need for new nuclear weapons (c.f. Item 9e). Increasing anxiety and suspicion over this recent trend in U.S. nuclear policy has had serious negative repercussions for the international nuclear disarmament process. One important measure for overcoming this problem must be to increase the transparency of U.S. nuclear research institutes. Looking at the regions in the proximity of Japan, we see that the stability and disarmament processes have been hampered by a lack of information on Chinese nuclear arsenals and its nuclear posture. If the Chinese government wants to demonstrate the truthfulness of its publicly acknowledged policy of non-first use, it must disclose more information on the technical and practical side of the policy. Moreover, the GOJ should not consent to the use by the U.S. of its rhetoric of “neither confirm nor deny” (NCND). This is essential for increasing the transparency of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

Therefore, the GOJ must: 1. call on the U.S. to increase the transparency of its national nuclear weapons research institutes; 2. request that China make the current status of its nuclear arsenals and nuclear posture more transparent, along with the demand for the U.S. on transparency; and 3. demand that the U.S. abandon its policy of NCND.

Reduce Usable Weapons First

9c. The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.

Both the U.S. and Russia have been increasing their dependence on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are considered usable in regional conflicts and the war against terror. The most notable example is the possible development of new types of nuclear weapons. The "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators" (RNPEP) and "advanced concept nuclear weapons" being discussed in the U.S. are characterized as non-strategic nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, a tendency can be seen in Russia to compensate for the deterioration of its conventional forces, resulting from the post-Cold War economic difficulties, by increasing dependency on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The GOJ should be attentive to these new and dangerous tendencies, which could lead to the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and express its intention to oppose such measures taken by the U.S. and Russia. At the 2002 NPT PrepCom, the NAC stressed that a "further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded priority" (April 5, 2002). Following this, at the UNGA in 2002 and 2003, the NAC proposed and achieved the adoption of a draft resolution: "Reduction of non-strategic weapons" (57/88, 58/60, respectively). The GOJ should join hands with these movements. Reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons is an important task for Japan in promoting the easing of its strained relations with its neighboring countries. In this regard, the non-strategic weapons possessed by China and the U.S. deserve special attention.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, the GOJ must: 1. voice its objections to research and development on new non-strategic nuclear weapons, such as earth penetrating nuclear weapons, conducted by the U.S. and Russia; and call for the reduction of existing nuclear arsenals; 2. support UNGA resolutions on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons proposed by the NAC; and 3. call on the U.S. to make unilateral cuts in its nuclear cruise missiles, and China to do the same for non-strategic nuclear weapons.
In general, the GOJ has stressed the importance of measures for unilateral reduction and proposed "Path Resolutions" to this effect (the latest resolution was 58/76, on December 3, 2004). If we look at more specific cases, however, the GOJ's failings become apparent. For instance, as already pointed out in Item 5, the GOJ did no more than welcome the Moscow Treaty, saying nothing about its drawbacks. Though this treaty is a setback from the Clinton-Yeltsin agreement in terms of the pace of reduction and the possibility of redeployment of once-removed warheads, the GOJ has failed to mention these defects. Nor did it make any systematic efforts to call for the reduction of nuclear weapons by states other than the U.S. and Russia. As far as China is concerned, it seems clear that the GOJ's effort will not succeed unless it adopts a systematic approach to "common security" in East Asia. Nevertheless, the GOJ showed no sign of taking this approach.

On this item, we give the GOJ a grade of D.

Evaluation

With regard to the issues of the resumption of nuclear testing and new nuclear weapons, increasing the transparency of the U.S. national nuclear weapons research institutes is a matter of concern for the entire world. Nonetheless, the GOJ has hardly demonstrated any interest in this regard. In conversations with us, MOFA officials have frequently noted the necessity for China to increase the transparency of its nuclear arsenals. On this issue, a yearly deliberative forum exists between Japan and China, called the "Japan-China Consultation on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation," whose latest session was held in Tokyo on September 14, 2004. In the session held in Beijing on August 14, 2003, the GOJ reportedly alluded to the transparency issue. However, the GOJ’s appeals to China will remain unpersuasive as long as it does not formulate a full-fledged policy vis-à-vis the U.S. Since then, China has come to strengthen its cooperation with the international non-proliferation regime, as exemplified by the release of a white paper stressing preventive measures against nuclear proliferation (December 3, 2003). This initiative is clearly a response to the strong pressure from the non-proliferation policy of the U.S. From the perspective of regional cooperative security, Japan's attitude toward the U.S. has to be reconsidered, if the GOJ wishes to continue to pursue the transparency issue regarding China. As for the suspicion regarding nuclear weapons loaded aboard US naval vessels in Japanese ports, municipal governments still cannot give a persuasive account to local residents. Though the secrecy brought about by the NCND policy is a primary cause of this problem, the GOJ has never requested the U.S. to change the policy but has merely repeated its usual explanation about the need for advance consultation.

On the whole, the GOJ's effort has been extremely unsatisfactory. We give it a grade of E.

Evaluation

As we already pointed out in Item 5, “the principals of irreversibility,” the GOJ’s response to the development of new nuclear weapons by the U.S. has been quite half-hearted. On the other hand, the "Guideline for the Modernization of Military Forces" issued by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov (October 2, 2003) made it plain that the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons was being considered in Russia. It can be seen from this document that Russia has been influenced by the new strategic thinking of the U.S., as manifested by the NPR or the preemptive strike strategy. The GOJ did nothing special to counter these moves in Russia.

At the UNGA in 2002 and 2003, the NAC submitted a draft resolution on the “Reduction of non-strategic weapons” (57/58, 58/50) in addition to its usual resolution. This resolution, which was adopted, calls for higher priority to be given to the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, for this policy to be made an integral part of the comprehensive disarmament process, and for transparency and irreversibility to be ensured in the process. Added to these are requirements including the conclusion of a treaty to formalize the presidential initiatives taken unilaterally by the U.S. (Bush) and Russia (Gorbachev, Yeltsin) in 1991 and 1992, strengthen the supervision of non-strategic nuclear arsenals and their physical protection, and ensure the commitment to not developing new types of nuclear weapons on the part of the NWSAs. It is a pity, however, that the GOJ joined NATO countries in abstaining on this draft resolution for the two consecutive years. U.S. pressure was reported to be behind these abstentions. In 2004, the NAC did not submit a draft resolution targeted at non-strategic weapons only. The GOJ has provided general support for the “reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,” continuing its appeal in “Path Resolutions” to this effect. Therefore, the abstention on NAC resolution gives us the impression that the GOJ’s words and its deeds are not in agreement. With respect to Task 3, we could not observe any concrete actions on the part of Japan.

The GOJ’s efforts on this objective have been virtually nonexistent. We give it a grade of E.

Evaluation
Japan’s Tasks (important tasks are underlined)

No “Preemptive Strikes” or “Hair-Trigger Alert”

9d. Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

Nuclear disarmament is not just a quantitative problem of warheads and missiles. It has a qualitative aspect as well, involving the operational status of the system as a whole. By operational status, we mean a readiness for striking preemptively or taking immediate retaliatory measures (hair-trigger alert status).

The preemptive strike doctrine that characterizes the Bush Administration’s strategic policy, through its articulation in a series of official documents, has brought tension and instability to international politics. For example, the “National Security Strategy” (September 2002) issued by the White House articulated the preemptive strike strategy in the “War on Terror.” It was stressed repeatedly in the subsequent “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction” (December 2002). It also turned out that both of these two documents are based on the “National Presidential Directives 17” (May 2002). As for operational status, even today, several thousand nuclear weapons can be launched with a little more than ten minutes’ advance notice after a warning (In a speech delivered at Carter Center in Georgia on January 2005, Bruce Blair, the president of the Center for Defense Information, reconfirmed this analysis). If we take into consideration the possibility of the accidental launch of missile, together with the risk of theft or other accidents, it is plain that this hair-trigger alert status should be relaxed.

Therefore, the GOJ should: 1. vigorously criticize the “preemptive strike strategy” of the Bush Administration and call for its withdrawal; and 2. call on the U.S. and Russia to adopt de-alerting measures.

Don’t Allow Any Role for Nuclear Weapons

9e. A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.

The U.S. NPR stressed the importance of new nuclear capabilities for: (1) defeating hard and deeply buried targets (so-called bunker busters); (2) finding and attacking mobile and relocatable targets; (3) defeating chemical and biological agents; and (4) improving accuracy and limiting collateral damage. All of these are characterized as attempts to assign new roles for nuclear weapons that were not available during the Cold War era. The international pressure to bring this movement to a halt must be strengthened.

Relying on the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” means, in effect, assigning certain roles to nuclear weapons. In order to fulfill the commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons, therefore, the GOJ should aim at eliminating the “nuclear umbrella.” The ongoing review of the Defense Program Outline provides a good opportunity for doing this. Moreover, the rationale for relying on the “nuclear umbrella” will become irrelevant if we remove the threat from the region altogether by establishing a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ). Therefore, the GOJ should proclaim a policy toward the establishment of a NWFZ without delay. In so doing, it should call upon the DPRK to not use nuclear weapons either as a “bargaining chip” or as a means of deterrence.

Therefore, the GOJ should: 1. vigorously protest against the U.S.’s moves to assign new roles to nuclear weapons, and object to similar moves by Russia; 2. proclaim a termination of its dependence on nuclear deterrence in the revised “Defense Program Outline” and put this ideal into practice; and 3. make a political proclamation, as soon as possible, for the establishment of a Northeast Asia NWFZ with a verification mechanism and, in such a public statement, call upon the DPRK to halt its nuclear weapon program.

Bring All Nuclear Weapon States to the Negotiating Table

9f. The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

There is a need to broaden the terrain of negotiation on nuclear weapons reduction. At present, the negotiations are limited to the U.S. and Russia; they must be extended to embrace all five NWSs. In this regard, China, the U.K. and France have suggested that they would not participate in such negotiations until the U.S. and Russia cut their arsenals down to levels similar to theirs. The second step would be to reach out to the “de facto nuclear weapon states” outside the NPT regime. From the perspective of the Non-Aligned Movement, India and Pakistan see multilateral talks within the CD framework as a desirable path. Israel’s standing remains ambiguous. There are other options as well, such as holding five party talks with a limited agenda on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, or a preparatory meeting on the technical side of verification systems in advance of entering into arms reduction talks.

In sum, the GOJ should: 1. make efforts to realize a conference on nuclear disarmament engaging all NWSs at the earliest time possible. In making these efforts, the GOJ should examine the possibility of interim measures, such as convening a preparatory meeting on the technical side of verification systems, or limiting the agenda to non-strategic nuclear weapons.
The U.S. preemptive strike strategy should be understood in conjunction with the concept of the “New Triad” of defense capabilities delineated in the NPR. In accordance with this triad, nuclear and non-nuclear weapons were lumped together as “offensive strike capability,” culminating in a lowered threshold between these weapons in terms of operational status. The NPR also stressed the importance of adopting a more flexible and rapid “Adaptive Planning.” This plan was developed by the U.S. military to address small-scale, contingent threats rather than the large-scale, all-out nuclear war envisaged in the Cold War era. We can see here the links between the “preemptive strike strategy” and “lowered threshold between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.” Taking this linkage into consideration, the GOJ should have criticized the “preemptive strike strategy” itself, without making a distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. However, no criticism of this strategy can be found in Japanese high officials’ statements delivered prior to the initiation of the War on Iraq, such as the Foreign Minister’s speech on weapons of mass destruction (delivered at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington on September 16, 2002), and a general speech on diplomacy delivered at the 156th session of the Diet (January 31, 2003). Moreover, Japanese Ambassador to the UN Koichi Haraguchi once made a statement that “we started to have some doubts about the effectiveness of the U.N. inspections in Iraq” (February 18, 2003). We can interpret this kind of statement as a manifestation of the government’s quiet acquiescence with the preemptive strike strategy.

As for the relaxation of the hair-trigger alert status, the MOFA has acknowledged that it has studied possible measures, but this has not led to any actions so far.

The GOJ has taken the wrong course of action on this issue. The grade is an E.

The plan for new nuclear weapons delineated in the NPR has been put into practice step by step through a succession of legislative measures and budget allocations. Starting with the approval for the plan for nuclear bunker busters, under the name of “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” (RNEP), under the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003” (November 13, 2002), the ban on R&D activities on low-yield nuclear weapons was repealed in the following year, opening the way for the development of advanced concept nuclear weapons. Though the budget allocation for these plans was reduced in 2004 (Fiscal Year 2005 Omnibus Appropriations Bill, November 20, 2004), the plan itself is still intact. Though it could be foreseen that these moves in the U.S. government would provoke a countermoves in Russian nuclear policy, the GOJ did almost nothing (c.f. Items 5 and 9c).

A review of the GOJ’s “Defense Program Outline” began in September 2001, with its first round in the Defense Agency. Originally scheduled to be completed in 2003, the draft proposal of the revised Outline had not yet been finalized when Cabinet approval was given on December 10, 2004. During this period, the “Evaluation Committee” made repeated requests to place more stress on nuclear disarmament issues. When the 1976 Defense Program Outline was revised in 1995, the cause of nuclear disarmament advanced slightly. Taking into account the “unequivocal undertaking” by NWSs to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, therefore, the new Defense Program Outline should be revised as follows: to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons, Japan will cease to be dependent on U.S. nuclear deterrence, and will play an active role in the international community at the same time to implement the “unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons” agreed by the NWSs at NPT Review Conference. Nevertheless, the 2004 “Defense Program Outline” did not go beyond repeating the same context of the one in 1995.

With regard to tasks 2 and 3, it should be noted that the GOJ failed to see that “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons” is a task for itself. Nor did it realize that establishing a Northeast Asia NWFZ would be an effective measure for achieving “a diminishing role for nuclear weapons.”

We give it a grade of E.

Except from the new Defense Program Outline applicable to the period beginning from 2005, concerning the “nuclear umbrella.”

“The nuclear umbrella is to be used to protect the United States,” the government continued to rely on the nuclear deterrent provided by the United States, while at the same time playing an active role in taking realistic step-by-step measures for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan would also play an active role in international disarmament and non-proliferation and contribute to international efforts regarding other weapons of mass destruction and delivery means such as missiles” (Cabinet Decision of December 10, 2004).

Anticipating objections from the U.S., the GOJ was reluctant to propose a process involving all NWSs until an agreement was reached in the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Since the agreement recognized this measure as one of its 13 steps, Japan’s “Path Resolution” has explicitly come to embrace it. This is a step forward to a certain degree, but the GOJ has not been active in promoting this measure on other fronts. It is conceivable that a subsidiary body of the CD in charge of nuclear disarmament issues could take up this issue as one of its mandates.

The GOJ does not seem to have done anything on this issue. The grade is a D.

The number of nuclear warheads possessed by the nuclear weapon states and “disarmament nuclear weapon states” (2004)

- Nuclear Weapons States
  - U.S.: 10,640
  - Russia: 6,800
  - UK: 200
  - France: 350
  - China: 990

- De facto Nuclear Weapon States
  - India: 100 (estimate), nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998
  - Pakistan: 20-45 (estimate), nuclear test in 1998
  - Iran: 100-200 (estimate), no nuclear tests
10 Monitor Excess Nuclear Materials Internationally

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon states to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

Under the NPT regime, “the disposition of nuclear fissile materials for peaceful purposes” is seen as a move forward. However, there are strong objections to this idea among NGOs. At a series of presentation sessions held within the NPT PrepComs, NGOs have continued to stress that nations should move away from their dependence on nuclear power and towards other forms of “sustainable energy.”

In Item 8, we already touched upon the Tripartite Initiative among the U.S., Russia, and IAEA. Technical and financial assistance from Japan and other states are required to prevent reduced nuclear weapons and excess fissile materials from being reused as weapons or illicitly transferred to other states. The most critical problem is how to dispose of excess plutonium produced in Russia since the dismantling of nuclear weapons. On this issue, we have seen some progress in international cooperation. In particular, bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Russia has been carried out on a wide scale. However, in consideration of the fact that people both in Japan and abroad have strong anxieties over Japan’s plutonium policy, the GOJ should be cautious when choosing a technical method for cooperation, distinguishing clearly the issue of providing international cooperation from domestic issues related to its plutonium policy. Therefore, the GOJ should: 1. cooperate actively for the development of a verifiable system which places weapon-useable fissile materials outside military programmes, and, simultaneously, examine its own method of cooperation through a series of international and domestic public discussions.

11 Make Disarmament Efforts on Every Front

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of states in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Some states, particularly France, interpret the commitment to nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT as subsumed under the treaty for “general and complete disarmament.” This interpretation often plays the role of keeping the issue of the abolition of nuclear weapons as one for the distant future. In setting the thirteen steps to implement Article VI, the NAC countries made it plain that nuclear disarmament and “general and complete disarmament” were related but separate obligations. In the background for this was the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which ruled clearly that there is an obligation to accomplish the negotiations for nuclear disarmament under Article VI.

This 11th item reconfirms that nuclear disarmament should be given priority, but that it is also one component of international security. In this regard, it indicates that strengthening the existing treaty frameworks on other WMDs, i.e., the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC), and making progress in the control and elimination of delivery systems will make a substantial contribution to nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the role of Japan should be to build on its Peace Constitution and make an international contribution to comprehensive disarmament, especially in Asia.

As the government of a country founded on a Constitution, the GOJ should: 1. strive for disarmament in Northeast Asia, seeking cooperative regional security frameworks on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles, and others; and 2. promote “general and complete disarmament” by coping with such international issues as the prevention of war, chemical and biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines, small arms and light weapons, and certain conventional weapons.

12 Issue Reports on Efforts

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all state parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,” and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

This is an obligation for all member states of the NPT, and is especially imperative for NWSs and nuclear-dependent states like Japan. At the 2002 NPT PrepCom, the issue of a desirable standardized format for reports attracted wide attention among many states and NGOs. With regard to this obligation, it is needless to say that the GOJ should submit its own regular report. On top of this, the GOJ should propose a concise standard format for regular reporting with a minimum set of requirements designed mainly for the implementation of the thirteen steps. This is to make sure that member states will not prepare biased reports for propaganda purposes. Reporting requirements may well vary between NWSs, nuclear-dependent states and others.

The GOJ should: 1. submit its own regular report and also propose a standard format for regular reporting on the implementation of thirteen steps so that the member states will not prepare arbitrary reports on their own; and 2. hold an expert meeting, including NGOs, to design an original reporting format for Japan and to arrange report-making procedures, and then submit these two reports to the Diet (one based on Japan’s original format, and the other according to the international standardized format).
Upon request from Russia and the U.S., the GOJ has actively promoted bilateral Japan-Russia cooperation on the disposal of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons in Russia. Since Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura’s visit to Russia in May 1999, Japan and Russia have been implementing the “Japan-Russian Federation Joint Efforts for Disarmament and Environmental Protection.” Following this, the “Japan-Russia Memorandum of Understanding on the Promotion of Cooperation for Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and the Disposal of Nuclear Weapons” was agreed by the two governments in Tokyo on September 4, 2000. Through this arrangement, the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JNC) and Research Institute for Atomic Reactors of Russia initiated a joint research program with the aim to promote the disposal of surplus weapon-grade plutonium in Russia by burning it as Mixed-Oxide (MOX) fuel in the Russian BN 600 Fast Breeder Reactor. JNC plans to provide technical cooperation for burning between 15 and 20 tons of surplus plutonium out of 34 tons presumed to exist in Russia. The program reportedly succeeded in burning 20 kilograms of surplus plutonium (Asahi Shim bun, April 14, 2002).

The Kanazaki G8 Summit adopted the “G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials for Mass Destruction” (June 27, 2002), giving priority to the disposal of surplus plutonium in Russia. Since then, bilateral cooperation between Japan and Russia has been placed within the multilateral cooperation framework of the G8. Japan made a financial contribution to this arrangement, and in general, Japan’s active role in the disposal of Russian surplus plutonium has been highly valued by the international community. However, we conjecture that the GOJ initiated this program because of its utility to the nuclear fuel cycle in Japan. JNC demonstrated this point itself, depicting its objective as follows: “Through the joint research program and from the experiences to be gained through the process...JNC will make the best use of this experience for our R&D activities” (JNC Website). In other words, Japan hopes to take advantage of Russia’s technology and know-how, acquired by Japan through this joint research project, for the use of plutonium in its nuclear fuel cycle. This attitude is problematic. This program was originally designed to promote non-proliferation and the reduction of nuclear weapons; thus, it should be uncoupled from the issue of Japan’s own nuclear fuel cycle, including the MOX plan. Unfortunately, there has been no transparent and balanced discussion on this matter.

We have seen some willingness on the part of the GOJ to cope with the problem of excess plutonium in Russia. However, its method and underlying motives are problematic. We give it a grade of C.

When looking at the role of Japan in light of “general and complete disarmament,” which is a chief objective of the UN, it is important to consider how we can preserve our political heritage built on Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, namely its “exclusively defensive defense policy” and the “Three Principles on Arms Exports,” and put these into practice in the international arena. One of the effective ways to achieve this objective is to establish a cooperative regional security framework in Northeast Asia. In this sense, the Pyongyang Declaration (September 17, 2002) marked laudable progress. This achievement, however, has not been followed in subsequent events. For instance, the GOJ’s active support for the war on Iraq, in defiance of the UN system, has had a clearly negative influence on the Northeast Asia region. When the GOJ made the decision to dispatch the Self Defense Forces to Iraq, based on the Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support Special Measures Law, China expressed concerns about a possible change in Japan’s exclusively defensive defense policy (December 9, 2003). The new “Defense Program Outline” publicly announced both at home and abroad that the GOJ would strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance through the deployment of the MD System (December 10, 2004). With this system, the “Three Principles on Arms Exports” have also been progressively eroded. These movements will inevitably raise military tension in the region. We cannot overlook the fact that the GOJ’s political decision to give prompt support for the attack against Iraq by the U.S. and U.K. has left an indelible stain on the efforts in preventing war not only in Northeast Asia, but also throughout the world. The preemptive strike took place at a time when the UN Security Council had not yet endorsed the draft resolution submitted by the U.S., U.K. and Spain to issue an ultimatum to Iraq. Instead, the UN Security Council had insisted on continuing UN inspections. When the GOJ supported this resolution, therefore, it was clearly working against the objective of “general and complete disarmament.”

Looking at individual disarmament and arms control objectives, however, the GOJ has been rather active at various inter-governmental conferences. In particular, it achieved high praise for its active engagement in the formal meeting on small arms and light weapons (New York, July 7-11, 2003), previously planned under the UN programme of action for 2001 (July 2001). The GOJ has nullified these achievements, nonetheless, by attaching primary importance to the security alliance with the U.S. This kind of policy should be characterized as a negative contribution to peace at the more fundamental level of international politics.

On the whole, it receives a grade of E.

At the 3rd PrepCom leading up to the NPT Review Conference in 2005, some thirty states submitted regular reports. At the same time, however, many states revealed a tendency to provide arbitrary information only in the particular areas that they wanted to emphasize. Although there is value even in reports that focus on some particular areas of concern, standardized information is essential for making a chronological record of each state’s performance. However, this requirement has not yet been met.

The GOJ has submitted regular reports since the 2002 PrepCom. If it had reported on each of the 13 steps elaborated in this Report Card, its reports could have had a significant effect on other states. It is a pity, therefore, that the GOJ’s report was not of such a nature, stressing only the favorable aspects. For instance, dependence on U.S. nuclear deterrence is not reflected in the report.

No efforts have been made to institutionalize the domestic reporting mechanism or to submit reports to the Diet for further discussion.

The overall grade is D.
13 Develop Verification Capabilities for a “Nuclear Weapon-Free World”

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapon-free world.

11 Make Nuclear Attacks against Non-Nuclear Weapon States Illegal

2. The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.

+2 Enlarge Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

6. The Conference welcomes and supports the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

Three new Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) are currently under discussion at the UN: the Central Asia NWFZ, Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in Middle East, and Nuclear-Free Southern Hemisphere. The last is an idea to combine four existing NWFZs in some constellation and accord the status of NWFZ to the entire Southern Hemisphere.

In the proximity of Japan, on the other hand, the significance and necessity of a Northeast Asia NWFZ have become more and more apparent, due to the issue of nuclear weapons development by the DPRK. The cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have frequently made appeals to this effect. NGOs have also actively presented concrete proposals. If the GOJ proposes the establishment of a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, it will be a sizable contribution not only to settling the issue of nuclear weapons in the DPRK, but also to relaxing military tensions and enhancing confidence building in the region. We have already explained this causality in Item 6e and 11. This idea will also be a remedy for correcting Japan’s biased position on NSA.

Therefore, the GOJ should: 1. extend its activities as far as possible to establish NWFZ, continuing its assistance to the Central Asia NWFZ and promoting the de-nuclearization of the Southern Hemisphere; and 2. adopt a policy to establish a Northeast Asia NWFZ with a verification system and take concrete actions to achieve this goal in practice.
The GOJ has generally recognized the importance of verification and expressed its willingness to extend maximum cooperation in this area. Certain achievements have been made as well, with regard to the verification systems of the FMCT and CTBT (International Monitoring System). The GOJ has been especially emphatic about strengthening the verification system through the Additional Protocol of the IAEA. Among states generating electricity by nuclear energy, Japan was the first to ratify this protocol, doing so in 1999. Since then, it has consistently devoted efforts to the universalization of the protocol. In June 2001, for instance, it hosted a symposium in Tokyo on the promotion and facilitation of the Additional Protocol, addressed to states in the Asia-Pacific region. Then, on December 9, 2002, it hosted the "International Conference on Wider Adherence to Strengthened IAEA Safeguards" in cooperation with the IAEA. At this symposium, a group called "Friends of the Additional Protocol Meeting" was established to promote the ratification of the protocol. The GOJ has also been active in Asia as well, through seminars and bilateral consultations. Recently, it has succeeded in making the Additional Protocol a standard requirement of the IAEA safeguard measures. In contrast to these contributions, however, top-level diplomats took political actions denying the importance of international verification. They expressed distrust in the international verification system and gave support to the use of force by the U.S. and the U.K. against Iraq (February 18, 2003). In doing so, they ignored the majority opinion in the UN Security Council in favor of resolving the issue of WMDs in Iraq by continuing UN inspections without resorting to military means. By adopting this line of policy, the GOJ, in effect, derided the international verification system. As IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei made plain in his statement of November 4, 2004, a U.S. inspection mission to occupied Iraq could add nothing new to the findings already made by the international organization. The inspection capability of the international organization was proved by history.

As for the idea of diverting resources wasted on nuclear weapons to the building of verification systems, this line of thinking does not seem apparent within the GOJ.

We think highly of the GOJ’s recent efforts made to universalize the "Additional Protocol." The grade is a C.

Three PrepComs leading to 2005 NPT Review Conference came to an end without reaching an agreement on a recommendation. Though the issue of legally binding NSA was not the only reason for the poor performance of the PrepCom, it certainly was one of the most difficult issues besetting its proceedings. Despite its publicly acknowledged theoretical support for NSA, the GOJ has been reluctant to make it legally binding in practice. This has been evidenced by its submission of "Path Resolutions" to the UNGA every year without making any specific remarks on this issue. It has also avoided the wording of "legally binding" in its working paper prepared for the NPT Review Conference. It has, in effect, turned its back on this objective. This passive posture stands in stark contrast, however, with the proactive posture of the NAC. Recalling the obligation to make a recommendation and appealing for the importance of legally binding NSA, the NAC submitted a working paper titled "Security Assurance" at the 2003 PrepCom (May 1, 2003). The idea of the NAC is to codify NSA into the form of a new treaty or a protocol to the NPT. The paper was intended as a draft proposal for such legislative measures.

We conjecture that the GOJ plans to rely on U.S. nuclear deterrence against biological and chemical weapons (BCW) of the DPRK. Though there do not seem to be any public statements to this effect, the GOJ reportedly asked the U.S., with regard to the six-party talks, to retain its nuclear deterrence policy in the region, even after providing "security assurance" to the DPRK (October 30, 2003, Kyodo News). We should not accept such a request, however, because it overrides the provision in the Defence Program Outline, which places the U.S. nuclear deterrence as a counter-measure only against the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Even if the presumed scenario of a North Korean attack using BCW is plausible, these threats should be removed through the universalization of treaties on the banning of BCW or by negotiating a regional security framework, such as the Northeast Asia NWFZ.

The GOJ adopted an erroneous policy on this objective. We give it a grade of E.

As demonstrated by its offer to convene a treaty drafting meeting in Hokkaido (October 5–8, 1999, April 3-4, 2000), the GOJ has actively extended its support to the establishment of the Central Asia NWFZ. These efforts came to fruition when five nations agreed to the text of the treaty at the expert meeting held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on September 27, 2002. Despite our high expectations, however, no further developments have been reported since then. Though coordination with Russia is reportedly complex, the political determination of the five nations to pursue the establishment of the treaty remains intact. The idea to de-nuclearize the Southern Hemisphere has been proposed as UNGA resolutions since its first appearance in 1996. Though the GOJ has continued to vote for these resolutions since 1998, we have seen no other efforts in this regard.

The GOJ took the lead in the Pyongyang Declaration, which laid the foundation for a Northeast Asia NWFZ (September 17, 2002). However, the plan was dealt a severe setback when the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT (January 10, 2003). Since then, continuous attempts have been made to resolve the problems involving the DPRK by peaceful means. In this regard, the three-party talks (April 21-25, 2004) and six-party talks (August 27-29, 2003; February 25-28, 2004; June 23-25, 2004) were notable achievements realized by arbitration efforts by China. Under these circumstances, NGO activities to establish a Northeast Asia NWFZ have persisted as well. Japanese and Korean citizen groups, for instance, proposed a model treaty in April 2004, and the idea has been acknowledged by experts of various nations. Unfortunately, however, the GOJ’s passive attitude toward the Northeast Asia NWFZ remains unaltered. Behind this lies Japan’s fundamental security policy, which accords the highest priority to U.S. nuclear deterrence at the expense of all other policy alternatives. We are at a critical juncture of history. To avoid a crisis, it is necessary to pursue a solution in line with the Pyongyang Declaration, and enhance confidence building in the region before resorting to military threats or economic sanctions. From this perspective, the GOJ should put forward the best option, namely to establish a Northeast Asia NWFZ.

The GOJ has continued to take a negative stance toward the establishment of a Northeast Asia NWFZ, which is a great necessity. We give it a grade of D.
Annex: The (13+2) Steps

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document
May 19, 2000
NPT/CONF.2000/28

Volume I:
Part I: Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference/Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty

Part II: Organization and work of the Conference

Part III: Documents issued at the Conference

Part IV: Summary records

Part I:

- Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference
- Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs
- Article III and fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs, especially in their relationship to article IV and the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs
- Article IV and sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
- Nuclear and radiation safety, safe transport of radioactive materials, radioactive waste and liability
- Technical cooperation
- Conversion of nuclear materials to peaceful uses

Part II:

- Article V
- Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs
- Article VII and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States

Part III:

- Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty

Article VI
Paragraph 15.

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
   - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
   - Increased transparency by the nuclear weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;
   - The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
   - Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
   - A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that those weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
   - The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Article VII
Paragraph 2.

The Conference reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.

Paragraph 6.

The Conference welcomes and supports the steps taken to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties since 1995, and reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.
