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Japan: 1965 H Bomb Incident () G, OADR

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A *Newsweek* article last week, which previewed a Greenpeace report on worldwide nuclear accidents, said a US Navy carrier in 1965 lost a hydrogen bomb in international waters near Japan. Subsequent articles in *Stars and Stripes* and other papers reported former members of the carrier's crew as saying the ship carried nuclear weapons into a Japanese port after the incident. Despite the time that has passed, these accounts strike sensitive Japanese political nerves.

Bomb overboard! In an unclassified 1981 study of nuclear accidents, the Defense Department disclosed that in 1965 the carrier *Ticonderoga* lost an A-4 bomber carrying a B-43 hydrogen bomb during training in the northern Pacific "about 500 miles from land." The study caused little stir at the time, but from *Ticonderoga's* deck log—which Greenpeace recently obtained through an FOIA request—Greenpeace determined that the loss took place about 80 miles from an island of the Okinawa chain (and about 500 miles from the Asian continental mainland). Greenpeace passed this information to *Newsweek* and claimed that, after the incident, *Ticonderoga* paid a scheduled port call at Yokosuka. The story has received wide attention in Japan, raising questions about US adherence to that country's nuclear transit policy.

Public opinion. Japanese opinion polls show that most respondents think US forces sometimes bend the nonintroduction rule—but the Japanese public has generally been willing to go along without pressing for verification.

Concerns. The US Navy never recovered the bomb, which still lies on the bottom in about 16,000 feet of water. The Japanese Government and (except in Okinawa, where cynicism about anything the US military says is chronic) the press seem to be accepting our assurances that the bomb cannot go off. But despite assurances that the bomb's nuclear matter is so dense it would just sink to the bottom and not disperse, there is a good deal of concern, especially in Okinawa, about radiation leakage.

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The Foreign Minister has told parliamentary questioners simply that he will press us for clarifications as needed.

suggest that an accommodation along lines largely defined by Hanoi and Phnom Penh is likely. Meetings among Khmer factions, Soviets, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Thai may help clarify the areas of agreement and the continuing obstacles.

Vietnam leaves center stage... Hanoi's policy on Cambodia is designed to reduce the burden and political consequences of direct domination in the hope of reversing Vietnam's economic decline. The policy also reflects a new willingness to accept greater autonomy in Phnom Penh. Moreover, Hanoi appears more confident than before in the PRK's ability to stand alone—as evidenced by its decision to advance its troop withdrawal to the end of September.

Hanoi's multifaceted diplomatic strategy has focused on wooing Bangkok, promoting the PRK, seeking accommodation with Beijing, and maintaining solidarity with the USSR. Hanoi seeks to isolate and defang the Khmer Rouge by securing an ending of Thai-Chinese aid and sanctuary, to maintain the PRK even if modified under "national reconciliation," and to minimize international control of the process.

...and "Cambodia" enters. Although still weak by some standards, the Phnom Penh regime has an administrative network that provides Cambodians with greater security and prosperity than they have known for years. Its leadership appears to have gained confidence over the past year as the Vietnamese presence has been drawn down and the security situation improved. Visitors and non-governmental organization representatives report fewer travel restrictions. The 10-year-old curfew was lifted in Phnom Penh on May 5.

((S/EXDIS/NF) (FDavenport)

Cambodia: A Snapshot of Players and Issues

Changes in the international environment and priorities of key players are moving the Cambodian problem closer to resolution. Recent developments have promoted the status of the Phnom Penh regime (PRK)—now called the "State of Cambodia"—and

The populace reportedly has responded positively to the lifting of restrictions on private ownership and enterprise as well as to the new promotion of Buddhism. These and other "non-socialist" measures have been codified, along with a number of human rights guarantees, in the recently amended Constitution, which differs markedly from the 1981 original modeled after Vietnam's. At the same time, however, the preeminent role of the com-



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